Using the diagram that Deleuze made about Foucault himself in order to draw a path through his work, the lines are traced that bring it into contact with the cinematic thinking from Deleuze's time-image and movement-image and which junctions can be found. The world is divided into layers (see Fig. 1,3), which are criss-crossed by a gap that separates the visible and the sayable (see Fig. 1,4) and in which the subjectification takes place, the ship as the interior of the exterior. (See Fou, 169f.).

The desire is to get to the outside (see Fig.1,1) in order to find out where the connection comes from, which prevails in the layered formations, between the visible and the sayable in the strategic zone (see Fig.1,2). From the Foucaultian perspective, there are discontinuities in the history of knowledge that indicate that the balance of power is changing and not starting from a center of power, but expressing differential relationships within knowledge. It is a zone, as in Stalker from Tarkovskij, which has set itself in relation to its outside: the room in the zone fulfills the desires and on the way there is a movement that seems intense, it runs over intense thresholds, that do not orientate themselves inside of spatial logics. (See Tarkovskij 1979). It passes the same place as in the zone, but you cannot recognize it as something you have already seen. There is no given structure of how to cope with the impassable, one rather participates in the act of thinking in which the path changes constantly. The zone has an opening to the outside (see Fig 1,1), the non-stratified. There is no route through the zone that is the same, and the navigation is thus diagrammatic - a constant exchange between the outside and the stratifications that one makes through one's own mapping. Each cut establishes a stratification and changes the coordinates of the entire zone. The cut is the connecting construction, here it is not simply a juxtaposition or just a gap, rather it has a constitutive character.

What can be seen and what can be said do not fit together and can only be applied to the genesis of cuts in history. In the ZB (time-image) you are in a thinking mode that can analyse layers, when the visible and the sayable do not go together. Deleuze's argument with Foucault is rooted here in a reflection on the cinematographic reading method. Its components are dealt with in the first part (Chapter 1). This is followed by a synthesis of Foucault with the ZB and a consideration of how the cutting technique happens when the two works are assembled together (Chapter 2). The last section discusses the method search as a consideration of other works by seeing diagrams in them as connections to the outside.

The cuts then provide information that the thinking, as initiated, prepares the transition from the non-layered (power) to the layered (knowledge). (Chapter 3).


If Foucault makes diagrams about other discursive topics or about certain historical formations, a diagram about Foucault should also be possible to create. The overall picture is considered (Fig. 1, 1-4) with reference to other images that represent diagrams in terms of power relations, what is visible and can be said at a certain time. Foucault himself sees a cut in the history of knowledge related to a certain discourse of the sayable and visible, in order to zoom in on this cut and analyze its production.

The order of things stands in relation to difference and repetition, the method books to difference, as an emerging difference or interval with effects. (See DW, 49ff.). To think the impossible is not the monstrosity, but its combination, its synthesis. The space in between is impossible, the place where they come together, the intersection comes out, how they stand next to each other and the table at which they all spend and the image of the arrangement, i.e. the sectional diagram. (See Foucault 1974, 14ff.). The plane is precisely the arrangement of the terms and gives them an image of thought, which is opened to a cinematic view in order to bring out the diversity of the images when their sections are viewed. Foucault also questions the table, the surface on which something can have space. Just as Deleuze looks at the level of immanence that allows the terms to be arranged. (See WiPh, 10ff.). The film in the mode of the time-image (ZB) provides the model for this, as it focuses on how synthesis in the sense of non-logical conclusions or cuts find their way and the adventure of discontinuity is referred to by films in which the time is running out and its differential power becomes visible through its hacking out. Foucault and his editing technique are to be questioned on a background that turns the connection of images as montage into a paradigm that reports on thinking and its limits.

The outside, the drive of Foucault's machine, is expressed in a literary text by Borges: one is shaken by its succession, by its sequence. Here you can zoom in on the meaning of a shock in thinking that drives you and disregards the order, lets you look into the virtual and lets you take on the level of the schizophrenic. The familiarity of thinking is shaken up: they are created tableaus that change depending on what is sayable, conceivable, feasible, and portrayed in a discourse. (See Foucault 1974, 17ff.). Animals are categorized like this:

“a) animals belonging to the emperor, b) embalmed animals, c) tamed, d) milk pigs, e) sirens, f) mythical animals, g) abandoned dogs, h) belonging to this group, i) who act like mad, k) which are drawn with a very fine brush made of camel hair, l) and so on, m) who have broken the water jug, n) which look like flies from a distance.” ( Foucault 1974, 17. translated by the author).

This taxonomic order gives an indication of the difference as an emergent, as one that is not concealed and indicates the impossibility of classifying this order. The classic image of thinking, in which thinking is inference, as reason, which very Kantian combines concepts with sensuality, is subverted.

