Practices of Phenomenological & Artistic Research


This exposition forms part of the Editorial Introduction by Alex Arteaga and Emma Cocker published in the Special Issue 'Practices of Phenomenological and Artistic Research', Phenomenology & Practice, [Vol. 17, No.1, 2022]. The Editorial itself is accessed here.

 

As with many of the other contributions to this Special Issue, an attempt is made to show the practice itself through an “exposition” on the Research Catalogue. The Editorial article itself takes the form of a research artifact resulting from the activation of a practice. Or rather, it crystallizes an affinity between two language-based artistic research practices presented within this Special Issue: Alex Arteaga’s practice of Exploratory Essay Writing and Emma Cocker’s practice of Conversation-as-Material


Process

The Editorial article is comprised wholly of transcript material generated through a series of conversations between Arteaga and Cocker. The original conversation transcripts were distilled gradually through a combination of marking and redaction, where the gaps of omitted words are left intact, in turn heightening attention to the agency of both the fragment and of the spacing itself. Within each phase  conversation, transcription, distillation, and presentation  an attempt is made to activate a particular aesthetic or poetic mode of attention, perhaps even a specific phenomenological attitude or disposition. 


Phase I: Conversation & Transcription

Arteaga and Cocker engaged in three separate 'rounds' of conversation and transcription which took place between 2629 March 2022: (1) Conversation: a recorded conversation lasting around 1.5 hours; (2) Transcription: the conversation is transcribed and the transcript material shared before the next conversation. The documents presented in this exposition (Scroll to the right) attempt to show aspects of the process from Phase II onwards  that is, the process of distillation from original transcript towards the Editorial text itself.


Phase II: Distillation (through marking)

* First distillation

All three conversation transcripts were reengaged with by Arteaga and Cocker through a process of marking, where each researcher highlights those sections of the text that felt most resonant. These annotations are compiled/gathered within a single text and colour coded: One colour (green) for one researcher's marked highlights; another colour (blue) for the other researcher's marked highlights. Another colour (red) is used when the same section of text is marked by both researchers. Those parts of the text not highlighted by either researcher are effectively redacted by changing the text to white. 

* Second distillation

Initially an attempt was made to further distill the transcript by retaining only that part of the text that both researchers highlighted (ie. only the red colour coded parts of the text). However, through this process the vocative dimension of the original conversation was becoming lost, and so a different approach was evolved. 


Phase III: Thematic Organisation

By revisiting the transcript material again a number of thematic foci became discernible: (1) Varieties of affinity between phenomenological and artistic research practices; (2) Common characteristics of phenomenological and artistic research practices; (3) Practices (and the matter of publishing practices). Going back to the first distillation of the conversation transcripts, this material was then reorganized using these three broad thematic foci, alongside allowing for emergent sub-foci. The reorganization of the material retained the original spacing generated through the first phase of redaction.


Phase IV: Distillation through further redaction

Over a period of days, Arteaga and Cocker gradually distilled the transcript material further through a very slow process of redaction of all extraneous content. The two researchers met online together with the shared text visible to each. First, a section of the text was read aloud. Then, each researcher  proposed/highlighted sections of text for redaction, awaiting agreement from the other before proceeding further.

 

Phase V: Presentation

The Editorial article (published in the Special Issue 'Practices of Phenomenological and Artistic Research', Phenomenology & Practice) attempts to remain in fidelity to the process of this shared practice, to the rhythm and unfolding of the original conversation, by retaining the empty spacing where words have been redacted.

 

 

Conversation 1 [26 March 2022] Distillation of transcript through marking

1st Distillation

Transcript from Saturday 26 March 2022

Conversation (Part 1)

 

I think that we can easily agree that this form of dialogue should be, could be, one of aesthetic dialogue. So we try not to much to elaborate discursively but see how these issues resonate, the resonance or the reflection, in terms of giving back. Resonances more than constructing discourse.

 

I agree.

 

I think we know what we mean when I say that. And the second point is the project which takes the form of the call.

 

Yes, the call.

 

Do we want to refer to the literality of the call or to the spirit of the call?

 

I think what I have been trying to do or tune into is two-fold: one is the sense of going back to the call and looking at it again, now, with fresh eyes, to see what might be invoked by some of the propositions or statement of the call. How is it that these have been phrased and what arises from the fresh encounter with those ideas? So on the one hand, almost like newly going back to the call in its detail and yet at the same time holding in mind the journey travelled between the writing of the call and now, and all of what has been encompassed in that journey – from the initial expressions of interest, to the process of reading and encountering people’s contribution, to where we are now at this moment. So there are these two related but different experiences that I am holding in relation – this going back to the call as if I have not read it, and at the same time what can be understood of the call with the hindsight now of the journey travelled.

 

And in addition to it, maybe, and what I think would be nice, and useful and enriching, to consider let’s say where it all started which was in the preparation for Venice. There is a continuity from this moment, from the proposal for the research cell, to the preparatory meetings which were especially interesting, especially maybe the first. And then, not so much the experience of Venice, I would not go into that … but thinking a little bit of the continuation – where this call came from. Because for me the call crystallises some developments that took place there, yes. And I think that the whole journey as you say, is an attempt to explore a field which, a field, a field of research, which takes two references, or which refers to two fields which can be outlined as autonomous fields: one is artistic research or aesthetic research, and the other one is phenomenology. I mean, what I am saying is quite obvious, but maybe it is quite nice to revisit this obviousness. And somehow it is guided by an intuition that there is a common field, that there is something in common.

 

And I guess that one of the things that I have been coming back to I guess, is what is meant by, or what is implied by, or how is this ‘in common’? And, again, in part looking at and encountering some of the contributions and thinking about this sense of ‘in common’ and how this sense of ‘in common’ manifests? Interestingly, at times the sense of ‘common’ is manifested in its opposite – to it becomes demonstrated through difference. So you get in some of the contributions, an attempt to delineate the difference between artistic research and phenomenological practice. And then, I suppose, something about these different registers of ‘being in common’, or actually even, a sense of being-in-touch. Or whether it might be possible to think about these two fields of practice as being in touch and what that mode of being in touch might open up? I suppose, I imagine them almost like a Venn diagram, two spheres of practice, and then different possibilities emerge depending on how these two spheres of practice overlap or how they overlap or how they touch or how they repel even. Actually, as I am saying this, I am thinking about magnets. Is there a kind of pull between these two fields of practice, like magnetically, towards some kind of contact, or actually is it something like, interestingly with magnets, sometimes the closer you bring them, it is only then that the repellent force becomes evident, and they push themselves away. And I can even see a sense of this – while ever there was a little bit of distance the commonalities seem strong, but where there is an attempt in places to bring the two together somehow the differences became more magnified. Something to do with different registers of in-touch-ness, or connection, or contact or commonality, and what these different registers might open up in terms of how we think about these fields of practice, or even what might exist in between.

 

Another term could be affinity. So this intuition of an affinity between these two fields of practice. Maybe this is better than saying in common, because in common is already a form of affinity. Affinity is an interesting starting point. And there is also something which inhabits, two different problematics which inhabits each of these fields in my opinion, that come also into expression when this affinity is explored. And this can be on the one hand the tension between artistic and/or aesthetic practices – where practices is not questioned in this sphere. But the tension is between these practices and these practices being practices of research. We affirm that. The one’s who practice in this field of so-called, just to take a term, artistic research; we affirm that, but we know that this remains problematic. So, so, how artistic and aesthetic practices can be affirmed, and especially practices, as practices of research is still a question. And the other field, at least originally, is a field of philosophy. So phenomenology was born and was mainly developed as a philosophical endeavour. And so it is not a question that this is a form of research. This is research let’s say – this is not questioned there. But the question there is the question of practices, which in my opinion should be out of debate, because it was affirmed by Husserl. But, let’s say, the system of philosophy is not so used to identified practices or accepting that they are practitioners as are artists. So in standard terms, artists are practitioners and philosophers are theorists. Which is then to not be practitioners. So I see this tension, and this tension comes to take different forms of expression and also in terms of demarcating differences when we explore the possibilities of affinities. 

 

I think that the sense of degrees of, how would it be, qualifying or the nuance at each of those levels feels important. So if I understand, you were differentiating … not only is it artistic practices but it is artistic research practices. But again the thing that becomes a further point of nuance within this particular journal call is: not only artistic practices but artistic research practices, but not only artistic research practices but artistic research practices that have a particular relationship to phenomenology. I think maybe even the relationship between artistic research and phenomenology could be a different way of describing it. So I am curious in that nuance – is it to say: not only artistic practices but artistic research practices, and not only artistic research practices but artistic “hyphen” phenomenological research practices; or is it phenomenologically-oriented artistic research practices, or is it artistic research practices with an affinity to phenomenology … so that last nuance feels not yet clarified in a sense or maybe that this feels to be the terrain of exploration in a way. I think that the clarity of not only artistic practices but also artistic research practices, yes. This is very clear. But this transition into the meeting or the relationship with phenomenology opens up into a whole range of possibilities of connection. And I am curious about that really. This closeness to or distance from phenomenology – whether those artistic research practices also have to be phenomenological research practices or if it is this range of relation that we are exploring? Its closeness to, its distance from, its difference from, its proximity but difference – there is a whole set of nuances there that feels very generative somehow.

 

Yes, these formulations are interesting because they show different possibilities. Actually, I would say, that our take for this call was, a let’s say, a strong name. Naming this with a hyphen. Even there, we could have two variations: we could say it’s the same because the order does not matter, but I think that it matters. So I mean, artistic “hyphen” phenomenological research practices. We have always thought in this way, the two of us. Maybe because the impulse for this project came from us, came from the field of artistic research. But we never formulated it, or at least I never formulated it as phenomenological “hyphen” artistic research practices.We can say it is the same, but we can say it is not. We can say that this order matters or has a meaning or value. And this, anyway this I could call it the strong variation. So we are affirming, and I think that this is the approach within this call, the approach or the starting point of this Special Issue, we say yes we affirm that there are research practices that at the same time are artistic and phenomenological. The other, let’s say ‘soft variations’, which funnily enough had two variants now, I am realising this for the first time. So a phenomenologically-oriented or -based artistic research practice. We never, or at least I never formulated it in the other way – so, an artistically-oriented or -based or informed phenomenological research practices. The whole time it seems to me that, and this is just a feeling, not just, this is a feeling, that phenomenology and by this I mean phenomenologists are fine where they are, there is no need. We are philosophers and we are doing phenomenology, our way of doing philosophy is phenomenology or our philosophical approach is phenomenological. But we are fine, you know. So self-sufficient. And so this impulse comes from us, from artistic research, from artistic researchers, to refer to them. That is why we are constantly thinking about phenomenologically-oriented or -based or -informed practices. So this for me, expresses this reference. From practices that are at least not born in this field, but attend to it, refer to it.And I think there could be a third possibility, which for me has been increasingly interesting which probably comes closer to the second or is easy to be thought through the second or starting from the second which is one for which I have no name. And this is like this third. So we relate there to practices … actually there is a fourth one. What I was trying to describe would be the fourth one. But there is a third. Wait a second, what is the second already. Well no. No I think it is the third which I think is the idea of an aesthetic phenomenology. I think that this is a third variation, which is clearly that it is phenomenology instantiated aesthetically. And the fourth variation would be this third, it is something that cannot properly be described as artistic or aesthetic nor as phenomenology.

 

There are lots of variations. Maybe going back to one of things that you started with, the sense of orientation or the directionality between artistic research and phenomenological research. If I look at the call again I think that there is something in the language of that spoke more to a sense of mutuality, mutual transformation, reciprocity, cross-contamination, hybridisation, where the sense of the one to the other was less defined and felt more like it could be a passage between both in a way. There is this question of whether that directionality from artistic research towards phenomenological research indicates hierarchy. What kind of relation does that set up in the sense of deference even? What you are pointing to is the sense of the organisation of artistic “hyphen” phenomenological, it is arrived at but never seen in the opposite orientation of phenomenological “hyphen” artistic, and there is something interesting that emerges there, a kind of taken-for-granted-ness about that particular correlation.So this struck me as interested. Then there is something about this hyphenation which feels as if it could also invite exploration. I think about this in relation to “choreo-graphic figures” where there is the use of the hyphen, and this practice of hyphenation had a dual function in a way: it holds the two things together but it also keeps them apart. So there is a dual function in hyphenation: there is a sense of holding in relation and also holding in separation. So there is something about the irreconcilability of the two sides of the hyphen, or the impossibility of synthesis indicated through that. And I think the thing that you were talking about … so yes, the hyphen on the one hand might suggest that they are the same, that they are the same, that they are interchangeable, no, that artistic and phenomenological practices are one and the same within a certain set of practices. But then you were talking about the sense that maybe the difference matters. So maybe I am interested in how this difference might matter. I am taking a tangent here, but one of the things I have been thinking about a lot in relation to the last rounds of review is these terms like “not enough” or “not phenomenological enough”. So there are a few terms: “almost” so “almost phenomenological” or “not enough”, “not phenomenological enough”. And also the presence of terms like “but” and “however”. And perhaps rather than seeing these as like deficits, maybe within there is a germ for really understanding the distinctiveness of artistic research within this terrain. I think that this sense of it not being 'enough’, ‘not being phenomenological enough’, signals that it somehow fails to be phenomenological, but I wonder whether there is something about the distinctiveness of certain artistic research practices where rather than it being a deficit or a failure, it really points to what artistic research does. That might be different from phenomenology. I am not sure, I have a suspicion that there is something about this sense of withholding or holding back or not quite following through into a phenomenological insight that seems to recur, that might be, there might something about the nature of artistic research practices that hold things open but don’t then follow all the way through into conclusion. There is something of this ‘not enough’, that also speaks of a ‘not yet’ or … I don’t know. I am not sure, but it feels like there is something there.

 

I mean, one thing I see there is also, I mean, starting from the beginning again, there is the affirmation of these two fields or spheres of practice. OK.  So we take this for granted: there is artistic research, there is phenomenology. OK. But now, how is this being expressed, in a normative closed way, in terms of a definitional way. This is artistic research, which mean all this is not. Or as you say ‘not enough’ or ‘not really’. Because there is artistic research. The positive side of this ‘not enough’ is the affirmation ‘this is’, this is artistic research, this is phenomenology. I think in this journey where these expressions were referring to phenomenology, nevertheless, there was one case, and it was my submission, when there was a common ‘is this artistic?’. No doubt this is aesthetic, but is it artistic? In this case, there was another term, that somehow justified (but not really again), but in the case of phenomenology there is no equivalent term, in terms of saying ‘well it is not phenomenology’ but it could be something like phenomenological. We would probably go with this phenomenologically-oriented or it is partly phenomenological. Interestingly both fields, and this is quite exceptional in philosophy or in humanities, in both fields, the definition of both fields has always been a question.So, the beginning of The Phenomenology of Perception is “What is the question, what is phenomenology?”. And the sense that it is strange that we keep asking the question almost fifty years after the foundation of it. I mean this could be the beginning of a book about artistic research: “What is artistic research?”. It is interesting that we keep asking this. So somehow this, in my opinion, this should make difficult to affirm that this is not phenomenology or this is ‘not enough’, this is ‘not phenomenological enough’. And somehow I think this openness, this definition of openness, about these two spheres could be, or probably should be if I am honest, a necessary starting point for this enquiry into these affinities. Let’s say as a norm, as a rule of the game, this cannot be said: it cannot be said it is not phenomenological or it is not artistic enough. Nevertheless, this rule should always be possible to be violated because it is interesting when someone says this is not artistic enough or phenomenological enough. It is interesting because even though I am affirming the impossibility to really say ‘this is artistic’ or ‘this is phenomenological’, we are using these terms. So there is a demarcation. We have a sense of ‘what is’ and ‘what is not’.

