Toward the end of the Cold War several NATO nations set up the Tactical Leadership Program (TLP) to train their military pilots to work cooperatively towards common goals. The school was set up to meet ‘the need to generate leaders for challenging multinational air defense and air strike missions’.  Those leaders were trained to be rapidly deployed by NATO joint command, should the need arise to defend themselves against a possible attack from the USSR. The TLP’s mission is to train officers from different nations to step in and perform a leadership role for a short, well-defined, multi-national operation. While Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri may not have had military stratagems in mind while writing their manifesto Assembly, they did very similarly and succinctly describe that same specific motivation, calling for leaders who could be used as ‘a weapon to wield and dispose of as the situation dictates'.  This creates a colorful allusion: only under the most dire circumstances and should the need arise, the pilots would be brought forth from their host nations to create a kind of multi-faceted shield protecting the allied nations from the red violence. Those leaders would be tactically deployed to operate according to the strategy of the moment and then, having subdued the beast and fulfilled their mission, ‘discarded’ and sent back to their normal duties.
According to the website dummies.com, strategy is the ‘what’ and tactics is the ‘who and how’.  In the context of business models, Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Joan Enric Ricart define tactics as the ‘residual choices open to a firm by virtue’ of its strategic choices.  If we apply this to our pilots above, those leaders would then represent the ‘residual’ tools left to NATO after having chosen to employ a particular model, a joint allied defense program.
Though not necessarily a weapon ‘to wield and discard’, conductors are also employed as tactical leaders, being deployed ‘à la carte’ for specific pieces and programs based on strategic and (sometimes) specified motivations of the utilizing actor, be that as artistic director and/or composer.  For example, Alexander Khubeev, to tell the story of the rise and fall of a dictator in Ghost of Dystopia, required a bound conductor; his strategy was the story, and his residual weapon of choice, an instrumentalized conductor. 
In the early fall of 2019, I commissioned Jessie Marino to compose a piece for an (as yet) unspecified ensemble and with a special role for the conductor. Based on the definitions above, the details of the commission represent our strategy. So what are the ‘residual choices’ for the special conductor’s role I, as the author of the strategy, left to Marino? These I did my utmost to leave as open as possible, meaning that I did not overtly define any specific role I wanted the conductor to play. I did, however, share my research (both reading material and my published articles) in a hope to nudge her to explore the subject somewhat further and continue to develop the instrumentalization of the conductor. Throughout this paper I will chronologically describe the creation process of what would become the composition six to five. I will attempt to ascertain the manner in which, if at all, Marino deployed me, the conductor to meet her artistic goals in each step, testing if they rise to the level of instrumentalization. And finally, I will determine whether the conductor (my role) in each phase represents a tactical leader.
 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, ASSEMBLY (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 22.
 Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Joan Enric Ricart, “From Strategy to Business Models and onto Tactics,” Long Range Planning 43, no. 2–3 (April 2010): 195–215, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2010.01.004.
 Thomas R. Moore, “Conductor à La Carte: Artistic and Practical Motivations for Utilizing a Conductor in New Music Ensembles Performing Integrated Concerts,” Accepted for Publication in Perspectives of New Music, n.d.
 Moore, Thomas R., “THE INSTRUMENTALISED CONDUCTOR,” Tempo 75, no. 297 (June 2021).