The impossibility of classification results from the whiteness that prevails between the animals, which one cannot imagine without the space that separates them and relates them to one another without any reference being possible. (See Foucault 1974, 18). The imagination is exceeded insofar as it cannot make out the distance at which the stray dogs stand next to the mythical creatures and which should make up the classification of the animals. In this context one becomes aware of the order as one which arranges things next to one another in the language, but which could also be completely different. When one attitude leads to another, with which it is questioned, one is thrown into the conglomeration itself, into the synthetic thinking, which experiences a shock. Only through the distance that emerges does it become apparent that the order of what was previously so firmly conceived is built up on a moving ground. This is the setting that shows the time-image, that releases time and lets it run down in the picture. (See ZB, 34ff.). In DW (difference and repetition), the cut is the difference that makes a difference, that changes and colors the background. (See DW, 49). Deleuze's work is characterized by this sharpness, which makes the condition more complex than its conditioned or does not make it dependent on that, but instead incorporates a genuine shift as an instance that includes a difference that ensures that the serial links with one another to communicate. If you could join in or understand the change, it would no longer be a change. With each new enumeration the place of meeting is destroyed, there is no image of thought that could summarize them. (See Foucault 1974, 18f.).

Deleuze's project, in which the difference is not un-demonized, is to withdraw this meeting place. Better to use in a film in which there is no whole that holds the images together, which in their temporality, in their difference, fit into a series and become indistinguishable, i.e. unclassifiable, so that no meta-narrative can be given.

"What is impossible is not the neighborhood of things, but the place itself in which they can come together." (Foucault 1974, 19. (tba)). The special thing is the series that promises meaningful classification and is nullified, it thus indicates the presence of the level of immanence, the table as a tableau on which things can be classified. (See Foucault 1974, 18ff.).

It's about the cut, which can appear itself and how it looks and what effects it has and how a difference is staggered that cannot be continued without changing. The transition to Foucault is intended to show how this cutting technique can be systematized. When this monstrosity breaks into thinking, it shows us exactly that we are not thinking. To separate from one another means that they are not in the same relationship, what separates is not different from the other in the same way. A diagram corresponds to each balance of power: “The layers do nothing other than collect and condense the visible dust and the audible echo of a battle that was raging overhead.” (Fou, 170. (tba)). It's then about immersing yourself in that strategy.


All knowledge unfolds in a space, in an image with certain possible transitions. Deleuze says about Foucault's order of things:

“In fact, the analytics of finitude does not ask us to pursue the science of man, but rather to design a new image of thinking: a thinking that no longer opposes the unthinkable or the unthinkable from the outside, but rather within itself settles in an essential relationship with it.” (Deleuze 1977, 17. (tba)).

Archeology can be understood as digging up the ground on which thought unfolds and in which it sinks in order to form its concepts. Foucault shows that there are different layers in this soil, topographical upheavals.

The quality of a new term depends on which perspectives it creates, with which fields of thought it connects and how the history of philosophy is staged in the Foucaultian sense as theatrum philosophicum. (See Schaub 2003, 21).

Foucault indicates that DW is a dramaturgical text with stage directions: it is not a new narrative about the end of metaphysics, but a theater: “The book of Deleuze should be opened like the doors of a theater when the lights go on and the curtain rises. ”( Foucault 1977, 8. (tba)). The Ariadne thread is the coherent plot, the reacting characters who follow a principle of common sense and drive the course of the plot forward. This thread of identity and negation leads through the labyrinth, where at the end, when the labyrinth has been run through, rescue follows, resulting from a sensomotric situation. The Ariadne thread is the order of representation and the classic image of thinking that guides the way through chaos. In Deleuze's world Ariadne hanged herself by the thread. (See Foucault 1977, 7f.). But Ariadne's distorted fable does not do justice to the theatrical quality of philosophy. It is not a book about theater, but rather a philosophy “that has become a stage with characters: a performance of a single unrepeatable event.” (Foucault 1977, 8. (tba)). And on the other hand, Foucault can be read as a commentary on the history of philosophy with a theatrical place of superimposition. (See Schneider 1996, 106). The event of the transition into another episteme must be listed. Deleuze and Foucault enter the ground of knowledge with the same requirements; they see it as a montage of images that have to be focused on their transitions.


Deleuze is not reading around Foucault, i.e. being able to read your own theory purely at individual points, due to the topological structure of the theory or its imagery. It is about the topic of re-reading itself, of finding breaks: reprogramming, cinematography as theatrum philosophicum, as Foucault describes it and how the discussion with Foucault systematizes it. “Let's listen to the drops of water trickling through Leibniz's marble. Let us see how the crack of time breaks the Kantian subject down into zebra stripes.”(Foucault 1977, 9. (tba)). The characters recite their text, which they said differently in another scene, as they are performing an unrepeatable event.

What is added to archeology so that it continues in the direction of Deleuze?

Foucault tries to identify cuts in the history of thought by sticking to statements, he wonders how a cut could occur - quite parallel to the cut in the cinema in the 60s, so a mutual inspiration is seen here when it comes to methodological considerations. With Foucault it is tested what the cinematographic reading of Deleuze can do and what components it has.