 

I was reading again Michael Biggs’ text, and was struck again by his comments in it that artistic research has almost, the historical definition making of it, has been through this sense of negative affirmation: what artistic research is not. There was a point where I was interested in the possibility of saying declaratively that artistic research is not phenomenology. Or even what the difference might be between saying ‘this is not phenomenology’ and ‘this is not phenomenological enough’. Whether even the second statement implies that there is already the attempt for one practice to be like the other, or be the other. And actually, maybe in the clarity of saying that artistic research is not phenomenology, that kind of deficit, deferent relation to phenomenology is somehow short-circuited. So if you were to say that artistic research is not phenomenology, is that even a pre-condition for exploring what the relationship is. I even wondered, is it possible to explore a relationship if things are considered to be “as”? Can there be any relationship between artistic research and phenomenology if they are considered to be one and the same practice? Is this condition of not-ness a precondition for exploring relations, or exploring connection or affinity?

 

It can be. What I am seeing is a triangle. One vertex of the triangle is this issue of definition. So how defined or how open are these fields or these concepts, of artistic research and phenomenology, or artistic research and phenomenological research to establish a common base? Because this common base was never doubted in this instance. Well, well, well – in some cases, in some submissions, it is an issue in terms of art and research. Because also there is this model of artistic research or this concept of artistic research which I call the additive model, which is “I am making art” and “I make research”. And it can happen in two different combinations, first I make art and then I make research, or first I make research and then I make art. And we have these expressions: art-based research or theory-based art, or research-based art. We have them. And we have these cases too. But the point is, this triangle I wanted to describe …  on the one hand, the definition of these fields, not so much of what or with what definition but rather than -finitional combination. So how much defined, positively or negatively as you said. The other point for me is the operations between them. You talk about mutual transformation, hybridization, being-in-touch … I would also say “addition”. Philosophical “and”, so “plus”. So this is phenomenological plus artistic research, artistic research plus phenomenology. This is the second vertex of this triangle, and the third is this, at least for me now, four possibilities of expression of this field that results from the performance of these affinities so: artistic-phenomenological research; phenomenology- or phenomenologically-based or -informed or -oriented artistic research; and this aesthetic phenomenology, that we can also always invert and talk about phenomenological art or phenomenological aesthetics, and this which I can the “third”, this unnamed function, this unnamed possibility. I think that these three (diagramming a triangle) elements have a systemic dynamic, in the sense that they are mutually conditions of possibility and results. So somehow I think that we are constantly between these three points of these three polarities, or fields of operation: definition, relation and resulting entanglement.

 

I think that the thing around addition and the relation to “and” also seems interesting in relation to this hyphenation of artistic “and” phenomenological. On the one hand, to say something is artistic “and” phenomenological could suggest “at the same time”, it is both at the same time, it is both. It is both artistic “and” phenomenological. But there is already the question of ‘how’, in the sense of – is that in combination, or is that through integration, or through synthesis, so the nature of this ‘and as both’ is also open to a whole set of variations and possibilities. And then there is this additive sensein the way that you were talking in terms of art ‘and’ research, in the sense that first there is art and then there is research, it gets added to it.You could see this in some cases where first there is the artistic research and then there is the phenomenological practice which is applied to, so it follows. The one comes first and then the other is applied to it. There was another one … something else about and-ness. I guess the thing with the ‘and’ in this sense, and I don’t know whether there is a cautionary dimension to it, to this addition of the methods and practices of others fields and disciplines, from other fields of practice, to artistic research in a defensive way. That often within artistic research that nature of addition is one of bolstering or propping or validating or justifying or retrospectively rationalising the research that is done artistically. It is added on after the artistic research as a way of giving that research some credibility or research credentials.

 

This can also happen in different ways. So, me personally, I believe in this, in the model in which I affirm that artistic research is an autonomous form of research, and saying that, I am at least as structurally, or I keep writing this, so equating this with philosophy or humanities or mathematics or natural sciences or social sciences or whatever. And then, as is always the case, all these autonomous forms of research are connected. So, in different ways. So sociologists refer to philosophers, philosophers refer to physicians, physicians refer to anthropologists, is this the case, so to biologists ... and so on. So all these autonomous research forms are in touch with one another, and this is not a strategy of legitimation, it is a function of our thinking. So our being society: we think in different ways but there is this unity let’s say, that we are a group, one group, society or culture. And this is not a legitimising strategy. It can be in the say that good science is the one that can be used by engineering. Then this is a criteria of quality but I do not mean it necessarily in this way. I mean it in the spontaneous flux of everything: of practices, of results, of methods, of approaches, of ideas, of concepts in between all these autonomous fields, and also this enables the autonomy of these fields. It is also because natural science is autonomous that engineering, or applied research, can work. So I believe this is the way it works and I believe this is also the case for artistic research and in this sense, if a phenomenologist refers in his or her work to an artistic research practice or process or project, nothing to be added, this is what is happening the whole time. But I would say that this is not the form of relation that we are, I would say that this is not the form of relation that we are interested in within this Special Issue. And I think make it very clear … no this is another point. So it is not, we were not interested in artistic research which in the most common case is art-based phenomenology, or phenomenology of artistic research nor in the other way around. I would say this is was not our interest: the form of relationship between these two fields that we were interested to enquire into for this Special Issue, for this Special Issue is research, is itself an enquiry, it is not only a form of publishing or disseminating, it is a research endeavour. This maybe should be made clear – we are researching these affinities through or by means of a Special Issue in a journal.

 

The way that you were describing different research fields or practices somehow being in touch, was bringing to mind conversations around ‘ecologies of practices’. I think that the sense of an ecological language for thinking about the relation of things …. I have been finding this helpful, particularly a different way of describing mutual, reciprocal, transformative relations might be symbiotic, a form of symbiosis. But I think that the way that you were describing it as a spontaneous, a spontaneous ecology of in-touch-ness differentiated from a more instrumental sense of how one field of practice might “use” another. I guess there was … I need to delve into this … something about different species or varieties of symbiosis also felt interesting. On the one hand, there is a kind of predatory or parasitic form, where you are ‘using’ the other, for one’s own ends, so an instrumentalised relation to the other, perhaps even causing harm to the other. There is a kind of relationship that might cause harm or damage to the other in some kind of way. And then is something where there is a form which is more like mimicry, which is based on mimicry, which I think could also be interesting and is observable within the field – where one field of practice mimics the practices, approaches, methods, languages of the other, or appropriates. So mimicry or appropriation on the one hand, and a parasitic using or adopting or theft even on the other, both of which feel that any sense of reciprocity is lacking. It is somehow, maybe there is something about how to avoid those tendencies in practice. Or maybe that is a bit moral.

 

The basis of this is a judgement of course. I think that all these operations are possible and I would not discard or devaluate one. Now I am talking as a third person, so not as an artist, as in what I do. So I can say this is not a devaluation, but this is not what I do, this is what I do. I am not saying this is not worth to be done, because there is a for me added to it. So, yes, yes, there are all these operations on two fields more or less defined, that come to a third field, anyway, that can more or less autonomous in relation to these two. So I think that the highest point of autonomy is in this fourth, this what can be called this ‘third’, so cannot be, or should not be named as either artistic nor phenomenological. And I have to say now this is a variation I am more interested in, because very often I have the feeling that operating or handling these categories artistic or phenomenological, I was going to say we don’t really touch the point or the points or these points are not clear enough. So this would be like the situation where someone says ‘this is not phenomenological enough’, and then the question might be well what do you mean by phenomenological, which is a good question. The question is why is this not enough, but actually I think a more interesting question is ‘how, so, what do you mean then with phenomenology?’. And then I think maybe it will follow a model of doubt or maybe not, but with or without doubt comes a ‘well, phenomenology is this’. And that is why this is not enough or why this is not really. But there the focus is the definition of the field but not what are the constitutive traits of this, the specificities of these forms of research and this is what for me is interesting. One issue in this first preparation meeting for the research pavilion in Venice, and I come back again and again to this moment with Mika Elo who asked this question – is this about artists making phenomenology? Or is this about artists trying to be phenomenologists, which implies a clear hierarchy. So this is like by means of elevation, so art is elevated to an implicitly higher category which is philosophy. So this Hegelian model, yes. And we say we were surprised by the question, not because it is a weird question, but probably because we had not been facing this question enough ourselves. And then I think the answer was ‘no, of course not’, without having prepared the answer, OK then what. And I think this is the line of enquiry which for me is interesting. No clearly not, so I don’t want to move in a hierarchical field. I don’t consider any of these two fields as being more valuable or superior to the other, OK. So, what is this form of research I am interested in. And now do it without using the terms phenomenology and art.

 

There are two, I am thinking about there being these two almost different momentums within this commonality or in-touch-ness or relation. On the one hand, we talked about this almost at the beginning which was to conceive of a kind of taxonomy or typology of all of the possible connections between these two fields of practices, all of the varieties of connection between artistic research and phenomenology. Touching on what we are already saying: informed by, influenced by, oriented towards, mimicking, appropriating, using. There is a whole list. But the thing that strikes me as interesting within those relations is I wonder how much transformation functions or operates. That it feels as if there is a sense that both practices remain reasonably intact, that there is something about the use of one practice within another – does it actually transform or open up into a space of actual enquiry, even a folding back of enquiry to interrogate the sense of that research practice in its own right. So on the one hand there is a list of possible varieties of connection, and then there are these other species of connection which ‘force’, I use this term but not in a violent way, that force an opening or a rethinking or a re-evaluation of ways of doing things. So it doesn’t leave the practices intact, it requires transformation. So I wonder whether that “third” … there were two models that you were talking about. One seems to be, let me think of how to say it, one is an “and” but which is not ‘additive’, so it is aesthetic phenomenology or artistic phenomenology. Actually, the hyphen has disappeared here in a way. There has been the emergence of a new species which  is not so much to do with the in-touch-ness of two separate fields of practice but the emergence of a fully integrated or fully synthesized form that has its own autonomy perhaps.

 

Yes and no. The hyphen has disappeared but there is a substantive and an adjective, and this implies a hierarchy. Because the adjective qualifies the substantive. So if I say aesthetic phenomenology, I am making strong, phenomenology. This is my feeling. So what do you do, I do phenomenology, but aesthetically, and aesthetically.

 

Is this the case? Now I go on a tangent. I am in the last stage of editing a book on live coding, a performance practice. And the copyeditors at MIT, when we have written something like ‘live coding performance’, they have hyphenated live coding as if it is used in an adjectival sense. So live-coding becomes an adjective that qualifies. But we have argued that this is not the case as it creates hierarchy, it privileges the term performance and diminishes live coding in relation to that. And actually live coding is not used adjectivally but is a proper noun.

 

But then there would be the possibility of performative live coding and then performative is the adjective and live coding is the substantive.

 

I mean this is getting into semantics in a way but I wonder whether there is a way of conceiving of aesthetic phenomenology where that relationship between how is it, the noun and the adjective is disqualified, in order to, in order to really avoid this hierarchisation of the one above the other.

 

Yes I agree. And actually I was affirming this. What I was interested in, and I am saying it in past form, was an aesthetic phenomenology. And there were two, and actually in order I think to realise this what you are seeing as a non-hierarchical relationship, I think that this new thing, this ‘no name’ possibility is needed. Because, and the operation there is not of transformation. Because for me aesthetic phenomenology meant the transformation of phenomenology. For example, phenomenological practices that can be realised in other media and not only in the media of language. Or, even in the medium of language, with different practices of language which are not propositional or discursive. And this is a transformation – so phenomenology was this, and now it becomes that. It is phenomenology but it is transformed. OK. Interesting, for sure. But I think now I am much more interested in making a step further in talking about a form of research, acknowledging the genealogy, acknowledging that in its genealogy phenomenology and artistic research can be found. Or even stronger, that these fields are the origin of this new one, but this new one is a new one. Of course, due to this genealogy it is connected to them, but it is not the same. I don’t know if what I say is what I mean but would it be the same for a case like urban studies. So urban studies is not architecture, it is not sociology, it is not anthropology, it is not geography, it comes from all these fields. Without all these fields there will not be urban studies. But urban studies is something else. Funnily enough these fields also in academia, especially in the States, they exist not as their own discipline or department or faculty, so the institutionalisation sense, but as something else, and with their own name, yes. And I think I am going in this way. I think it is interesting to say, for me, but this is too much what I am interested in and not the issue, so I would say better to change track.

 

But there is something in trying to get close to the kind of relation or correlation that is present there, because as you are describing that I am thinking of terms like ‘composite’. Or even the sense of a research practice being a bricolage of other research practices, or an assemblage. Thinking about the sense that a bricolaged practice or an assemblage has its own identity even though it is comprised of a composite of parts.

 

I would talk about hybridisation. There is something new, and there is a recognition that this something new comes from something established or something already existing. This is my sense of hybrid, a hybrid is something that is neither/nor but is both at the same time. So it includes, but it takes another form. So not so much the idea of transformation but really a new birth.

 

Yes, and then on the other hand there is something that is … maybe it is the same. I am thinking … tonight I am doing a talk from a text I wrote recently which draws on the organism of lichen, but lichen is a particular, specific organism which is actually fungus and algae.

 

It is a symbiotic.

 

No it is not – because lichen is comprised as fungus and algae, and yet it has properties that are distinct from either of them.

 

Exactly, exactly.

 

So it is interesting, so it preserves the presence of its two constitutive parts – fungus and algae – (or we might think of artistic research and phenomenology) and yet at the same time it has characteristics that are not properties of either of them.

 

Yes, that is interesting.

 

There probably is a name for it biologically. But really it is about trying to be precise about the nature of the relation of those two things: they are not synthesised, they are not reconciled in some kind of way, they are held in relation where they are allowed to retain their distinctiveness, and yet there is something else which is neither the property of the one nor the other. And there is something about this that I am interested in.

 

Yes. Yes. And I think that this goes further than this than what I was thinking about, because what I was thinking about was let’s say, following your example, an entity that has qualities of both, but with the example of the lichen, you add this ‘and new properties’. So it is true that lichen has properties of the algae and the fungus, but it is not true that the algae and the fungus has properties of the lichen. And this is a step farther. I think that this is a fifth model I would say, or maybe in the fourth but I don’t see it. The fourth is still somehow additional, in terms of these threads and these threads – I am not sure.

 

It is also making me think about the model of conversation, I am not sure if this does relate. The nature of the in-touch could have a quality of conversation or of dialogue, where in that meeting of the one and the other, there is something that emerges that does not belong to the one or the other but emerges through the nature of the contact.

 

Yes, a conversation is let’s say, more than my talk and your talk. There we have the lichen.

 

And even the idiom of something being more than the sum of its parts seems to resonate.