Under the direction of Deleuze, the images are first created or constructed in order to then destroy them and they are already invented in such a way that they then have interfaces to blockade, to break apart.

“Here Plato is the inflated wise man who chases away common illusions, scares away bad images and obliterates the appearance that reflects and invokes the one archetype: that idea of the good that is itself good. But there the other Plato is almost in a panic, because in the shadow he does not know how to distinguish Socrates from the sneering sophist.” (Foucault 1977, 9. (tba)).

Plato is read against himself: the reversal of Platonism as a stage direction. The ZB provides the optical situation for this, each term has its radius of action or the milieu it has formed - with the film as ZB one can move on its level without there having to be a reference, as this one with its moving ones images indicates that each image is singular. This is what the film sets as the task for philosophy to be able to invent singular terms with a milieu. The optical situation is its own subject and constantly replaces it. Deleuze sees the terms that philosophers invent on such a level that works like a film and can thus examine their difference in relationships and their cuts.

“Where under the mask of Socrates the Sophist suddenly bursts out laughing; where Spinoza's modes dance an unbridled hoop while substance races around them like a mad planet; [...] where Leibniz reaches the top of the pyramid in the dark and realizes that the heavenly music is the 'Pierrot lunaire'. In the sentry house of the Palais Luxembourg, Duns Scotus sticks his head out the peep window; he wears Nietzsche's huge mustache, masked as Klossowski.” (Foucault 1977, 57f. (tba)).


Here, “cinematography” is understood as observing the change in the image, the cartography or the program, with Foucault, of the diagram itself. What Deleuze says about Foucault is decidedly cinematic: every film surrounds itself with a world and searches for ever larger circles that determine its current image until one finds the smallest cycle. (See ZB, 95). Foucault's method consists precisely in looking only at the statements: "Everything is real here and every reality is manifest: only what counts is what has been said, here, at this moment, with these gaps and omissions." (Fou, 11. (tba)). With this assumption one can see sections, they are projected onto an immanence plane or placed in a diagram. The archivist who only looks at statements is not far from the director who does not stage the history of philosophy, but lets it fall apart and reassemble it. (See Schneider 1996, 108f.).

Using the example of the history of a term, Foucault makes it clear that it has no identity with its designated object, but occupies different constitutional fields, depending on the historical setting. Depending on the discourse in which a term is included, it changes its components. From this insight grows a new kind of questioning, no longer about continuity and systemic capacity, about a constant horizon that constantly grows through the logic of identity and can thus go back in history to a starting point. Rather, attention is directed to sections that are marked by breaks and are not bridged by a logos and a synthesizing subject. So the discontinuity emerges as a kind of method. (See Foucault 1981, 15).

It is only through the creation of a discourse that the documents are given expression, they become monuments and have no other hidden discourse to reveal. (See Foucault, 16). The project of archeology does not consist in following a law, its method is the discontinuity, which is at the same time its object, so its conditions go no further than the conditioned. The object and the method are formed, so to speak, reciprocally and simultaneously. Hence the term “archeology” as the paradoxical method that stands for the discontinuity, the disconnection from an all-encompassing history. The description of the documents constitutes the discourse; there are sequences and series without a law.


With regard to the basic idea of not considering Foucault as a method application for Deleuze, his occupation will be in the direction of an expansion of cinematography. It is modulated directly to the ZB, a ZB is made out of it, which in turn has repercussions on the connection between the use of film as a thinking medium and the methodical approach of cinematography.

The aim is to work out the points that bring Foucault close to a description of the film and place the visual processes in a time-visual context. Then to see what changes the illustration of Foucault indicates in a cinematographic way.

1. The statement becomes the virtual side of the image that requires the update, ie. the statements and propositions can form through the statement, just as the current images are constituted through the past itself in Bergson and in the cinema books. Deleuze makes the connection between the statement and Bergson's memory, which are preserved and fill their space. (See Fou, 14).

2. The statement is always located in a milieu, it has an appearance or is audio-visual because it is shaped by what can be transformed.

2. The means of the film to express the disjunction between seeing and saying fertilize Foucault's view of discontinuities.

3. As a result, his knowledge analyzes can be understood as layers of what is visible and what can be said, as images and sounds that do not go together but give each other impetus.

4. The concatenation of images and sounds refer to diagrams. The question is how Foucault can be understood differently when he is recording an audio-visual archive and why he can focus on the cuts.

5. Reading the picture requires a new combination of the pictures, since one becomes aware of the cut.

6. The capabilities of the visible and the sayable are pushed to their limits in order to function in their element.


In a discursive formation one has to deal with a series of statements in which one can describe the same system of dispersion. (See Foucault 1981, 58). This analysis can also be read as a cutting log, a function of the sequencing. It is not about regularities, statements are placed side by side and their differences are analyzed. The point is to describe the distribution itself, not its coherence. The formation rules determine the conditions for the appearance of the objects of the discursive formations, they regulate the appearance, modification or disappearance of the objects that circulate in the discursive field. (See Foucault 1981, 60ff.). The correlation of the statement, what it says, is more of a topic, an area that relates to something specific. The statement does not have a correlation like the sentence or the proposition, which has an identity, but rather an area which properties indicate what can appear there. The statement “I went to bed early for a long time” is not the same when assigned to Proust or someone else. (See Fou, 17). It changes according to its field of appearance, according to the images that are arranged around it, it is a description, a film description.

"Foucault's statements are like dreams: each one has its own object or surrounds itself with a world." (Fou, 19. (tba)). Just as the film not only presents images, but also surrounds them with a world. (See ZB, 95). In What is Philosophy, the concept-creating philosophy surrounds itself with a level that stands for the appearance of the concepts; it is itself not a picture or an idea, but the construction of the concepts, their appearance, it emerges with them. (See WiPh, 20ff.). So that one can examine the differences between the levels and their superimpositions through them.

Understanding the message fields in this way leads to the idea that knowledge is differentiated into what is visible and what can be said. This makes it clear that, for example, mania in the 17th century does not have the same environment as in the 19th century, it changes its discursive meaning.

The question of the connection between the visible and the sayable is a cinematic question: the diagonal connection (as a cut) between discursive relationships and non-discursive milieus is understood as the horizon of what is said. (See Fou, 20f.). With Foucault, exactly this milieu is examined. "'Species change' is not the same statement in natural history in the 18th century and in biology in the 19th century." (See Fou, 22. (tba)). The statement is linked to an environment that determines its appearance, just as the film is confronted with a whole that appears either as the open (with the BB) or as the outside (with the ZB).

This milieu bondage leads to a paradox. The statement is unhidden hidden, or at the same time visible and invisible. It does not bypass the existing linguistic statements in order to arrive at a signifier that is hidden. Nevertheless it is not visible as such, it does not appear. So it is not hidden insofar as it contains or analyzes the conditions of existence of an actually produced character string. (See Foucault 1981, 54ff.). Since it does not mark a way of arising, but rather the emergence itself, it has the vanishing structure of "there is". This quasi-invisibility results from the nature of language never being able to say the meaning of what one says. So to be trapped in a referral structure. It is itself characterized by absence. Since it takes a back seat to the appearance of what it makes appear, it transfers this disposition to the statement. Moreover, it has no number of parts or an object that can be determined in a limited manner; it is an indifferent substance that only expresses the relations. (See Foucault 1981, 34ff.).


In order to work out the peculiarity of the Foucault cut or its consideration of cuts in history, the gap between BB and ZB is considered. There had to be a break because the ZB is the constitutional condition for the BB. In the BB, the montage between the whole and the ensemble or the image regulates the relationship; there is a constant exchange between the BB and its relationship to the whole of the film. (See BB, 98ff.). In the ZB there is no longer this whole of the film towards which the images are oriented.

The alogical cut shows how the nonsense in the language (Logic of Sense), what the other, emerging cut can do, what the cut is capable of. Because of the distance, things continue differently; if the chain is broken, one is thrown onto the cut itself, the interval.

In order of things, Foucault sees no continuity in the scientific question for the five centuries analyzed, but rather two complete breaks, one in the first half of the 17th century and the other time around the year 1800. (See Foucault 1974). In the classical age of the 17th and 18th centuries, knowledge was arranged, classified and taxonomically processed in tables (similarity). The human being appears here only between the orders of the infinite. Here Foucault shows that man is an invention. Around 1800 new fields of science emerged that put people in the middle, as a break (representation). In the 19th century the human sciences emerged, which bear witness to the disappearance of man. Man is an invention, the recent date of which the archeology of our thinking quite openly shows, perhaps also the imminent end. (See Foucault 1974, 463). The forming forces are related to the outside, which allows the shapes to vary in order to produce new connections.

It becomes a book of methods when the visible and the sayable are considered separately. First of all, the field must be laid in which the repetition contains the greatest difference so that one can discover the non-discursive and talk about the milieu or the diagram - about the nest that allows a swarm of statements. The statements constitute the words and things. (See Fou, 24).

Every statement also changes the space of what can be said or forms it at the same time. The statement ensure that the sentences and propositions can appear.

"The theory of incisions is therefore an essential part of the system." (Fou, 36. (tba)). 


The two orders of the visible and the sayable are not located on the same level. The visible contains a virtuality that can be partially actualized through the sayable. (See Schaub 2006, 10ff.).

Deleuze names Straub, Syberberg, Duras as examples of films in which voices have no visible place and visibilities that have no correlation in what is said and connects them with the way Foucault writes about images and sounds. (See Fou, 92). The archive comes to its functionality, it allows the statement to function as a diagonal when there is a break between the visible and the sayable: "between the two there is always an irrational cut." (Fou, 93. (tba)). Deleuze relates the closeness of the ZB and its new meaning of the connection, which does not involve joining together, directly to Foucault and his links between discursive and non-discursive content. Foucault's audio-visual investigation is linked to a specific editing apparatus, with various editing techniques. The example here is the moment of the irrational cut that emerges in the ZB, which at the same time creates a gap and a hinge between image and sound.