 

Exactly, exactly. There must be a name for that. I have to look at it. But I thought lichen was thought as a symbiotic.

 

It probably is, but symbiosis has a whole set of sub-categories. So, symbiosis, I think that this is true in terms of its organisation, let me think, there are three main forms: commensalism, and then parasitic and mutualistic. But then there are others within this, so the nature of symbiosis varies in terms of degrees of relationship, of hierarchy, of harm, or mutual benefit, which I think makes it an interesting term for considering the in-touch-ness of practices. But it could also, maybe I go on a tangent now, maybe my concentration is wavering, but it could be that in terms of the call we sort of enter in with this question of ‘how is the commonality?’, but it may be that this is not the place of entry, or not the only place of entry. Oh no, there were two things in my mind – one was to go back to this typology and all these different varieties of in-touch-ness, and whether there is a way if avoiding, or whether there is an implicit sense of a hierarchy within that?

 

Yes, maybe this is a nice moment to literally read the call, because I am aware that I am working with my memories of the call but not the text. So here is the question, how did we formulate. Do we want to do that now? Should I read it.

 

I have it printed out also. It would be nice to read it. The thing that shone out on reading it again was the statement that ‘both sets of practices share a basic aspect, they approach their object of research as phenomena, that is, through their phenomenal presences’. So there was something about this through-ness, this ‘through phenomena’ that could also be the entry point.

 

Yes, and this is the logic of this ‘unnamed variation’, the identification of constitutive traits of both fields, that these, that in this unnamed form of research can be found. And this could be one. So, yes, I affirm that this form of research operates with phenomena. And in saying that, I was going to say, I am somehow affirming a definition of what a phenomenon is given by phenomenology. And then the critic of the hierarchy again can appear, yes, but the I am saying from the very beginning in this new form of research, you will find elements that comes from both, but these elements will not relate to one another hierarchically. This is the difference. But even there I think, even there I think, there will be, I mean, it is field, I was going to say battle field, it is not true, but it is a field of discussion. And even there, even the question what is a phenomena, can be answered in different ways, or has been answered in different ways in the history of what calls itself phenomenology. For example, the big debate about the relationship between the phenomenon and the thing, is the phenomenon the thing or not? This a big issue, an open issue for phenomenology. So in the attempt of the characterising, because it would not be a definition of a new form of research, which crystallises a form of affinity between artistic research and phenomenology. And I say characterises, because it would be a list, at least a list of characteristics, it would be characterising. It would be this. So this form of research operates with phenomena. And now it must be necessary to provide at least a minimal definition of what is meant – being the phenomena. For example, another characteristic would be, or could be, this form of research operates with or through the observation of phenomena. So this would exclude other forms like analysis or interpretation, of course, everything is problematic for can you really establish such a clear difference between observation and analysis, or observation and interpretation. Ok, whatever I say is going to be problematic, I know. But nevertheless we have to say this, something. This is what I imagine and as you say we try to provide an anchor in this call: we came from that, which was also the movement we made, you and me made, in Helsinki, starting from Mika’s question. The name of our research cell was going to be a different one, I don’t know if I can recall it, but it was not as it went, as it was Through Phenomena Themselves. I think it was closer to the original inspiration which is ‘to the things themselves’ which is Husserl. Do you remember?

 

It was Back to the Things Themselves.

 

But we took the ‘through’ and we took the ‘phenomena’, and this was a result of our reflections, triggered by Mika’s questions and I think that this found a formulation in the call, where we say, however they are, these forms of practices of research - we haven’t so much touched on the point of the practices, because it was one clear attempt of this Special Issue to publish practices, not just artistic research, but practices, specific practices – and then, we proposed this. We believe that these practices in a specific form crystalises this affinity between these two fields, that depart from phenomena, that operate with or on phenomena. This is an unquestionable characteristic of the kinds of practices we are interested in.

 

I am thinking about this term ‘characteristic’ and this idea, as you are saying, of a list of characteristics. So yes, characteristics. Is this something, is this towards the ‘what-ness’ of this field of practice?

 

Sure, sure. Yes, absolutely. So what is, there is always a very tricky relationship between the ‘what’ and the ‘how’. So is this, is this the answer to the question ‘what is this practice?, or is the question more ‘how is this practice?’. Probably it is more related to the 'what’.

 

I guess I was wondering whether there is a kind of corresponding list of hows. I guess the terms, the field that was coming to mind more was the tending or tendencies of practice, or the inclination or leaning of a practice, of practising in a particular kind of way, and whether that actually is closer to a sense of a shared attitude between artistic research and phenomenological research practices. So, yes, I can’t really conceive of which is the one and which is the other and how they meet in a way, but there feels to be something to do with a shared tendency or a shared attitude, and whether this is the same as describing the characteristics, or where the overlap is between these two registers of identification in a way.

 

I mean, attitude is also a word quite fundamentally used in phenomenology, right – like a ‘natural attitude’. And for me, the term attitude is too vague. And I try to, I am not saying it is wrong at all, but I try to specify it in terms of forms of action. If I, in the sense, if I have an attitude or if someone has an attitude towards something, this person is making something, is acting in a way. So it is possible to specify or to clarity attitudes in terms of actions, and I think this brings us, or at least it brings me, to my feeling that in doing so, we know more about what we mean. I think that an attitude is previous stage. There is this attitude, but how is this attitude, and then we, probably the step is to go into actions.

 

Or etymologies also I wonder? The reason I say this is because two words came to mind, not necessarily as alternatives, but in relation to attitude. One was ‘perspective’, thinking about in terms of per-spective, I mean I would have to look this up, but I guess, per- through, seeing. And the other was ‘disposition’, a shared disposition. A sense of this dis-position. I mean, how would this be - a shared un-positioning.

 

Exactly. But in both cases I see the action there. I situate myself in certain relation to this. So this disposition is a set of actions, it is possible to be expressed in terms of a set of actions. So, because a disposition is always taken or adopted. That is what I meant. A perspective, also in an optical sense, is to put oneself in a certain spatial relationship towards something else. You are doing that. So I take a perspective, in the sense that I situate myself here and not there. I move there, I do it. This is what I mean, it is possible to break out of these perspective, these positions, these attitudes as a set of actions. So this is what thinking in terms of practice is for me. Fine, everything is fine – but what do you do, and how do you do it, in the interests of what of course? And probably in this relationship between the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ is what characterises. So in terms of defining traits, this is the sense that I am using characteristics here. Yes. And I think that the move would be what do you and then how do you do it. So in this case, the ‘how’ will follow the ‘what’ in this kind of thinking.

 

I think one thing that is in my mind – it might not connect, but it feels present as something to pick up more, is the sense that the result is one of destablisation. I have been trying to look through some of the contributions, and thinking almost of some questions. So one – can I identify the phenomenon that is taken as the core of this particular enquiry? Not always so easy to do actually. What is the phenomenon that is taken as the object of study or as the object of enquiry in this particular enquiry? What are the practices and how are they activated? And then there was something about how is the mode of touch or contact between artistic and phenomenological research practices? So specific examples of this and then maybe this, maybe this sounds a bit instrumental, but ‘to what effect?’.

 

Yes, and the question before the last one, could be also put in these terms. What elements, what characteristic traits of artistic research, and of phenomenology are to be found in this practice.So there are these fields [gesturing two fields] and I take this and this and this and this and this, and [gesturing a gathering together] with this I work. Not with the whole. So in this sense, it could be also said that this is not phenomenology, in terms that this is not ‘fully’ phenomenology. And it could also be said the same way – it is not fully art. And yes it is true but it has these elements and this selection and organisation of constitutive traits of both fields is the way that this affinity between both fields is expressed.

 

And this ‘not fully’ is really different I think from ‘not enough’.

 

Absolutely, I notice this when I say it, I felt that. Exactly.

 

I noticed in Esa’s contribution he talks about there being ‘aspects of’. And this felt interesting – what is an aspect?

 

I recognise there my use of the terms ‘characteristics’ or ‘traits’. For me, this is another expression of the same. For example, one aspect would be – it works with phenomena. Which for me means to be aware, and to be coherent with this awareness, that I am working with an appearance, with something that appears. So, of course, always what comes then is this question is what appears a thing? Or its appearance, I mean, this is the whole debate. But this could be an aspect.

 

I think that the sense of aspect that I was drawn to, I was drawn to its etymology – a sense of ‘a relative position to’, but also something to do with ‘appearance’ within the definition or the etymology of aspect. I need to look at this more – an observing or to look, it also has this specare like perspective. Meaning the look one wears or the appearance of things, meaning the way one is facing.

 

Meaning the aspect of someone. I don’t know if you use it this way in English, do you say someone has a good aspect?

 

You could, it is not so common. But this sense of leaning in the direction of, or facing in the direction of … but maybe this goes back to a sense of deference. Artistic research facing in the direction of phenomenology. There is something still about orientation.

 

‘Aspect’ in the sense that Esa wrote, could be understood as some ‘faces’ of it. So it is not the whole image, it is not the whole, but part of it.

 

I think that this feels really interesting to explore more – this ‘not fully’, these ‘faces’ or ‘facets’ of something.

 

Yes, exactly. So there is also a third. So ‘not fully’, ‘not enough’, and the aspect of course of the ‘enough’. So, in terms of saying, actually what I am tending to decide is the ‘not fully’ or ‘not really’ or the ‘not enough’, no the ‘not enough’, no what I want to say is ‘enough’. So I recognise ‘enough’ as a criteria of validity, I recognise enough elements of artistic research practices and enough of phenomenological research practices to affirm that these practices crystalises enough an affinity between artistic research and phenomenology. This is different than to say this practice is artistic and is phenomenological. This other way, this other approach is different – because it doesn’t agree to this strong being.

 

The other phrase that comes to mind is not longer and not yet’, Victor Turner’s term for describing the liminal and I wonder whether this could be in relation to this ‘third other’ or the ‘not-yet-named’, it is no longer, but it is not yet.

 

Yes, I mean the negativity, I know there is a positivity of that, the positivity exactly of the liminal but actually what I am trying to reject is the ‘not enough’. And actually going in the direction of the ‘enough’ but the ‘enough’ not in the sense of affirming this practice as being, as being a practice of phenomenology. This is not the enough, the enough does not refer to that, but it is enough to be considered a realisation of this affinity. So I am referring to the affinity, not to the defined terms. And this is a big difference. So the argument is not that it is enough phenomenological, in order to be affirmed as being phenomenological, but it is enough phenomenological and enough artistic to be considered in this space, this liminal space, this third space, this space of affinity.So if someone says this enough phenomenological for this, and someone asks but is it phenomenology, the answer could be yes or not. But it would not be relevant, for our endeavour. And then we are affirming a kind of autonomy of this third space.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2nd Distillation

Transcript from Saturday 26 March 2022

Conversation (Part 1)

 

I think that we can easily agree that this form of dialogue should be, could be, one of aesthetic dialogue. So we try not to much to elaborate discursively but see how these issues resonate, the resonance or the reflection, in terms of giving back. Resonances more than constructing discourse.

 

I agree.

 

I think we know what we mean when I say that. And the second point is the project which takes the form of the call.

 

Yes, the call.

 

Do we want to refer to the literality of the call or to the spirit of the call?

 

I think what I have been trying to do or tune into is two-fold: one is the sense of going back to the call and looking at it again, now, with fresh eyes, to see what might be invoked by some of the propositions or statement of the call. How is it that these have been phrased and what arises from the fresh encounter with those ideas? So on the one hand, almost like newly going back to the call in its detail and yet at the same time holding in mind the journey travelled between the writing of the call and now, and all of what has been encompassed in that journey – from the initial expressions of interest, to the process of reading and encountering people’s contribution, to where we are now at this moment. So there are these two related but different experiences that I am holding in relation – this going back to the call as if I have not read it, and at the same time what can be understood of the call with the hindsight now of the journey travelled.

 

And in addition to it, maybe, and what I think would be nice, and useful and enriching, to consider let’s say where it all started which was in the preparation for Venice. There is a continuity from this moment, from the proposal for the research cell, to the preparatory meetings which were especially interesting, especially maybe the first. And then, not so much the experience of Venice, I would not go into that … but thinking a little bit of the continuation – where this call came from. Because for me the call crystallises some developments that took place there, yes. And I think that the whole journey as you say, is an attempt to explore a fieldwhich, a field, a field of research, which takes two references, or which refers to two fields which can be outlined as autonomous fields: one is artistic research or aesthetic research, and the other one is phenomenology. I mean, what I am saying is quite obvious, but maybe it is quite nice to revisit this obviousness. And somehow it is guided by an intuition that there is a common field, that there is something in common.

 

And I guess that one of the things that I have been coming back to I guess, is what is meant by, or what is implied by, or how is this ‘in common’? And, again, in part looking at and encountering some of the contributions and thinking about this sense of ‘in common’ and how this sense of ‘in common’ manifests? Interestingly, at times the sense of ‘common’ is manifested in its opposite – to it becomes demonstrated through difference. So you get in some of the contributions, an attempt to delineate the difference between artistic research and phenomenological practice. And then, I suppose, something about these different registers of ‘being in common’, or actually even, a sense of being-in-touch. Or whether it might be possible to think about these two fields of practice as being in touch and what that mode of being in touch might open up? I suppose, I imagine them almost like a Venn diagram, two spheres of practice, and then different possibilities emerge depending on how these two spheres of practice overlap or how they overlap or how they touch or how they repel even. Actually, as I am saying this, I am thinking about magnets. Is there a kind of pull between these two fields of practice, like magnetically, towards some kind of contact, or actually is it something like, interestingly with magnets, sometimes the closer you bring them, it is only then that the repellent force becomes evident, and they push themselves away. And I can even see a sense of this – while ever there was a little bit of distance the commonalities seem strong, but where there is an attempt in places to bring the two together somehow the differences became more magnified. Something to do with different registers of in-touch-ness, or connection, or contact or commonality, and what these different registers might open up in terms of how we think about these fields of practice, or even what might exist in between.

 

Another term could be affinity. So this intuition of an affinity between these two fields of practice. Maybe this is better than saying in common, because in common is already a form of affinity. Affinity is an interesting starting point. And there is also something which inhabits, two different problematics which inhabits each of these fields in my opinion, that come also into expression when this affinity is explored. And this can be on the one hand the tension between artistic and/or aesthetic practices – where practices is not questioned in this sphere. But the tension is between these practices and these practices being practices of research. We affirm that. The one’s who practice in this field of so-called, just to take a term, artistic research; we affirm that, but we know that this remains problematic. So, so, how artistic and aesthetic practices can be affirmed, and especially practices, as practices of research is still a question. And the other field, at least originally, is a field of philosophy. So phenomenology was born and was mainly developed as a philosophical endeavour. And so it is not a question that this is a form of research. This is research let’s say – this is not questioned there. But the question there is the question of practices, which in my opinion should be out of debate, because it was affirmed by Husserl. But, let’s say, the system of philosophy is not so used to identified practices or accepting that they are practitioners as are artists. So in standard terms, artists are practitioners and philosophers are theorists. Which is then to not be practitioners. So I see this tension, and this tension comes to take different forms of expression and also in terms of demarcating differences when we explore the possibilities of affinities. 