Modern cinema then shows that the non-relationship can be a relationship. (See Fou, 94). From the consideration that Foucault is very close to modern cinema - the conclusion must still be drawn as to what their relationship to one another would express.

Deleuze's strategy is to let the connection between the visible and the sayable run through several conditional fields. As in the ZB first the circles of memory, of dreams and more and more circles that determine how the image interacts with the sound, or how the current image experiences its own condition in the form of the virtual image in the present. (See ZB, 78ff.). Deleuze-Foucault's argument is analogous: the point is that what can be determined is determined by the determination without being determined by it in a closed manner.

But when what can be said is permeated with the fullness of what is visible, they give themselves impetus.

The statements now slid back and forth between the visible and its condition as between the two pipes of Magritte. Visibilities creep in between the statement and its condition, as in the case of Roussel, who does not open the words without letting the visible emerge. (Fou, 95).

1. The relationship is always serial: one side is the condition, the other the conditioned, “carving of the discourse into the shape of things and vice versa”. (Foucault 1974, 249). Whereby the condition opens up a space for the other and does not contain the conditioned in itself. 2. The visible would be the inexhaustible store of what can be determined, which is determined by what can be said. The visible, however, remains in its visibility and would not be reduced by the sayability, since it functions in its own sense: something visible that can only be seen.

The archaeological crack stands specifically for the image of the diagram: the film shows that the disjunction between image and sound is not arbitrary, the gap between them becomes more of a connecting element, the only connecting factor. The reference through the non-reference of the irrational incision works like a bridging that constantly repeats the distance between the image and sets it again and again in scene. Likewise, Foucault's archaeological sections are discontinuous, but refer to a section that continues because it pushes visibility to a limit. The crack is then given the function of shaping the pages and allowing them to communicate with one another, beyond a whole that overlooks them.

How Foucault understands the visible and the sayable can find instructions in the film and thus point to the breaks that occur in the archive, which in turn give clues as to how they work together, how their disjunction, their non-matching provides clues about thinking : “It is also not surprising that the most complex examples of the disjunction seeing-speaking can be found in the realm of film.” (Fou, 92. (tba)). What is connected with this is the image that thought makes of itself. Not to be sure of yourself, but to be shaken by something, like the characters in the ZB who don't know how to react. (See DW, 169).


The visible and the sayable are connected on the diagram that regulates their exchange, or their specific connection - just as the BB is a diagram that stands out from the ZB that draws another diagram. It is the map of the balance of power. (See Fou, 55). With regard to the interval between image and sound, it is precisely the view that is opened when the gap is not closed but is built upon it, in its referential relationship. This makes it possible to view a diagram. In the BB the balance of forces is the indirect time controlled by the movement and from the ZB the diagram is the liberated time, which subordinates the movement and becomes the wrong movement, as the driving moment.

The panoptism of surveillance and punishment is such a diagram that shows the balance of power and affects the visible and the sayable.

The panoptic system is not simply a hinge or an exchange regulator between a power mechanism and a function, it brings out power relationships within a function and thereby enhances this function. (Foucault 1994, 257).

The supervisor can see everything without being seen: that is the condition for visibility, a visualization that leads to a control that is internalized. The diagram of panoptism dominates relationships, in school you are controlled by grades, in work by others and deadlines.

It's about how Foucault can talk about the diagram as the predominant image of thought at a given time. As we have seen, it seems to have something to do with the fact that he divides the archive into what is visible and what can be said, i.e. taking an audio-visual view in order to be able to zoom in on the breaks in between.

The diagram is no longer the audio-visual archive, it is the map, the cartography, coextensive with the totality of the social field. It's an abstract machine. By defining itself through informal functions and materials, it ignores any distinction between a content and an expression, between a discursive formation and a non-discursive formation. (See Fou, 54).

The diagram is the virtual level that produces the visibilities and sayings and regulates their relationships with one another without being visible and expressible itself.

The question that Deleuze asks himself is that of transition: how do you get from the diagrammatic situation to an update, how does the cutting process work, and here always: what does it look like? The force differential is actualized in what is visible and what can be said, in non-discursive and discursive formations. With the ZB one can show that there is no totalization between the visible and the sayable that binds them together - hence the need for a diagram that updates them and does not need a unified cause. With the film as ZB and its theoretical formulation, one can give the philosophy hints on how to understand the diagram, since its actualization changes with each film.

The visible and the sayable are separated by a gap where the diagram penetrates in order to be embodied in these formations, which are then differentiated. (See Fou, 58).