 

I think that the sense of degrees of, how would it be, qualifying or the nuance at each of those levels feels important. So if I understand, you were differentiating … not only is it artistic practices but it is artistic research practices. But again the thing that becomes a further point of nuance within this particular journal call is: not only artistic practices but artistic research practices, but not only artistic research practices but artistic research practices that have a particular relationship to phenomenology. I think maybe even the relationship between artistic research and phenomenology could be a different way of describing it. So I am curious in that nuance – is it to say: not only artistic practices but artistic research practices, and not only artistic research practices but artistic “hyphen” phenomenological research practices; or is it phenomenologically-oriented artistic research practices, or is it artistic research practices with an affinity to phenomenology … so that last nuance feels not yet clarified in a sense or maybe that this feels to be the terrain of exploration in a way. I think that the clarity of not only artistic practices but also artistic research practices, yes. This is very clear. But this transition into the meeting or the relationship with phenomenology opens up into a whole range of possibilities of connection. And I am curious about that really. This closeness to or distance from phenomenology – whether those artistic research practices also have to be phenomenological research practices or if it is this range of relation that we are exploring? Its closeness to, its distance from, its difference from, its proximity but difference – there is a whole set of nuances there that feels very generative somehow.

 

Yes, these formulations are interesting because they show different possibilities. Actually, I would say, that our take for this call was, a let’s say, a strong name. Naming this with a hyphen. Even there, we could have two variations: we could say it’s the same because the order does not matter, but I think that it matters. So I mean, artistic “hyphen” phenomenological research practices. We have always thought in this way, the two of us. Maybe because the impulse for this project came from us, came from the field of artistic research. But we never formulated it, or at least I never formulated it as phenomenological “hyphen” artistic research practices.We can say it is the same, but we can say it is not. We can say that this order matters or has a meaning or value. And this, anyway this I could call it the strong variation. So we are affirming, and I think that this is the approach within this call, the approach or the starting point of this Special Issue, we say yes we affirm that there are research practices that at the same time are artistic and phenomenological. The other, let’s say ‘soft variations’, which funnily enough had two variants now, I am realising this for the first time. So a phenomenologically-oriented or -based artistic research practice. We never, or at least I never formulated it in the other way so, an artistically-oriented or -based or informed phenomenological research practices. The whole time it seems to me that, and this is just a feeling, not just, this is a feeling, that phenomenology and by this I mean phenomenologists are fine where they are, there is no need. We are philosophers and we are doing phenomenology, our way of doing philosophy is phenomenology or our philosophical approach is phenomenological. But we are fine, you know. So self-sufficient. And so this impulse comes from us, from artistic research, from artistic researchers, to refer to them. That is why we are constantly thinking about phenomenologically-oriented or -based or -informed practices. So this for me, expresses this reference. From practices that are at least not born in this field, but attend to it, refer to it.And I think there could be a third possibility, which for me has been increasingly interesting which probably comes closer to the second or is easy to be thought through the second or starting from the second which is one for which I have no name. And this is like this third. So we relate there to practices … actually there is a fourth one. What I was trying to describe would be the fourth one. But there is a third. Wait a second, what is the second already. Well no. No I think it is the third which I think is the idea of an aesthetic phenomenology. I think that this is a third variation, which is clearly that it is phenomenology instantiated aesthetically. And the fourth variation would be this third, it is something that cannot properly be described as artistic or aesthetic nor as phenomenology.

 

There are lots of variations. Maybe going back to one of things that you started with, the sense of orientation or the directionality between artistic research and phenomenological research. If I look at the call again I think that there is something in the language of that spoke more to a sense of mutuality, mutual transformation, reciprocity, cross-contamination, hybridisation, where the sense of the one to the other was less defined and felt more like it could be a passage between both in a way. There is this question of whether that directionality from artistic research towards phenomenological research indicates hierarchy. What kind of relation does that set up in the sense of deference even? What you are pointing to is the sense of the organisation of artistic “hyphen” phenomenological, it is arrived at but never seen in the opposite orientation of phenomenological “hyphen” artistic, and there is something interesting that emerges there, a kind of taken-for-granted-ness about that particular correlation.So this struck me as interested. Then there is something about this hyphenation which feels as if it could also invite exploration. I think about this in relation to “choreo-graphic figures” where there is the use of the hyphen, and this practice of hyphenation had a dual function in a way: it holds the two things together but it also keeps them apart. So there is a dual function in hyphenation: there is a sense of holding in relation and also holding in separation. So there is something about the irreconcilability of the two sides of the hyphen, or the impossibility of synthesis indicated through that. And I think the thing that you were talking about … so yes, the hyphen on the one hand might suggest that they are the same, that they are the same, that they are interchangeable, no, that artistic and phenomenological practices are one and the same within a certain set of practices. But then you were talking about the sense that maybe the difference matters. So maybe I am interested in how this difference might matter. I am taking a tangent here, but one of the things I have been thinking about a lot in relation to the last rounds of review is these terms like “not enough” or “not phenomenological enough”. So there are a few terms: “almost” so“almost phenomenological” or “not enough”, “not phenomenological enough”. And also the presence of terms like “but” and “however”. And perhaps rather than seeing these as like deficits, maybe within there is a germ for really understanding the distinctiveness of artistic research within this terrain. I think that this sense of it not being 'enough’, ‘not being phenomenological enough’, signals that it somehow fails to be phenomenological, but I wonder whether there is something about the distinctiveness of certain artistic research practices where rather than it being a deficit or a failure, it really points to what artistic research does. That might be different from phenomenology. I am not sure, I have a suspicion that there is something about this sense of withholding or holding back or not quite following through into a phenomenological insight that seems to recur, that might be, there might something about the nature of artistic research practices that hold things open but don’t then follow all the way through into conclusion. There is something of this ‘not enough’, that also speaks of a ‘not yet’ or … I don’t know. I am not sure, but it feels like there is something there.

 

I mean, one thing I see there is also, I mean, starting from the beginning again, there is the affirmation of these two fields or spheres of practice. OK.  So we take this for granted: there is artistic research, there is phenomenology. OK. But now, how is this being expressed, in a normative closed way, in terms of a definitional way. This is artistic research, which mean all this is not. Or as you say ‘not enough’ or ‘not really’. Because there is artistic research. The positive side of this ‘not enough’ is the affirmation ‘this is’, this is artistic research, this is phenomenology. I think in this journey where these expressions were referring to phenomenology, nevertheless, there was one case, and it was my submission, when there was a common ‘is this artistic?’. No doubt this is aesthetic, but is it artistic? In this case, there was another term, that somehow justified (but not really again), but in the case of phenomenology there is no equivalent term, in terms of saying ‘well it is not phenomenology’ but it could be something like phenomenological. We would probably go with this phenomenologically-oriented or it is partly phenomenological. Interestingly both fields, and this is quite exceptional in philosophy or in humanities, in both fields, the definition of both fields has always been a question.So, the beginning of The Phenomenology of Perception is “What is the question, what is phenomenology?”. And the sense that it is strange that we keep asking the question almost fifty years after the foundation of it. I mean this could be the beginning of a book about artistic research: “What is artistic research?”. It is interesting that we keep asking this. So somehow this, in my opinion, this should make difficult to affirm that this is not phenomenology or this is ‘not enough’, this is ‘not phenomenological enough’. And somehow I think this openness, this definition of openness, about these two spheres could be, or probably should be if I am honest, a necessary starting point for this enquiry into these affinities. Let’s say as a norm, as a rule of the game, this cannot be said: it cannot be said it is not phenomenological or it is not artistic enough. Nevertheless, this rule should always be possible to be violated because it is interesting when someone says this is not artistic enough or phenomenological enough. It is interesting because even though I am affirming the impossibility to really say ‘this is artistic’ or ‘this is phenomenological’, we are using these terms. So there is a demarcation. We have a sense of ‘what is’ and ‘what is not’.

 

I was reading again Michael Biggs’ text, and was struck again by his comments in it that artistic research has almost, the historical definition making of it, has been through this sense of negative affirmation: what artistic research is not. There was a point where I was interested in the possibility of saying declaratively that artistic research is not phenomenology. Or even what the difference might be between saying ‘this is not phenomenology’ and ‘this is not phenomenological enough’. Whether even the second statement implies that there is already the attempt for one practice to be like the other, or be the other. And actually, maybe in the clarity of saying that artistic research is not phenomenology, that kind of deficit, deferent relation to phenomenology is somehow short-circuited. So if you were to say that artistic research is not phenomenology, is that even a pre-condition for exploring what the relationship is. I even wondered, is it possible to explore a relationship if things are considered to be “as”? Can there be any relationship between artistic research and phenomenology if they are considered to be one and the same practice? Is this condition of not-ness a precondition for exploring relations, or exploring connection or affinity?

 

It can be. What I am seeing is a triangle. One vertex of the triangle is this issue of definition. So how defined or how open are these fields or these concepts, of artistic research and phenomenology, or artistic research and phenomenological research to establish a common base? Because this common base was never doubted in this instance. Well, well, well – in some cases, in some submissions, it is an issue in terms of art and research. Because also there is this model of artistic research or this concept of artistic research which I call the additive model, which is “I am making art” and “I make research”. And it can happen in two different combinations, first I make art and then I make research, or first I make research and then I make art. And we have these expressions: art-based research or theory-based art, or research-based art. We have them. And we have these cases too. But the point is, this triangle I wanted to describe …  on the one hand, the definition of these fields, not so much of what or with what definition but rather than -finitional combination. So how much defined, positively or negatively as you said. The other point for me is the operations between them. You talk about mutual transformation, hybridization, being-in-touch … I would also say “addition”. Philosophical “and”, so “plus”. So this is phenomenological plus artistic research, artistic research plus phenomenology. This is the second vertex of this triangle, and the third is this, at least for me now, four possibilities of expression of this field that results from the performance of these affinities so: artistic-phenomenological research; phenomenology- or phenomenologically-based or -informed or -oriented artistic research; and this aesthetic phenomenology, that we can also always invert and talk about phenomenological art or phenomenological aesthetics, and this which I can the “third”, this unnamed function, this unnamed possibility. I think that these three (diagramming a triangle) elements have a systemic dynamic, in the sense that they are mutually conditions of possibility and results. So somehow I think that we are constantly between these three points of … these three polarities, or fields of operation: definition, relation and resulting entanglement.

 

I think that the thing around addition and the relation to “and” also seems interesting in relation to this hyphenation of artistic “and” phenomenological. On the one hand, to say something is artistic “and” phenomenological could suggest “at the same time”, it is both at the same time, it is both. It is both artistic “and” phenomenological. But there is already the question of ‘how’, in the sense of – is that in combination, or is that through integration, or through synthesis, so the nature of this ‘and as both’ is also open to a whole set of variations and possibilities. And then there is this additive sensein the way that you were talking in terms of art ‘and’ research, in the sense that first there is art and then there is research, it gets added to it.You could see this in some cases where first there is the artistic research and then there is the phenomenological practice which is applied to, so it follows. The one comes first and then the other is applied to it. There was another one … something else about and-ness. I guess the thing with the ‘and’ in this sense, and I don’t know whether there is a cautionary dimension to it, to this addition of the methods and practices of others fields and disciplines, from other fields of practice, to artistic research in a defensive way. That often within artistic research that nature of addition is one of bolstering or propping or validating or justifying or retrospectively rationalising the research that is done artistically. It is added on after the artistic research as a way of giving that research some credibility or research credentials.

 

This can also happen in different ways. So, me personally, I believe in this, in the model in which I affirm that artistic research is an autonomous form of research, and saying that, I am at least as structurally, or I keep writing this, so equating this with philosophy or humanities or mathematics or natural sciences or social sciences or whatever. And then, as is always the case, all these autonomous forms of research are connected. So, in different ways. So sociologists refer to philosophers, philosophers refer to physicians, physicians refer to anthropologists, is this the case, so to biologists ... and so on. So all these autonomous research forms are in touch with one another, and this is not a strategy of legitimation, it is a function of our thinking. So our being society: we think in different ways but there is this unity let’s say, that we are a group, one group, society or culture. And this is not a legitimising strategy. It can be in the say that good science is the one that can be used by engineering. Then this is a criteria of quality but I do not mean it necessarily in this way. I mean it in the spontaneous flux of everything: of practices, of results, of methods, of approaches, of ideas, of concepts in between all these autonomous fields, and also this enables the autonomy of these fields. It is also because natural science is autonomous that engineering, or applied research, can work. So I believe this is the way it works and I believe this is also the case for artistic research and in this sense, if a phenomenologist refers in his or her work to an artistic research practice or process or project, nothing to be added, this is what is happening the whole time. But I would say that this is not the form of relation that we are, I would say that this is not the form of relation that we are interested in within this Special Issue. And I think make it very clear … no this is another point. So it is not, we were not interested in artistic research which in the most common case is art-based phenomenology, or phenomenology of artistic research nor in the other way around. I would say this is was not our interest: the form of relationship between these two fields that we were interested to enquire into for this Special Issue, for this Special Issue is research, is itself an enquiry, it is not only a form of publishing or disseminating, it is a research endeavour. This maybe should be made clear – we are researching these affinities through or by means of a Special Issue in a journal.

 

The way that you were describing different research fields or practices somehow being in touch, was bringing to mind conversations around ‘ecologies of practices’. I think that the sense of an ecological language for thinking about the relation of things …. I have been finding this helpful, particularly a different way of describing mutual, reciprocal, transformative relations might be symbiotic, a form of symbiosis. But I think that the way that you were describing it as a spontaneous, a spontaneous ecology of in-touch-ness differentiated from a more instrumental sense of how one field of practice might “use” another. I guess there was … I need to delve into this … something about different species or varieties of symbiosis also felt interesting. On the one hand, there is a kind of predatory or parasitic form, where you are ‘using’ the other, for one’s own ends, so an instrumentalised relation to the other, perhaps even causing harm to the other. There is a kind of relationship that might cause harm or damage to the other in some kind of way. And then is something where there is a form which is more like mimicry, which is based on mimicry, which I think could also be interesting and is observable within the field – where one field of practice mimics the practices, approaches, methods, languages of the other, or appropriates. So mimicry or appropriation on the one hand, and a parasitic using or adopting or theft even on the other, both of which feel that any sense of reciprocity is lacking. It is somehow, maybe there is something about how to avoid those tendencies in practice. Or maybe that is a bit moral.