Through the postulates such as localizatios, essence, modality, power is transferred from its transcendent to an immanent mode of functioning. (See Fou 39ff.). Power subsists and pervades the realms; it is the condition of possibility as an evading field, the appearance and functioning of which has historically changed. In connection with the images in the film, it shows the arrangement of the images themselves, their inner connection, beyond a transcendent horizon of montage. Power is the relationship that can be seen, when you see its change, when it becomes noticeable.


The BB or the classic image run over something that can be said or over a sound level that differentiates itself in relation to the ensemble, i.e. to the next image and the relation to the whole that is expressed in the ensemble - it always has a clearly shaped one Regarding - to the visual image. (See ZB, 300ff.). With modern cinema, the relationship between sound and image changes, between the visible and the sayable, image and sound no longer fit together and do not refer to something outside the image. (See ZB, 310). The free indirect speech can no longer be located off-screen, the narrator maintains relationships with the characters, they begin to fabulate or not speak in dialogue form or in the first person: there is a change towards a liberation of the image from the sound and the voice and what is said. (See ZB, 310f.).

Deleuze locates the change in the image in the new kind of what can be said as the visual that becomes archaeological or stratigraphic. (See ZB, 312). The fact that their relation is in question guarantees that one can think about the connection itself, which would otherwise be ignored and made unnoticeable. The image comes to its constitutional level when it is called into question by the other faculty of sound.

By releasing the connection between image and sound, the image can now be read:

If the images no longer 'naturally' link themselves, if they show that incorrect connections and setting changes are systematically used, then one could say that the settings themselves rotate or reverse and that their perception requires a considerable effort of memory and imagination, in other words, reading. (See ZB, 314).

Reading in the pictures is the key point that links Deleuze with Foucault and exhibits him as an extension of the cinematographic reading method. In Foucault's work, image and sound do not match either, which leads him to the discontinuities in the story and makes him wonder where they come from and why it is possible to make a certain statement.

Reading then means reassembling the images because one becomes aware of the cut (in this context also the normalization through the cut). Reading means rotating the images and reversing them, following a new type of analytics.

The crack is archaeological - only through the crack one can apply the Foucault-method and immerse into the archaeological crack. Reading means doing exactly this exchange, which in turn is archaeological, because one goes from what is seen to what is spoken to what is imagined and remembered. In short, through the intersection of the visible and the sayable, through their separation, one has to read - this is what defines the archaeological intersection - the sides of the picture are constantly merged into one another and exchanged. (See ZB, 314). The aim is to discover the layers of the visual image. With Rossellini, Deleuze finds a Foucault archeology present. (See ZB, 318). The speech acts and the visible space alternate between the old and the new in their historical concept. So that the speech acts bring out something that is not yet present in the images and the persons who are directed into the past bring out something in the image that language cannot yet take. The irrational cut presupposes the new acoustic stage. (See ZB, 318f.). The ZB shows that the irrational cuts do not run between the acoustic and the visual, but rather in the visual itself, in the acoustic itself and its connections. (See ZB, 319). So that the space in between can be explored in a completely Foucaultian way as a separate component that can be examined - Foucault concentrates on these cuts, which are given a special shape by saying that it is up to the power to separate what is visible and what can be said and how they interact .


Within the painting Las Meninas by Velasques, Foucault sees the representation of the nineteenth century expressed, with the image and with what makes it visible and legible. It stands for a diagram that shows how the knowledge formations are ordered at a given time. Aligned to the king's place as contained in the reflections of the image. (See Foucault 1974, 31ff.). With this image analysis or diagrammatic analysis, he can give his outside or his base a more concrete design, with the base giving precisely the indications that lead to the transition from the unlayered outside to the layers and indicate the cut in the story. (See Fou, 83). That is, the picture of how the visible and the sayable relate to one another can change.

The visible and the sayable do not belong to the same formation, they have a different genesis and are not derived from each other and the question of their relationship is in the room. (See Fou, 89). Foucault expresses the diagram of representationalism of the 17th and 18th centuries over Las Meninas: the invisibility of the depicted image while the painter is visible at the same time. (See Foucault 1974, 31). The representation projected by the painter onto his invisible canvas is precisely that outside of the picture - we as the viewer (See Foucault 1974, 32). As if this visibility could better describe the structure of the representation - and with it the theory that a cinematic philosophy could describe the diagram of the current balance of power.

“Instead of revolving around the visible things, this mirror crosses the entire field of representation and neglects what it could grasp in it, restores the visibility of what remains beyond the accessibility of any view. The invisibility that he overcomes is not that of the hidden: he does not bypass any obstacle, he does not deviate from any perspective, he turns to what is invisible at the same time through the structure of the picture and through his existence as a painter.” (Foucault OdD, 36. (tba)).

The mirror is the invisible virtual image that is always shifting and making it visible. In the ZB, the mirror is this virtual image as the first ZB.

The relationships in the picture and the visual occurrences are shown in the diagram of forces, which then have an effect in terms of colors and lines, so it is first an unlayered arrangement of light that is then updated.