 

The basis of this is a judgement of course. I think that all these operations are possible and I would not discard or devaluate one. Now I am talking as a third person, so not as an artist, as in what I do. So I can say this is not a devaluation, but this is not what I do, this is what I do. I am not saying this is not worth to be done, because there is a for me added to it. So, yes, yes, there are all these operations on two fields more or less defined, that come to a third field, anyway, that can more or less autonomous in relation to these two. So I think that the highest point of autonomy is in this fourth, this what can be called this ‘third’, so cannot be, or should not be named as either artistic nor phenomenological. And I have to say now this is a variation I am more interested in, because very often I have the feeling that operating or handling these categories artistic or phenomenological, I was going to say we don’t really touch the point or the points or these points are not clear enough. So this would be like the situation where someone says ‘this is not phenomenological enough’, and then the question might be well what do you mean by phenomenological, which is a good question. The question is why is this not enough, but actually I think a more interesting question is ‘how, so, what do you mean then with phenomenology?’. And then I think maybe it will follow a model of doubt or maybe not, but with or without doubt comes a ‘well, phenomenology is this’. And that is why this is not enough or why this is not really. But there the focus is the definition of the field but not what are the constitutive traits of this, the specificities of these forms of research and this is what for me is interesting. One issue in this first preparation meeting for the research pavilion in Venice, and I come back again and again to this moment with Mika Elo who asked this question – is this about artists making phenomenology? Or is this about artists trying to be phenomenologists, which implies a clear hierarchy. So this is like by means of elevation, so art is elevated to an implicitly higher category which is philosophy. So this Hegelian model, yes. And we say we were surprised by the question, not because it is a weird question, but probably because we had not been facing this question enough ourselves. And then I think the answer was ‘no, of course not’, without having prepared the answer, OK then what. And I think this is the line of enquiry which for me is interesting. No clearly not, so I don’t want to move in a hierarchical field. I don’t consider any of these two fields as being more valuable or superior to the other, OK. So, what is this form of research I am interested in. And now do it without using the terms phenomenology and art.

 

There are two, I am thinking about there being these two almost different momentums within this commonality or in-touch-ness or relation. On the one hand, we talked about this almost at the beginning which was to conceive of a kind of taxonomy or typology of all of the possible connections between these two fields of practices, all of the varieties of connection between artistic research and phenomenology. Touching on what we are already saying: informed by, influenced by, oriented towards, mimicking, appropriating, using. There is a whole list. But the thing that strikes me as interesting within those relations is I wonder how much transformation functions or operates. That it feels as if there is a sense that both practices remain reasonably intact, that there is something about the use of one practice within another – does it actually transform or open up into a space of actual enquiry, even a folding back of enquiry to interrogate the sense of that research practice in its own right. So on the one hand there is a list of possible varieties of connection, and then there are these other species of connection which ‘force’, I use this term but not in a violent way, that force an opening or a rethinking or a re-evaluation of ways of doing things. So it doesn’t leave the practices intact, it requires transformation. So I wonder whether that “third” … there were two models that you were talking about. One seems to be, let me think of how to say it, one is an “and” but which is not ‘additive’, so it is aesthetic phenomenology or artistic phenomenology. Actually, the hyphen has disappeared here in a way. There has been the emergence of a new species which  is not so much to do with the in-touch-ness of two separate fields of practice but the emergence of a fully integrated or fully synthesized form that has its own autonomy perhaps.

 

Yes and no. The hyphen has disappeared but there is a substantive and an adjective, and this implies a hierarchy. Because the adjective qualifies the substantive. So if I say aesthetic phenomenology, I am making strong, phenomenology. This is my feeling. So what do you do, I do phenomenology, but aesthetically, and aesthetically.

 

Is this the case? Now I go on a tangent. I am in the last stage of editing a book on live coding, a performance practice. And the copyeditors at MIT, when we have written something like ‘live coding performance’, they have hyphenated live coding as if it is used in an adjectival sense. So live-coding becomes an adjective that qualifies. But we have argued that this is not the case as it creates hierarchy, it privileges the term performance and diminishes live coding in relation to that. And actually live coding is not used adjectivally but is a proper noun.

 

But then there would be the possibility of performative live coding and then performative is the adjective and live coding is the substantive.

 

I mean this is getting into semantics in a way but I wonder whether there is a way of conceiving of aesthetic phenomenology where that relationship between how is it, the noun and the adjective is disqualified, in order to, in order to really avoid this hierarchisation of the one above the other.

 

Yes I agree. And actually I was affirming this. What I was interested in, and I am saying it in past form, was an aesthetic phenomenology. And there were two, and actually in order I think to realise this what you are seeing as a non-hierarchical relationship, I think that this new thing, this ‘no name’ possibility is needed. Because, and the operation there is not of transformation. Because for me aesthetic phenomenology meant the transformation of phenomenology. For example, phenomenological practices that can be realised in other media and not only in the media of language. Or, even in the medium of language, with different practices of language which are not propositional or discursive. And this is a transformation – so phenomenology was this, and now it becomes that. It is phenomenology but it is transformed. OK. Interesting, for sure. But I think now I am much more interested in making a step further in talking about a form of research, acknowledging the genealogy, acknowledging that in its genealogy phenomenology and artistic research can be found. Or even stronger, that these fields are the origin of this new one, but this new one is a new one. Of course, due to this genealogy it is connected to them, but it is not the same. I don’t know if what I say is what I mean but would it be the same for a case like urban studies. So urban studies is not architecture, it is not sociology, it is not anthropology, it is not geography, it comes from all these fields. Without all these fields there will not be urban studies. But urban studies is something else. Funnily enough these fields also in academia, especially in the States, they exist not as their own discipline or department or faculty, so the institutionalisation sense, but as something else, and with their own name, yes. And I think I am going in this way. I think it is interesting to say, for me, but this is too much what I am interested in and not the issue, so I would say better to change track.

 

But there is something in trying to get close to the kind of relation or correlation that is present there, because as you are describing that I am thinking of terms like ‘composite’. Or even the sense of a research practice being a bricolage of other research practices, or an assemblage. Thinking about the sense that a bricolaged practice or an assemblage has its own identity even though it is comprised of a composite of parts.

 

I would talk about hybridisation. There is something new, and there is a recognition that this something new comes from something established or something already existing. This is my sense of hybrid, a hybrid is something that is neither/nor but is both at the same time. So it includes, but it takes another form. So not so much the idea of transformation but really a new birth.

 

Yes, and then on the other hand there is something that is … maybe it is the same. I am thinking … tonight I am doing a talk from a text I wrote recently which draws on the organism of lichen, but lichen is a particular, specific organism which is actually fungus and algae.

 

It is a symbiotic.

 

No it is not – because lichen is comprised as fungus and algae, and yet it has properties that are distinct from either of them.

 

Exactly, exactly.

 

So it is interesting, so it preserves the presence of its two constitutive parts – fungus and algae – (or we might think of artistic research and phenomenology) and yet at the same time it has characteristics that are not properties of either of them.

 

Yes, that is interesting.

 

There probably is a name for it biologically. But really it is about trying to be precise about the nature of the relation of those two things: they are not synthesised, they are not reconciled in some kind of way, they are held in relation where they are allowed to retain their distinctiveness, and yet there is something else which is neither the property of the one nor the other. And there is something about this that I am interested in.

 

Yes. Yes. And I think that this goes further than this than what I was thinking about, because what I was thinking about was let’s say, following your example, an entity that has qualities of both, but with the example of the lichen, you add this ‘and new properties’. So it is true that lichen has properties of the algae and the fungus, but it is not true that the algae and the fungus has properties of the lichen. And this is a step farther. I think that this is a fifth model I would say, or maybe in the fourth but I don’t see it. The fourth is still somehow additional, in terms of these threads and these threads – I am not sure.

 

It is also making me think about the model of conversation, I am not sure if this does relate. The nature of the in-touch could have a quality of conversation or of dialogue, where in that meeting of the one and the other, there is something that emerges that does not belong to the one or the other but emerges through the nature of the contact.

 

Yes, a conversation is let’s say, more than my talk and your talk. There we have the lichen.

 

And even the idiom of something being more than the sum of its parts seems to resonate.

 

Exactly, exactly. There must be a name for that. I have to look at it. But I thought lichen was thought as a symbiotic.

 

It probably is, but symbiosis has a whole set of sub-categories. So, symbiosis, I think that this is true in terms of its organisation, let me think, there are three main forms: commensalism, and then parasitic and mutualistic. But then there are others within this, so the nature of symbiosis varies in terms of degrees of relationship, of hierarchy, of harm, or mutual benefit, which I think makes it an interesting term for considering the in-touch-ness of practices. But it could also, maybe I go on a tangent now, maybe my concentration is wavering, but it could be that in terms of the call we sort of enter in with this question of ‘how is the commonality?’, but it may be that this is not the place of entry, or not the only place of entry. Oh no, there were two things in my mind – one was to go back to this typology and all these different varieties of in-touch-ness, and whether there is a way if avoiding, or whether there is an implicit sense of a hierarchy within that?

 

Yes, maybe this is a nice moment to literally read the call, because I am aware that I am working with my memories of the call but not the text. So here is the question, how did we formulate. Do we want to do that now? Should I read it.

 

I have it printed out also. It would be nice to read it. The thing that shone out on reading it again was the statement that ‘both sets of practices share a basic aspect, they approach their object of research as phenomena, that is, through their phenomenal presences’. So there was something about this through-ness, this ‘through phenomena’ that could also be the entry point.

 

Yes, and this is the logic of this ‘unnamed variation’, the identification of constitutive traits of both fields, that these, that in this unnamed form of research can be found. And this could be one. So, yes, I affirm that this form of research operates with phenomena. And in saying that, I was going to say, I am somehow affirming a definition of what a phenomenon is given by phenomenology. And then the critic of the hierarchy again can appear, yes, but the I am saying from the very beginning in this new form of research, you will find elements that comes from both, but these elements will not relate to one another hierarchically. This is the difference. But even there I think, even there I think, there will be, I mean, it is field, I was going to say battle field, it is not true, but it is a field of discussion. And even there, even the question what is a phenomena, can be answered in different ways, or has been answered in different ways in the history of what calls itself phenomenology. For example, the big debate about the relationship between the phenomenon and the thing, is the phenomenon the thing or not? This a big issue, an open issue for phenomenology. So in the attempt of the characterising, because it would not be a definition of a new form of research, which crystallises a form of affinity between artistic research and phenomenology. And I say characterises, because it would be a list, at least a list of characteristics, it would be characterising. It would be this. So this form of research operates with phenomena. And now it must be necessary to provide at least a minimal definition of what is meant – being the phenomena. For example, another characteristic would be, or could be, this form of research operates with or through the observation of phenomena. So this would exclude other forms like analysis or interpretation, of course, everything is problematic for can you really establish such a clear difference between observation and analysis, or observation and interpretation. Ok, whatever I say is going to be problematic, I know. But nevertheless we have to say this, something. This is what I imagine and as you say we try to provide an anchor in this call: we came from that, which was also the movement we made, you and me made, in Helsinki, starting from Mika’s question. The name of our research cell was going to be a different one, I don’t know if I can recall it, but it was not as it went, as it was Through Phenomena Themselves. I think it was closer to the original inspiration which is ‘to the things themselves’ which is Husserl. Do you remember?

 

It was Back to the Things Themselves.

 

But we took the ‘through’ and we took the ‘phenomena’, and this was a result of our reflections, triggered by Mika’s questions and I think that this found a formulation in the call, where we say, however they are, these forms of practices of research - we haven’t so much touched on the point of the practices, because it was one clear attempt of this Special Issue to publish practices, not just artistic research, but practices, specific practices – and then, we proposed this. We believe that these practices in a specific form crystalises this affinity between these two fields, that depart from phenomena, that operate with or on phenomena. This is an unquestionable characteristic of the kinds of practices we are interested in.

 

I am thinking about this term ‘characteristic’ and this idea, as you are saying, of a list of characteristics. So yes, characteristics. Is this something, is this towards the ‘what-ness’ of this field of practice?

 

Sure, sure. Yes, absolutely. So what is, there is always a very tricky relationship between the ‘what’ and the ‘how’. So is this, is this the answer to the question ‘what is this practice?, or is the question more ‘how is this practice?’. Probably it is more related to the 'what’.

 

I guess I was wondering whether there is a kind of corresponding list of hows. I guess the terms, the field that was coming to mind more was the tending or tendencies of practice, or the inclination or leaning of a practice, of practising in a particular kind of way, and whether that actually is closerto a sense of a shared attitude between artistic research and phenomenological research practices. So, yes, I can’t really conceive of which is the one and which is the other and how they meet in a way, but there feels to be something to do with a shared tendency or a shared attitude, and whether this is the same as describing the characteristics, or where the overlap is between these two registers of identification in a way.

 

I mean, attitude is also a word quite fundamentally used in phenomenology, right – like a ‘natural attitude’. And for me, the term attitude is too vague. And I try to, I am not saying it is wrong at all, but I try to specify it in terms of forms of action. If I, in the sense, if I have an attitude orif someone has an attitude towards something, this person is making something, is acting in a way. So it is possible to specify or to clarity attitudes in terms of actions, and I think this brings us, or at least it brings me, to my feeling that in doing so, we know more about what we mean. I think that an attitude is previous stage. There is this attitude, but how is this attitude, and then we, probably the step is to go into actions.

 

Or etymologies also I wonder? The reason I say this is because two words came to mind, not necessarily as alternatives, but in relation to attitude. One was ‘perspective’, thinking about in terms of per-spective, I mean I would have to look this up, but I guess, per- through, seeing. And the other was ‘disposition’, a shared disposition. A sense of this dis-position. I mean, how would this be - a shared un-positioning.

 

Exactly. But in both cases I see the action there. I situate myself in certain relation to this. So this disposition is a set of actions, it is possible to be expressed in terms of a set of actions. So, because a disposition is always taken or adopted. That is what I meant. A perspective, also in an optical sense, is to put oneself in a certain spatial relationship towards something else. You are doing that. So I take a perspective, in the sense that I situate myself here and not there. I move there, I do it. This is what I mean, it is possible to break out of these perspective, these positions, these attitudes as a set of actions. So this is what thinking in terms of practice is for me. Fine, everything is fine – but what do you do, and how do you do it, in the interests of what of course? And probably in this relationship between the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ is what characterises. So in terms of defining traits, this is the sense that I am using characteristics here. Yes. And I think that the move would be what do you and then how do you do it. So in this case, the ‘how’ will follow the ‘what’ in this kind of thinking.

 

I think one thing that is in my mind – it might not connect, but it feels present as something to pick up more, is the sense that the result is one of destablisation. I have been trying to look through some of the contributions, and thinking almost of some questions. So one – can I identify the phenomenon that is taken as the core of this particular enquiry? Not always so easy to do actually. What is the phenomenon that is taken as the object of study or as the object of enquiry in this particular enquiry? What are the practices and how are they activated? And then there was something about how is the mode of touch or contact between artistic and phenomenological research practices? So specific examples of this and then maybe this, maybe this sounds a bit instrumental, but ‘to what effect?’.

 

Yes, and the question before the last one, could be also put in these terms. What elements, what characteristic traits of artistic research, and of phenomenology are to be found in this practice.So there are these fields [gesturing two fields] and I take this and this and this and this and this, and [gesturing a gathering together] with this I work. Not with the whole. So in this sense, it could be also said that this is not phenomenology, in terms that this is not ‘fully’ phenomenology. And it could also be said the same way – it is not fully art. And yes it is true but it has these elements and this selection and organisation of constitutive traits of both fields is the way that this affinity between both fields is expressed.

 

And this ‘not fully’ is reallydifferent I think from ‘not enough’.

 

Absolutely, I notice this when I say it, I felt that. Exactly.

 

I noticed in Esa’s contribution he talks about there being ‘aspects of’. And this felt interesting – what is an aspect?

 

I recognise there my use of the terms ‘characteristics’ or ‘traits’. For me, this is another expression of the same. For example, one aspect would be – it works with phenomena. Which for me means to be aware, and to be coherent with this awareness, that I am working with an appearance, with something that appears. So, of course, always what comes then is this question is what appears a thing? Or its appearance, I mean, this is the whole debate. But this could be an aspect.

 

I think that the sense of aspect that I was drawn to, I was drawn to its etymology – a sense of ‘a relative position to’, but also something to do with ‘appearance’ within the definition or the etymology of aspect. I need to look at this more – an observing or to look, it also has this specare like perspective. Meaning the look one wears or the appearance of things, meaning the way one is facing.

 

Meaning the aspect of someone. I don’t know if you use it this way in English, do you say someone has a good aspect?

 

You could, it is not so common. But this sense of leaning in the direction of, or facing in the direction of … but maybe this goes back to a sense of deference. Artistic research facing in the direction of phenomenology. There is something still about orientation.

 

‘Aspect’ in the sense that Esa wrote, could be understood as some ‘faces’ of it. So it is not the whole image, it is not the whole, but part of it.

 

I think that this feels really interesting to explore more – this ‘not fully’, these ‘faces’ or ‘facets’ of something.

 

Yes, exactly. So there is also a third. So ‘not fully’, ‘not enough’, and the aspect of course of the ‘enough’. So, in terms of saying, actually what I am tending to decide is the ‘not fully’ or ‘not really’ or the ‘not enough’, no the ‘not enough’, no what I want to say is ‘enough’. So I recognise ‘enough’ as a criteria of validity, I recognise enough elements of artistic research practices and enough of phenomenological research practices to affirm that these practices crystalises enough an affinity between artistic research and phenomenology. This is different than to say this practice is artistic and is phenomenological. This other way, this other approach is different – because it doesn’t agree to this strong being.

 

The other phrase that comes to mind is not longer and not yet’, Victor Turner’s term for describing the liminal and I wonder whether this could be in relation to this ‘third other’ or the ‘not-yet-named’, it is no longer, but it is not yet.

 

Yes, I mean the negativity, I know there is a positivity of that, the positivity exactly of the liminal but actually what I am trying to reject is the ‘not enough’. And actually going in the direction of the ‘enough’ but the ‘enough’ not in the sense of affirming this practice as being, as being a practice of phenomenology. This is not the enough, the enough does not refer to that, but it is enough to be considered a realisation of this affinity. So I am referring to the affinity, not to the defined terms. And this is a big difference. So the argument is not that it is enough phenomenological, in order to be affirmed as being phenomenological, but it is enough phenomenological and enough artistic to be considered in this space, this liminal space, this third space, this space of affinity.So if someone says this enough phenomenological for this, and someone asks but is it phenomenology, the answer could be yes or not. But it would not be relevant, for our endeavour. And then we are affirming a kind of autonomy of this third space.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1st Distillation

Conversation 2 [28 March 2022] Distillation of transcript through marking

Transcript from Conversation Part II

28 March 2022

 

Doing the transcription made me realise the thing we have talked before about resonance – the listening again is a way of extending the resonance of the conversation.

 

It is also fantastic to be able to read it again, which is another kind of resonance […]

 

It is a touching point really, maybe to come back to some things. There are somethings that I was curious to come back to maybe as a way of saying again, something around the formulations of the different variations that became clearer in the reading of the transcript. And we also can take on a new direction.

 

Yes, yes. We can do both of course. I was feeling the need of introducing another, somehow a new aspect, to go back again to the call and see if there are other aspects. Because we are already very focused on these modalities of relationship and the operations that lead or might lead to them. Actually, when we touched on the point of the lichen and we move on in this, there is a point for me that is still interesting, I mean interesting in the sense that for me it is new. Which I don’t know if this should be the criteria for this conversation – so new for me. But why not. It doesn’t have to be because it is an editorial text and it is for others, no, no. It can be a prospective thing. It can be part of the journey that we have travelled, being an arrival point and a view, let’s say a depth view, of the past. So I was wondering, especially at the beginning, because I went for these two modalities of highlighting, so blue and black, underlining and marking. It works well but it was also like what is the difference. Because the highlighting was something that can be developed, and the underlining was this is interesting. And sometimes, I felt, I want to really develop the findings, so is there two different modalities of marking. But it is clear. So as you want. I can really follow you.

 

Maybe I would return having reread the transcript, to return to the four variations. It felt that it was a way of – not even that it needs more elaboration – but to return to it, and then one of the things that came through strongly for me as an area that we have not yet explored is the sense of practices and the distinctiveness of practices.

 

Exactly.

 

But maybe first to touch on this. I think one of the things that really struck me, was a line that you said about how the Special Issue itself is not a means of dissemination but a means of research, and for researching these relations. That felt very significant to acknowledge that. So that expression of these different formulations felt, maybe there is a sense of it being, I mean I know it was also already there in your own thinking, but an expression of these different variations. So if I understood them properly or in the way that they were expressed. The first variation was described as a ‘soft variation’, in the sense that it was phenomenologically oriented, informed, influenced or based artistic research practices. And the interesting thing is that this relationship can be inverted though we noticed it was present to a lesser degree in that you could also have arts oriented, informed, influenced or based phenomenological research practices.

 

Yes, sure. I mean first of all I named this soft, because the hard one was the one with the hyphen. So it was much more affirmative that this is both. And the other one, this oriented one has a softer, more dynamic relationship. But when I read that, so more commonly we think phenomenologically-based artistic research, so the weight is in the artistic, I think, well actually there is a think a tendency within phenomenology, within language-based phenomenology, or phenomenology within philosophy, which is, this tendency of phenomenology to be literary. Maybe this is a move from phenomenology to the arts. So this exists, also in the realm of philosophical phenomenology. When philosophy, I was going to say, goes to become literature, and as we mentioned in the work of Merleau-Ponty, it is really amazing to see, to see the last text which was published as a manuscript after his death, the way he is really thinking through writing, but this is another thing.

 

I think that this is really interesting because maybe it might complicate some of the consequences that seemed to come from some of these relationships. Because as we were talking it seemed that this particular variation tended to express a reference and also potentially a hierarchy. But maybe this dimension of the literary, the relation of phenomenology to literature as an art form, maybe complicates that a little. I am not sure.

 

It allowed or for me is proof, that this inversion takes place. So whether in the first case, for me, the stronger variation of artistic-phenomenological, I also wonder if the inversion changes. We could say, but we could also say not really. But in this phenomenologically-oriented or artistically-oriented or in the case of aesthetic phenomenology or inverse as phenomenological aesthetics, in this case, the order, this inversion matters. And it indicates at least a certain hierarchy, I would say. Or different forms of hierarchy.

 

So in this second variation that you mention already, this hyphenated variation, or strong variation, we were talking about as you say, artistic-phenomenological research practices and also noticing to maybe a lesser extent or maybe not-even-extent phenomenological-artistic research practices. But there was still the question of how is the quality of this hyphen – what does it indicate towards, there was something about it having an additive dimension, of both-ness, of combination, also this quality of plus-ness, artistic research plus phenomenology. And I think even within this category there was this notion that something, that there could be ‘enough’ presence of a research practice but it might not be fully expressed, it might not express the full depth and breadth of phenomenology to be able to be considered in this category.

 

I am not sure about that. I tend to think, two comments on that. I tend to think that artistic-phenomenological or the other way around, I wonder say no real difference between them, implies that, it implies two things for me. One is that it is artistic, it is enough artistic and it is enough phenomenological.This for me is embedded in this, in this construction but maybe not. And this ‘not really’ or ‘not enough’ is probably best expressed for me in the phenomenology-oriented … so I can say it is not really phenomenology, but it is phenomenologically oriented. And whereas if I say artistic-phenomenological practice then it is both – fully or at least enough. This is my feeling of the expression.

 

So let me just think again. So the criteria of this would be enough but it might not be fully. There was a line that I was really struck by, this sense that enough, that enough crystalises the sense of affinity between the two practices, the two fields of practice, but not so fully as to be. One of the things I was struck by in the conversation was this almost refusal of this category of being: artistic research is, or phenomenology is. Or maybe refusal is a bit too heavy, but maybe deviation .. but maybe I am not understanding this fully.

 

I think it depends on the model right, because if the model is based on transformation or on contamination or at least a certain kind of  … then I would say, I would repeat what I said, that in order for this it is necessary to have a certain definitional softness. So if I say this is, and this is  and there is a clear barrier between both, then I would say this model of 100% and 100%, all this artistic and all this phenomenological, you find all of this in these practices, so this would be like, there you can have a strong definition of each field, not a problem. But if for example, if we go for phenomenologically-oriented. We can say well I don’t need to depart from a definition of phenomenology, I can depart from a sense that phenomenology is, I can depart from certain traits. And I can take that in order to say this is the orientation. But I am not referring to a full definition, if it exists, of phenomenology, independently of if it exists or not, of the idea of the possibility of, I don’t need to depart from the possible definition of phenomenology.

 

One of the things that seemed characteristic of this particular variation is that the constitutive parts of artistic research and phenomenology may possibly be transformed in each direction, but there is not the production of this ‘third’ possibility that is described in the fourth variation. So the mode is combination or addition but not the birth of the new, no-name yet. At least that is how I could see this hyphenated practice – as combination or as both-ness or even as mutual transformation, but not necessarily producing properties that are distinct from those constitutive fields of practice.

 

Yes. Yes, and I have to say, in reading the transcription, there was a point. There is the idea of the lichen as the inspiration, for me, it is a model. And then we came to talk about how we, well, how we for example mention these kinds of examples of practice that we are looking for or we want to explore as I say through the Special Issue was that they work with phenomena. And this in this moment, so looking at it, so yes, let’s affirm that, there are two moves, let’s affirm that, artistic research and phenomenology work with phenomena or through phenomena. OK, there we have a common element, there we have an affinity, there we have common ground. And then the next move was but in saying that do we, so what do we understand of these phenomena. And there, there is a possibility in understanding phenomena. Let’s say that artistic research has never defined what a phenomenon is, but phenomenology has. So let’s take this. OK, there is again a hierarchy, a possible hierarchical element in favour of phenomenologylet’s say. But, if instead of going this way we take phenomena somehow as an empty vessel and say, and what do we mean by phenomena, and we don’t take the phenomenological definition. We allow this practice to say or to show what this phenomena is, there we have the moment of novelty. There was something that was not, at least not fully, constitutive either in one side or the other. And looking at it in this way, I saw the work of something new departing from the affirmation of a common ground, a minimal, or even empty common ground. I cannot really grasp it. I wonder if there are four or five models of this no-named or non-named or not-yet-named model, implied by let’s say the lichen model. So the emergence of new properties, different from the original one. I don’t know but I see at least a potentiality in that.

 

What I was curious about was whether that sense of ‘new-ness’ is present in the third or the fourth variation, in that, whether this sense in the third variation as it was described as phenomenology instantiated artistically or aesthetically, in other media.  This feels as if it could also be something to explore, the sense of what might it mean to do phenomenology through other media than language, or also the variation there was with and through other media than language, and with language in other ways beyond discursive, propositional forms. So there is also a split at that point, and whether this leads to a ‘new’. I don’t know – this possibility in the third variation of artistic or aesthetic phenomenology somehow through this expression of phenomenology through artistic means or through other media leads to the possibility of new forms, new practices.

 

I think new practices for sure. I think when I say that I have as a reference Cezanne’s Doubt by Merleau-Ponty. It is funny because when you talk to people about this everyone has a very different interpretation of this text. But my interpretation is that, at least one aspect of this, is that Merleau-Ponty affirms that Cezanne makes phenomenology through painting. Why? Because it allows us to see how colours or how a colour or how a landscape emerges. How we come to see a colour. He is not showing us the colour but allowing us to have access to this source of meaning, to observe the source of meaning. And because I think this was the -finitive of phenomenology for Merleau-Ponty, he affirmed that. Cezanne was doing phenomenology in the medium of paint. So this is what is in the back of my head when I affirm an aesthetic phenomenology. This is part of it.

 

I am also curious, one of the things I have been trying to think, I think it was mentioned in the conversation before – one of the characteristics or traits might be that these practices are engaged in the observation of phenomena. And it seemed as if there are various practices or media that highlight or amplify that experience of observation, in some kind of capacity. I think even the sense that there might be technologically-mediated forms of observation or practices that somehow allow the experience of observation to be sharable with others. Maybe this is a territory that is quite big on its own. The other dimension was aesthetic or artistic phenomenology has this capacity, it is engaged in the observation of phenomena, but there is also this phenomena-producing component to it. Or I am curious about that – is that true? Is this true only of aesthetic or artistic phenomenological practices or does phenomenological practices also do that – not only observing the phenomena but also simultaneously producing phenomena. I know that Esa has talked about this as ‘artistic phenomena’. This also seemed to be coming through in Michael Biggs’ contribution in the sense of what fiction can do, fiction in the sense of producing an experience that is not already given.

 

Yes. I tend to think that, maybe I am wrong, that phenomena are neither, phenomena are neither the media nor the practices or the artifacts that they generate. So in the case of fictionality I would understand this as a field of practices based on in a big part imagination, fantasy, and the activation of these practices creates enabling conditions, or provides enabling conditions, for the emergence of new phenomena. I have to really concentrate. So artistic artifacts, I would tend to understand artistic artifacts in the same sense, so, a novel, a fictional novel, a fictional text – this is not fictionality it is an artifact, and is produced in this field. It is in touch with it that phenomena will appear, it is in the experience, or through the experience, or by virtue of the experience of, the experience of this artifact or that this artifact enables or co-enables that phenomena will appear. So I tend to think that phenomena are always emerging, they are never, cannot be produced and cannot be contained in an artifact, or in practices, or in a medium. It is not equal to the practices, and the artifacts and the medium. So maybe I am fully wrong, but this is where I situate phenomena. So, an artistic phenomenology would be a phenomenology substantiated through artistic practices. This would be my take.

 

I was thinking, when I was thinking about the sense of practices: what is stake in showing or sharing practices, or wanting to publish practices? There was interesting sense of ‘where’ is the practice – not what is the practice, but where is the practice? Not even how is the practice, but where is it? Even to the point that it made me wonder, maybe this is wrong, are practices themselves phenomenal?

 

I think everything is a phenomenon if it is thematised. So the relation between phenomena and observation is circular. If I observe something given in experience, I turn it into a phenomenon, I would say. And the other way around, a phenomenon can appear without me calling or me focusing awareness, and can mobilise my awareness. So practices can be a phenomenon if this what I observe? So if I observe how this practice appears in my experience, if I ask my question: how is this practice and my way to address this question is to observe how this practice is appearing in my experience, then practice is a phenomenon. That is the way I would think about it. And in this sense, this is a relevant question for this aim of publishing practices. Which is easy to say, not absolutely easy because it sounds a bit forced or weird, but this was our aim. And I think in this regard, and in relation to possibilities variations of relation between artistic research and phenomenology, also in regard to publishing practices in this Special Issue, is also a research endeavour.Because clearly, at least for me, we were formulating this without knowing what it was. And the radicality is that we are saying we want to publish practices, and not the results of practices. No, we want to publish the practices themselves. In the strict sense there is the question, is this operation possible. Is a practice able to be published? …. In a journal. Because if we think about making public, then yes. No problem. I can show it and share, I can display live my practices. No doubt. Well, or maybe. But the field of possibility is quite open but in a journal, or through a journal. There with these constraints.