Foucault's description of the pictures makes something obvious that is beyond visibility and can deal with the whole thesis of the book. The axes of imagery that appear here are broken twice, and these refractions contain inversions: 1. Refraction: Imagery that should actually disappear because it is a sign of representation - exaggerated here because it is supposed to describe an epoch 2. It is a special picture that can show this - with special viewing and mirror axes.

You are turned towards the people in the mirror - they are invisible and in the virtuality of the mirror, which makes them visible, which exhibits its representation with it, its mediality, they are located at the other point of the painting, where the viewer is and thus can take their place. (See Foucault 1974, 43). The point outside of the picture is repeatedly addressed and touched upon, in the point outside the instances meet, it brings them to communication.

But in this dispersion, which it catches and also spreads, an essential emptiness is imperatively indicated from all sides: the necessary disappearance of what constitutes it, of that which it resembles, and of that in the eyes of which it is nothing but resemblance. This subject itself, which is also the subject, has been left out. And finally freed from this relationship that chained them, the representation can present itself as pure representation. (See Foucault 1974, 45).

A cinematographic view of thought structures deals with this primacy of imagery at a certain time. For the ZB, the exchange in the mirror and the images becoming indistinguishable is the first example of a direct time image, a current image that is reflected in the mirror and thus shows its virtual side, its origin, its past exchanges with the present. (See ZB, 95f.). The image finds its genetic element in that the virtual is no less real than its current double. The series circulate around an empty field; it cannot be represented in the picture, which guarantees its representability. 


The curtain is like the base of the statement, the condition: the statement has a sculpture of predictability, it has a sculpturality in it that makes it appear as an inscription. It is then all the more important to describe the curtain and to turn it around, to drive along it, because nothing can be exposed behind it. (See Fou, 73).

When the method books of Deleuze (LS and DW) express themselves in the ZB, or use it as their hinge to get to the later work and for an analysis of the picture that thinking makes of itself, a legibility of this picture to induce by copying what has been written, the issue here is how to classify the relation to Foucault. Up to now the relation to film has been significant, the second level of relation is the methodological one. Deleuze sees in Foucault the same questions of his own rereading in theory.

With Foucault, the plinth can always express itself differently in which the statements can appear (which light is there?). He explicitly focuses on the appearance of the stage. Deleuze sees his own work reflected in Foucault; it can be used to systematize how we deal with the fact that the condition cannot be derived from its conditioned. It is a cinemato-diagrammatic approach that can see and analyze sections in the sense of a difference.

The condition is no wider than the conditioned, or with Foucault: the a priori is historical, ie. the singular conditional element, the virtual, is also undergoing a change, with Deleuze it is based on a particular way of thinking and every philosophy has changed what thinking means. (See DW, 132ff.).

 Foucault can be used to be able to talk about cinema, that there are changes based on the movements in the picture itself that can alter the historical a priori. It is the guarantee that the conditions are historical, so that the knowledge it forms of the visible and the sayable at a certain time and the light and the language just as singularly refer to the respective layer. (See Fou, 161f.). "In short, the conditions are never more general than the conditioned and apply by virtue of their own historical singularity." (Fou, 161. (tba)).


Only when the movement becomes automatic does the artistic essence of the picture appear. It consists in causing a shock in thinking, transmitting vibrations to the cerebral cortex, directly influencing the brain and the nervous system. "The cinematographic image transforms that into a fortune that previously only existed as a possibility." (ZB, 205. (tba)). With the cinema it is seen that thinking has no other function than to produce itself again and again, and precisely not to derive logically or to proceed according to its possibilities. (See ZB, 206ff.).

When thinking arises from shock, "then it can only think one thing: the fact that we are not yet thinking, the inability to think the whole thing as ourselves." (E.g., 219. (tba)).

In the ZB, thinking is linked to the consideration that the images do not say that thinking takes place in an act of consciousness. In the ZB, the thinking itself changes, it deals with the outside and can populate this crack in relation to the visible and the sayable, in order to make the transition into the layers from here.

In Foucault's work, this interval, which relates what is visible and what can be said to one another, i.e. thinking from the outside, occurs because the rift between image and language leads to the non-layered nature of the diagram. (See Fou, 121). This relationship of the stratified and non-stratified formations is constantly changing their relationship, which is expressed by this gap that is expanding.

In the order of things, through the intricacies of language, life and work, loud duplications emerge, within which the human being has appeared only to disappear again. (See Foucault 1974, 389). This misunderstanding of the outside must be expanded as a difference that forces one to think - then one arrives at the forces that Foucault means by the outside. "Thinking that tries the impossible, namely to think everything that is diametrically opposed to one's own determinations". (Schaub 2003, 253. (tba)). A way of thinking that is no longer self-confident like the cogito, a language that has no speaking subject. The outside appears “as an undetectable, unstable effect on the ontological edge of the true as well as the untrue linguistic. One only has to think about the threshold of unchecking itself experienced in language.” (Schaub 2003, 156. (tba)).