 

I guess this is why I am interested, maybe this is the wrong question, but where is the practice? Where does a practice manifest? Or where is a practice operative? And this was leading me to the phenomenal dimension of practice. Or maybe even thinking in the sense of how a phenomenological practice is manifested within that frame? And the emphasis perhaps on writing. Does the writing (noun) manifest the practice of writing? Or is what we encounter an artifact? Because we have been talking in these terms – the result or outcome of a practice might be considered as an artifact, but not the practice itself, or not necessarily the practice itself. What does that show or reveal of the relation of writing within phenomenology more broadly?

 

Yes, now I understand your where. Where is the practice? Because I would say the fact is that we can only publish artifacts … in a journal. For the fact is that in a journal only artifacts can be published. Departing from this, which I would take as a fact, what we could clearly see in advance, was that we need diversity of media. But nevertheless we continue publishing artifacts. So on a first level of the meaning of publishing, so in the sense of what we will make public on the first level, will be artifacts, and then is you question: where in these artifacts is the practice, we could add, to be found?

 

I actually think that what we publish or what seems to be being published are two moments within the practising, in the sense that many of the contributions have some dimension of score or outline of a practice, so there is a kind of pre- moment, or a to-come moment within that. And then there is the artifact, which is in a way after the fact of practising to a certain extent. And what is interesting is that there is this gap, which opens up between the description of what a practice involved and what emerges through the practising of that practice. Yes, I am curious whether something does appear or emerge through the conjunction of those two moments of showing in a way, or is there something that is revealed through the combination of different kinds of manifestation or tangibility … because all of those things seems to be to do with how do you give expression to a first person experience of observation. On the one hand, I was wondering, what is this, is this to do with the externalisation of an experience of observing, or the giving of tangibility to the experience of observation, or attention, or noticing. Practices of the attending to, or noticing, or observing of a phenomenon, and through what means can that be made sharable with others. So conventionally, writing would be one of those means. But then I thought, it seems, maybe this relates to what you were saying about the artifact, it seems as if it is not quite as straight forward as that. And more about how you might create a set of conditions that allow that, maybe this is it, how do you create a set of conditions that allow that phenomenon to arise again for the reader, viewer.

 

Yes, yes – that is an interesting point. Because I was thinking, if we go one of these three possible ways, I saw more, but I see three now: so score, an artifact describing the actions to be made in order to practice. Or the artifact or artifacts that are produced or that emerge through the practising of the practice. If the score is before, or somehow, before and maybe also somehow at the same time, because the score is somehow present in the performance of the practice. And the artifacts are mainly afterwards although also maybe in the in-between, because they emerge through the practice. And then there is a third way which is the description of the practice which is what we were calling the about-ness mode. And we were insisting that we don’t want description of practices, we want the practices themselves. The interesting thing is that under this condition that the practice themselves, or the practice itself, can only appear as an absence. So the practice itself as a phenomenon is a possibility. And the question for me is, is this not always the case? If a phenomenon is not always, or if a phenomenon observed phenomenologically is not always a field of possibilities and I would say yes. And that is what I would connect with this ‘source of meaning’, it is not meaning, it is the source of meaning. So what is a field of possibility is temporal, not only because of the temporal dimension of experience, of this the way I like to call it, this flow of sense, which crystalises as a phenomenon, which is objectified as a phenomenon. So probably the practices we might publish in this Special Issue are published as their absence, and therefore as presence of a possibility of practice. And probably this is the only way to publish practices in a journal. Yes, for sure this is a way to address this. This is a possible way to address this impossibility.

 

It feels as if, that sense of variations of things – on the one hand, one of the things that you pointed to in the last conversation was … there is a different notion of the making public of practices, a different sense of what is at stake in making public practices. There was something about how within artistic research – because artists think of themselves as practitioners – there is more of a familiarity with what it means to share practice and to share practices. Whereas there was something … even like the ‘how do you do it?’ dimension. So how do you do that? This has been one of my major intrigues I guess in relation to how some of the phenomenological methods are described. Particularly with something like epoché. So I can get a sense of the intentions of the epoché, but how do you do that? How do you actually do it? My sense is, my experience is, that within an artistic research context there is something very close to that, but it is difficult to practise. Or there are many ways of practising it? But I am left with this question of so how is it to practise it then? Yes, I have a sense of where it is heading or the state or attitude which it is trying to get towards, but I don’t get any sense of how it is practised. Maybe this would correspond to the publishing of scores dimension of this project in the sense of something of this – how do you do it?, I do it like this.The outlining of a procedure (this sounds too formulaic) but still this sense of how do you do this?

 

But ‘you’ there should be strong and not in the sense of impersonal, and what I mean by that is, so when I was listening to you I was van Manen’s text is resonating, and the frustration that appears from time to time. When you think, so now he is going to tell, he is going to address this question. Because … well the goal of this practice is this, this practice is about, and then say, OK, OK, I am not sure if it is often, but in a couple of moments he writes, Of course, we cannot say how to do it because it is very personal, and it is situated and in the moment. That is why in this sense I said, how to you do it? It is a strong ‘you’ and not the impersonal because if the question is “how this should be done?”, which is impersonal, ‘by everyone’, then I understand van Manen. But if the question is ‘how do you, specifically you do it?’, this question can be answered. Of how have you been doing it? And this is a possible question, and this is where for me the concept of practice is interesting. Not in the sense of a closed method defined in advance. So, you want to do this, then this is the way to do it. No, this is not what I mean by a practice. A practice is a specific way of doing something, and there is where the necessary balance between specificity (I can tell you how I do it) and the open-ness of ‘it can be done in different ways’ meet. This is an interesting point. And this, if this is right, leads to the necessity of affirming that phenomenology is a field of practices, even phenomenological reduction or epoché. It is a field of practices – why, because you can do it in different ways, but these different ways can be systematised, sufficiently systematised, because you can do it again. You can do it again. And so, and yes, and I understand that the way van Manen says in the book, but this can be compensated, not compensated, but avoided by saying that we can show practices. As examples but not in a normative sense, and somehow he does it, he comes close to that in the chapter on the vocative, the examples of modalities of the vocative. He brings examples, so Sartre for example. This is the way he did it – so it is possible to identify a practice, which is not described but is in this part or fragment of the artifact, the book, can be seen, the practice that generates it. But the practice is the presence of an absence.

 

So in those examples that van Manen uses – there were two things I was thinking, is this expressed in ‘how might that be done?’. So removing the pronoun, but it is still not how it ‘should be done’ … but it may be done in this way, shown through the proliferation of possibilities of practice. But when you were describing van Manen’s examples, is what we encounter when we encounter the example of Sartre, the artifact. Is it?

 

Yes. Because a practice is a process, we cannot find it, we cannot directly observe it. Even if we would directly see Sartre writing, we would not see the practice. So, somehow even in this case of a direct exposition of someone practising, even in this case, the practice will not be evident. So maybe this is a point – maybe a practice is never evident. Maybe a practice is somehow a kind of infrastructure of the visible or what can be seen, yes the visible. So in this sense, to publish a practice can only follow indirect strategies. Because even a description of the practice would be somehow direct. Probably the most direct way would be indirect. Because maybe a practice, I don’t know, I am just speculating, maybe the practice can only be expressed directly as a structure. But even this would not be the practice, as practising. So the structure of a practice can be grasped, can be expressed, can be formulated, can be described, but not the practice. So there is something of the practice that can be expressed, formulated, clearly formulated, but not the practice.

 

That makes me think, I am thinking about practices that have an indexical relation to them, now what do I mean by that.

 

To what, to themselves?

 

What do I mean? Somehow I thinking of Katja’s work, where there is an indexical relation to what is observed, but I wonder if it is also indexical to the practice? I suppose what I am trying to think through, is the unfolding, maybe this is the temporal dimension of an artifacts unfolding places you in the time-space of the practising of it.So there is a degree that film, that lens-technologies, maybe is one of those technological-mediations which creates a temporal unfolding that somehow provides access to the actual practice, I am not sure.

 

I think that there can be an intuitive of it, but it is not, I mean there can be an intuition of a practice.So I am imagining myself watching one of Katja’s videos or even the photos, and thinking oh I think I know how you do it. Well a lot of things can be said very clearly about a practice – so I do that, and I do that, and I do that. Which would be, might be, formulated as a score: do that, do that, do that, or don’t do that, don’t do that, don’t do that. But even the score is a frame for the practice.

 

And the score, even a sense of watching or engaging with an artifact, and having a sense of understanding how you do that, is not access to the practice. Because the practice also contains, also contains also the experience of the phenomenon.

 

I would say that a practice is invisible and irreducible. In the sense that it is pure action, it is pure organised action. But organised in the sense, in a way which is intrinsic to the action. So it is framed. As you know, from time to time I tend to compare this with a game. I can formulate the rules and the rules enable me to play. Without the rules I cannot play, but the playing is clearly not the rules. And I wonder if this is also the case with a practice. There is part of the practice, there are components of the practice which are maybe these enabling conditions, or frameworks, or goals or departing points, that can be expressed. But it is not the practice itself, in the same way that each game is unique in this sense. And this uniqueness, this is what I mean with the irreducibility of a practice.

 

Is that also related to its liveness, the liveliness of something?

 

Yes, I would say.

 

But then it feels as if, so if I think about how van Manen writes about the vocative, it seems as if part of the let’s say drive, is to re-enliven this sense of liveliness.

 

It is this idea of attunement with the phenomenon. On the one hand, the attunement with the phenomenon, and on the other, for others to attune to that. So I think the phenomenon is at the point … there is an attunement of the one who is writing and the one who is reading.

 

But in the way that it has been described in the last part of this conversation there are two interwoven livenesses, one in the sense of the appearing phenomenon and the other in the sense of the liveness of the practice.

 

Yes. Yes.

 

I find this interesting, also in the sense that this fluidity between the practice that is adopted through which to engage with phenomena, or through phenomena, and then how that practice also becomes, or has a phenomenal dimension. I mean, I would use the term ‘reflexive’ to describe this dimension, but I know this is a term that you would not use so much? But that idea, that in the practising, the practising also becomes part of the emerging phenomenon, also being observed. It seems as if, it is not common to all of the submissions, but it seems to be a dimension that is present within many of the submissions.

 

Which dimension?

 

Of observing, the practice engages with a particular phenomenon, but at times, it is also engaging with its own appearance, its own unfolding.

 

In the journal yes, because this is a requirement of publishing practices.

 

Is it a requirement?

 

Do you mean that phenomenological practices are always self-reflective?

 

Not that they always are – but it seems that there is a self-reflexive dimension that is more … but maybe it is this requirement to show the practice or to demonstrate the practice.

 

In this case, I see it clear. So we are, we were asking people to, and reflection is a term that I use more and more, and I wasn’t using it because I needed this what I call aesthetic reflection, which is also a term that I use as a phenomenological reflection. It is not reflection through construction and articulation but reflection in the original sense of ‘giving back’. So the mirror sense of reflection. So we were asking, in these terms we were asking people to reflect, and I would say not on their practices, but to reflect their practices which are reflective practices in the same way. So the submission reflects practices that reflect phenomena … aesthetically. In order to say, within whichever version of it, that these are aesthetic-phenomenological practices.

 

Maybe there is something in the reflection of that phenomenon, in reflecting that phenomenon, there seems at times that there is something also of the practice that is also reflected back. Or is also reflected.

 

Yes, yes. And I think that for me this is also the sense of the vocative, the idea, and also the sense of Cezanne being a phenomenologist, because it allows me to see. And in this sense, I can say it is exactly what a mirror does. We say, which is not really true I would say, that the mirror reflects an image. Actually a mirror reflects light. So where is the image in the mirror, or is it on the mirror? Well, even the question would be different if it was is the picture in the mirror? The picture is in the painting or in the photography but the mirror it is difficult to say. Anyway, I got lost. Anyway, the mirror is not keeping anything it is just giving back. And, and, the idea of the vocative is the idea of a text that mirrors the phenomenon, in the sense of allowing the phenomenon to be seen. Maybe in a way, not in the way that I have a mirror in front of me, but in a way I have a mirror that is positioned so that I can see something which is not myself.

 

I guess I have been mulling over this sense of, in this research enquiry of seeking to publish practices in this journal, what is it that is at stake in the pursuit? What is it that is at stake in publishing practices? And maybe as you were talking then, there was something about in showing or sharing or presenting practices, is there something about showing the mirror at the same time as what is mirrored? I don’t know. Is the practice the mirror?

 

It is complicated because even as I was saying this with the displaced mirror, I mean, there is the point that metaphors work for a while, but we are not talking about an object. And a mirror might reflect an object or to be more precise, the light falling on an object, but a phenomenon is not an object, it is objectified of course. I think that the whole point, not the whole point but an important aspect, of epoché is that I change the relationship to my experience, so I don’t look at it, at the content of my experience, but I look at the way I experience it. And there is where I can, in this turn, is the turn of experience, of content-led experience to phenomena. And this is the way I understand this question of thematising it. A theme. If I thematise it because I direct my attention to the way it appears in my experience, I am not really looking at my experience, I am looking at it in my experience. Then, I turn it in a phenomenon. So a phenomenon is not only an appearance, but it is a thematised appearance. This is what I would say.

 

Even as I was describing this simultaneity of the mirror and the mirrored, I thought no actually the earlier description of the impossibility of showing practices, or of practices only being able to be shown through their absence felt a more adequate way of describing it.

 

But it is the idea of making an absence present. So it is about the accessibility of a absence. Not as an absence but as a presence to which the absence refers. So maybe the reasonable goal is that the reader acquires a sense of what this practice is, or even better, might be.

 

I think that the mirror metaphor risks objectification and what you describe there of making an absence present but not through objectification, but through having a sense of, or an experiential connection.

 

One of the problems of this metaphor is that we see the mirror outside, but the idea is that the practitioner becomes the mirror, and the practice is what allows the practitioner to become the mirror. So the practitioner is reflecting, or even better, the practitioner is reflective, or is reflecting in the sense of performing its reflective skills.

 

Or it is reflective agency. In the same way that the mirror, we could say, has a reflective agency, and is performing this, or is actualising this agency probably when someone looks at the mirror, still this is the metaphor. The core of the metaphor is that there is matter and that matter has agency, and that agency is reflective. It could be absorbing, an absorbing agency. So all light that falls into it disappears and is not reflected. But the mirror has the agency of reflection. And we also have subjectivity, which also has the agency of reflecting. And I think it is the practice which mobilises this, or actualises this potentiality of reflecting. Not reflecting on, because this is another agency, the agency of constructing, logical construction, construction in logical terms. But reflecting.

 

Then I am interested in how various media interplay with that.

 

Exactly.

 

So on the one hand there is this agency that can be described as this reflective agency, and then how is it then in relation to media? Is that agency mediated through those technologies, or mediatized through different technologies, or how does that entanglement with the media also, I want to say produce again, inform or influence the nature of that reflection. You could say that conventionally language or writing, is this right, is the form of mediation bridges between the reflective agency and the capacity for making this sharable?