For Deleuze, Foucault’s diagram is an exterior that gives his own thinking a layered structure, a layered formation. The layers form deposits and the reference to the outside of the diagram as a cinematographic cutting device calls into question the visibilities and sayings by assembling them together in such a way that an alogical cut is created, the creation of which must be sought. The distance in the power relations, which is reflected in the visible and the sayable, was able to experience a view with a transition to the film books, which attaches a constitutive character to the interval and does not have to conceal it. With Foucault, the transition itself can be zoomed in, which inserts a gap between power and knowledge and makes thinking appear as a shock. For Deleuze, Foucault shows instructions for portraying other thought structures: the cinematographic effect of the power of the wrong.

In this sense, Foucault works through a philosophy that appears to be filmic, since what is seen and what can be said are understood as layers that interact in such a way that they can express the third moment in different ways. So that the condition changes depending on how the visible and the sayable relate to each other and form a diagram. In this respect, the combination takes place on a different level than that of the stratifications. Foucault’s third instance, which relates the determinable and the determination to one another, is a non-place in the sense of the ZB or Deleuzian interpretation. Here you can insert the adventure of the ZB in order to explore the mutual determinability of the visible and the sayable. The film can show that it is about how this third dimension changes, how one can relate to it so that it determines the layering.

Deleuze-Foucault's thesis, what brings them closer together, is how to deal with the third element. That it should not be retouched, but that it is the subject of the investigation and that it changes, can be shifted in itself, because it brings about appearance. The conditional level, that is, what brings you to see and speak, is more complex than the conditioned. This ensures that this balance of power, in the sense of cohesion and the cutting of images, changes and has an impact on the layered milieu of visibilities and sayings.


Deleuze, Gilles; Foucault, Michel: Der Faden ist gerissen. Merve Verlag, Berlin, 1977. 

[LS]   – : Logik des Sinns. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M., 1993. 

[BB]   – : Das Bewegungs-Bild. Kino 1. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M., 1997a. 

[ZB]   – : Das Zeit-Bild. Kino 2. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M., 1997b. 

[DW] – : Differenz und Wiederholung. Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 3. Aufl., München, 2007. 

[K] Deleuze,Gilles; Guattari, Félix: Kafka. Für eine kleine Literatur. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. 

M., 1976. 

[WiPh]   – : Was ist Philosophie? Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M., 2000. 

[TP]   – : Tausend Plateaus. Kapitalismus und Schizophrenie II. Übers. von G. Ricke und R. 

Voullié. Merve, Berlin, 2002.

[F]  – : Foucault. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 7. Aufl., 2013.

Deleuze, Gilles; Foucault, Michel: Die Intellektuellen und die Macht. In: Michel Foucault: Von der Subversion des Wissens. Carl Hanser Verlag, München, 1974. S. 128- 140. 

Foucault, Michel: Hermeneutik des Subjekts. Vorlesungen am Collège de France 1981/82,  

Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M., 2004.

– : Überwachen und Strafen. Die Geburt des Gefängnisses. Frankfurt a. M., Suhrkamp, 1994.

– : Der Mut zur Wahrheit. Die Regierung des Selbst und der anderen II. Vorlesung am Collège de France 1983/84. Suhrkamp, Berlin, 2010.

– : Die Ordnung der Dinge. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M., 1974

– : Über den Willen zum Wissen. Vorlesungen am Collège de France 1970-1971. Suhrkamp, Berlin, 2012c.

– : Archäologie des Wissens. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M., 1981.

– : Wahnsinn und Gesellschaft. Eine Geschichte des Wahns im Zeitalter der Vernunft. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M., 21. Aufl., 2015.

–: Der Wille zum Wissen. Sexualität und Wahrheit I. Übers. von W. Raul  U. und Seitter. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 1983.

Kant, Immanuel: Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Hrg. Wilhelm Weischedel, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 3. Auflage, 1977.

Müller, Marie Elisabeth: Passagen des Sinns. Eine ästhetische Theorie ereignishafter Darstellung. Über paradoxe SinnSerien, informelle Fakes und Peter Greenaway's Featurefilme. Könighausen & Neumann, Würzburg, 1999.

Schaub, Mirjam: Gilles Deleuze im Kino. Das Sichtbare und das Sagbare. Wilhelm Fink Verlag, München, 2006.

–:  Gilles Deleuze im Wunderland. Zeit als Ereignisphilosophie. Wilhelm Fink Verlag, München, 2003.

Schneider, Ulrich Johannes: Theater in den Innenräumen des Denkens. Gilles Deleuze als Philosophiehistoriker. In: Gilles Deleuze - Fluchtlinien der Philosophie / Friedrich Balke ... (Hrsg.). Fink, München, 1996. S. 103-115. 


STALKER (STALKER), SU, 1979, R.: Andrej Tarkowskij.


Foucault-Film when reading him from a deleuzian perspective