 

Well, I think that every reflection is sharable by definition, no? Coming back again to the metaphor of the mirror, the reflection of the mirror is sharable. And I think language makes, each medium, this is what I would say, each medium provides certain conditions of mobilisation of different forms of reflection. And, of certain forms of sharability of these reflections, or the results of these reflections. And clearly language, is a fantastic medium for constructed reflection, so logic, so it is probably. So I say it right, logic can be instantiated through language and has been mainly instantiated through language. So if I turn the expression around I would say that language is a medium that provides adequate enabling conditions for logical reflection to be activated and realised. And I think that for example images might have it easier for the form of reflection that we are talking about. Maybe language has to be mobilised in other ways, like through poetry or the writing of Merleau-Ponty, you know, in order to activate these agencies of mirror reflection, or aesthetic reflection.

 

This sense of language being mobilised in other ways I find interesting. It made me think that in the case of a poetic form, is language mobilised as image? I am not sure. Or even, thinking of the more semantic, alliterative dimensions that van Manen talks about language is then mobilised as sound in a way.

 

Yes, that is why poetic images.

 

I guess I am interested in this sense of not only through other media, but that other dimension of language, which is evident in the submissions. It is more than non-linguistic mediality but something to do with the capacity of language to be mobilised in different ways, beyond this discursive, propositional register.

 

Sure, and there it is useful to talk about media and practices. Because for me, practices mobilise certain capacities of the medium, so if we consider language, even written language as a medium, and I think we can, because it provides certain conditions of possibility and certain enabling and constraining conditions for practices. Then there are certain practices that activate a certain sphere, a certain terrain, a set of these conditions, and other practices activate others. And the same thing happens with images by the way. If we compare a diagram, an icon, a logo, and a poetic image, or with sounds. This is not exclusive to language, you can do a lot of different things with all of these media. So, and you do it because you perform different practices that are situated in - is we use a certain topological metaphor of a medium – they are situated in different areas of this medium.

 

In the conversation yesterday, one of things that you were saying was something to do with how attitude is expressed in action, and I was thinking about this relation between action and practices. And I guess in this sense, practice is systematised action, would it be?

 

Yes, this is my idea. This is the minimal definition of practice, minimal in order to be sufficient. Practice as a set of actions. Yes.

 

And, we were talking about a sense of attitude, perspective, disposition, orientation, so those actions are … practice is a set of systematised actions that are imbued with a certain quality – they are expressive of a certain attitude.

 

I think so, because the common take is that an attitude precedes an action or precedes a practice. But I see the point in that, but I can see an attitude is already a set of practices, it is something I do, there are different things I do. For example, when we talk about phenomenology, we talk about the phenomenological attitude. If I take a phenomenological attitude, I have to have done a lot of things already and actually this taking of a phenomenological attitude is the practice of epoché. Or you could say that the attitude is what results of this. OK, fine. Like an attitude or disposition.

 

Maybe this is my struggle with understanding epoché – in the sense, is it a practice, or does it describe an attitude, and therefore what are the practices required for or what are the practices that give expression to, how is it a practice?

 

I think it is a practice and it might be that the attitude is a synonym for the disposition which is a result of these practices. It can be understood also that the attitude, as a disposition, is the result of the practice of epoché. And actually this is the way it is normally described – so the practice of epoché allows me to pass from the natural attitude to the phenomenological attitude. So an attitude, a phenomenological attitude, is a consequence of practising the epoché. And there for van Manen, you have bracket this, to bracket that, to bracket that. So then main action of epoché is this bracketing, or suspending, or neutralising. But also there is another action which is necessary to this action which is this being aware of what you have to bracket, so I am aware that I have this predisposition, and then I can bracket it. But then there is also another aspect which makes clear – I take a position, not only bracketing but I also refer to, establish another relationship to my experience. And this relationship is to thematise it, and this is why I don’t take something for given or as given, but I take it as given in my experience, and this is also part of the epoché. I think that epoché as a whole is a field of practices, or a set of systematised actions, I would say that.

 

Maybe it comes back then to this dual question: So how do you do that? And/or How might that be done?

 

Exactly.

 

Or even, and how else might that be done, because I guess the phenomenological methods describes it as a predominantly linguistic set of systematised actions.

 

And there we can also link to the point saying that the practices we want to, or we aim at publishing in this Special Issue, are they practices that have to include or even instantiate epoché? So even then, further reduction? And then we could also by trying to answer this question we could scan our different varieties and say what is it with aesthetic-phenomenological, or if we take this sense of 100%/ 100% model, we have to say yes because there is no phenomenology without the epoché and reduction. But if we take phenomenologically oriented then I think we enter a field of relativity – we could say maybe epoché, but not reduction. This is a possibility. Or if we go to this other one, the unnamed one, this is the question. I think that this is a good example for these different varieties.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

    

2nd Distillation

Transcript from Conversation Part II

28 March 2022

 

Doing the transcription made me realise the thing we have talked before about resonance – the listening again is a way of extending the resonance of the conversation.

 

It is also fantastic to be able to read it again, which is another kind of resonance […]

 

It is a touching point really, maybe to come back to some things. There are somethings that I was curious to come back to maybe as a way of saying again, something around the formulations of the different variations that became clearer in the reading of the transcript. And we also can take on a new direction.

 

Yes, yes. We can do both of course. I was feeling the need of introducing another, somehow a new aspect, to go back again to the call and see if there are other aspects. Because we are already very focused on these modalities of relationship and the operations that lead or might lead to them. Actually, when we touched on the point of the lichen and we move on in this, there is a point for me that is still interesting, I mean interesting in the sense that for me it is new. Which I don’t know if this should be the criteria for this conversation – so new for me. But why not. It doesn’t have to be because it is an editorial text and it is for others, no, no. It can be a prospective thing. It can be part of the journey that we have travelled, being an arrival point and a view, let’s say a depth view, of the past. So I was wondering, especially at the beginning, because I went for these two modalities of highlighting, so blue and black, underlining and marking. It works well but it was also like what is the difference. Because the highlighting was something that can be developed, and the underlining was this is interesting. And sometimes, I felt, I want to really develop the findings, so is there two different modalities of marking. But it is clear. So as you want. I can really follow you.

 

Maybe I would return having reread the transcript, to return to the four variations. It felt that it was a way of – not even that it needs more elaboration – but to return to it, and then one of the things that came through strongly for me as an area that we have not yet explored is the sense of practices and the distinctiveness of practices.

 

Exactly.

 

But maybe first to touch on this. I think one of the things that really struck me, was a line that you said about how the Special Issue itself is not a means of dissemination but a means of research, and for researching these relations. That felt very significant to acknowledge that. So that expression of these different formulations felt, maybe there is a sense of it being, I mean I know it was also already there in your own thinking, but an expression of these different variations. So if I understood them properly or in the way that they were expressed. The first variation was described as a ‘soft variation’, in the sense that it was phenomenologically oriented, informed, influenced or based artistic research practices. And the interesting thing is that this relationship can be inverted though we noticed it was present to a lesser degree in that you could also have arts oriented, informed, influenced or based phenomenological research practices.

 

Yes, sure. I mean first of all I named this soft, because the hard one was the one with the hyphen. So it was much more affirmative that this is both. And the other one, this oriented one has a softer, more dynamic relationship. But when I read that, so more commonly we think phenomenologically-based artistic research, so the weight is in the artistic, I think, well actually tThere is think I a tendency within phenomenology, within language-based phenomenology, or phenomenology within philosophy, which is, this tendency of phenomenology to be literary. Maybe this is a move from phenomenology to the arts. So this exists, also in the realm of philosophical phenomenology. When philosophy, I was going to say, goes to become literature, and as we mentioned in the work of Merleau-Ponty, it is really amazing to see, to see the last text which was published as a manuscript after his death, the way he is really thinking through writing, but this is another thing.

 

I think that this is really interesting because maybe it might complicate some of the consequences that seemed to come from some of these relationships. Because as we were talking it seemed that this particular variation tended to express a reference and also potentially a hierarchy. But maybe this dimension of the literary, the relation of phenomenology to literature as an art form, maybe complicates that a little. I am not sure.

 

It allowed or for me is proof, that this inversion takes place. So whether in the first case, for me, the stronger variation of artistic-phenomenological, I also wonder if the inversion changes. We could say, but we could also say not really. But in this phenomenologically-oriented or artistically-oriented or in the case of aesthetic phenomenology or inverse as phenomenological aesthetics, in this case, the order, this inversion matters. And it indicates at least a certain hierarchy, I would say. Or different forms of hierarchy.

 

So in this second variation that you mention already, this hyphenated variation, or strong variation, we were talking about as you say, artistic-phenomenological research practices and also noticing to maybe a lesser extent or maybe not-even-extent phenomenological-artistic research practices. But there was still the question of how is the quality of this hyphen – what does it indicate towards, there was something about it having an additive dimension, of both-ness, of combination, also this quality of plus-ness, artistic research plus phenomenology. And I think even within this category there was this notion that something, that there could be ‘enough’ presence of a research practice but it might not be fully expressed, it might not express the full depth and breadth of phenomenology to be able to be considered in this category.

 

I am not sure about that. I tend to think, two comments on that. I tend to think that artistic-phenomenological or the other way around, I wonder say no real difference between them, implies that, it implies two things for me. One is that it is artistic, it is enough artistic and it is enough phenomenological.This for me is embedded in this, in this construction but maybe not. And this ‘not really’ or ‘not enough’ is probably best expressed for me in the phenomenology-oriented … so I can say it is not really phenomenology, but it is phenomenologically oriented. And whereas if I say artistic-phenomenological practice then it is both – fully or at least enough. This is my feeling of the expression.

 

So let me just think again. So the criteria of this would be enough but it might not be fully. There was a line that I was really struck by, this sense that enough, that enough crystalises the sense of affinity between the two practices, the two fields of practice, but not so fully as to be. One of the things I was struck by in the conversation was this almost refusal of this category of being: artistic research is, or phenomenology is. Or maybe refusal is a bit too heavy, but maybe deviation .. but maybe I am not understanding this fully.

 

I think it depends on the model right, because if the model is based on transformation or on contamination or at least a certain kind of  … then I would say, I would repeat what I said, that in order for this it is necessary to have a certain definitional softness. So if I say this is, and this is …  and there is a clear barrier between both, then I would say this model of 100% and 100%, all this artistic and all this phenomenological, you find all of this in these practices, so this would be like, there you can have a strong definition of each field, not a problem. But if for example, if we go for phenomenologically-oriented. We can say well I don’t need to depart from a definition of phenomenology, I can depart from a sense that phenomenology is, I can depart from certain traits. And I can take that in order to say this is the orientation. But I am not referring to a full definition, if it exists, of phenomenology, independently of if it exists or not, of the idea of the possibility of, I don’t need to depart from the possible definition of phenomenology.

 

One of the things that seemed characteristic of this particular variation is that the constitutive parts of artistic research and phenomenology may possibly be transformed in each direction, but there is not the production of this ‘third’ possibility that is described in the fourth variation. So the mode is combination or addition but not the birth of the new, no-name yet. At least that is how I could see this hyphenated practice – as combination or as both-ness or even as mutual transformation, but not necessarily producing properties that are distinct from those constitutive fields of practice.

 

Yes. Yes, and I have to say, in reading the transcription, there was a point. There is the idea of the lichen as the inspiration, for me, it is a model. And then we came to talk about how we, well, how we for example mention these kinds of examples of practice that we are looking for or we want to explore as I say through the Special Issue was that they work with phenomena. And this in this moment, so looking at it, so yes, let’s affirm that, there are two moves, let’s affirm that, artistic research and phenomenology work with phenomena or through phenomena. OK, there we have a common element, there we have an affinity, there we have common ground. And then the next move was but in saying that do we, so what do we understand of these phenomena.And there, there is a possibility in understanding phenomena. Let’s say that artistic research has never defined what a phenomenon is, but phenomenology has. So let’s take this. OK, there is again a hierarchy, a possible hierarchical element in favour of phenomenologylet’s say. But, if instead of going this way we take phenomena somehow as an empty vessel and say, and what do we mean by phenomena, and we don’t take the phenomenological definition. We allow this practice to say or to show what this phenomena is, there we have the moment of novelty. There was something that was not, at least not fully, constitutive either in one side or the other. And looking at it in this way, I saw the work of something new departing from the affirmation of a common ground, a minimal, or even empty common ground. I cannot really grasp it. I wonder if there are four or five models of this no-named or non-named or not-yet-named model, implied by let’s say the lichen model. So the emergence of new properties, different from the original one. I don’t know but I see at least a potentiality in that.

 

What I was curious about was whether that sense of ‘new-ness’ is present in the third or the fourth variation, in that, whether this sense in the third variation as it was described as phenomenology instantiated artistically or aesthetically, in other media.  This feels as if it could also be something to explore, the sense of what might it mean to do phenomenology through other media than language, or also the variation there was with and through other media than language, and with language in other ways beyond discursive, propositional forms. So there is also a split at that point, and whether this leads to a ‘new’. I don’t know – this possibility in the third variation of artistic or aesthetic phenomenology somehow through this expression of phenomenology through artistic means or through other media leads to the possibility of new forms, new practices.

 

I think new practices for sure. I think when I say that I have as a reference Cezanne’s Doubt by Merleau-Ponty. It is funny because when you talk to people about this everyone has a very different interpretation of this text. But my interpretation is that, at least one aspect of this, is that Merleau-Ponty affirms that Cezanne makes phenomenology through painting. Why? Because it allows us to see how colours or how a colour or how a landscape emerges. How we come to see a colour. He is not showing us the colour but allowing us to have access to this source of meaning, to observe the source of meaning. And because I think this was the -finitive of phenomenology for Merleau-Ponty, he affirmed that. Cezanne was doing phenomenology in the medium of paint. So this is what is in the back of my head when I affirm an aesthetic phenomenology. This is part of it.

 

I am also curious, one of the things I have been trying to think, I think it was mentioned in the conversation before – one of the characteristics or traits might be that these practices are engaged in the observation of phenomena. And it seemed as if there are various practices or media that highlight or amplify that experience of observation, in some kind of capacity. I think even the sensethat there might be technologically-mediated forms of observation or practices that somehow allow the experience of observation to be sharable with others. Maybe this is a territory that is quite big on its own. The other dimension was aesthetic or artistic phenomenology has this capacity, it is engaged in the observation of phenomena, but there is also this phenomena-producing component to it. Or I am curious about that – is that true? Is this true only of aesthetic or artistic phenomenological practices or does phenomenological practices also do that – not only observing the phenomena but also simultaneously producing phenomena. I know that Esa has talked about this as ‘artistic phenomena’. This also seemed to be coming through in Michael Biggs’ contribution in the sense of what fiction can do, fiction in the sense of producing an experience that is not already given.

 

Yes. I tend to think that, maybe I am wrong, that phenomena are neither, phenomena are neither the media nor the practices or the artifacts that they generate. So in the case of fictionality I would understand this as a field of practices based on in a big part imagination, fantasy, and the activation of these practices creates enabling conditions, or provides enabling conditions, for the emergence of new phenomena. I have to really concentrate. So artistic artifacts, I would tend to understand artistic artifacts in the same sense, so, a novel, a fictional novel, a fictional text – this is not fictionality it is an artifact, and is produced in this field. It is in touch with it that phenomena will appear, it is in the experience, or through the experience, or by virtue of the experience of, the experience of this artifact or that this artifact enables or co-enables that phenomena will appear.So I tend to think that phenomena are always emerging, they are never, cannot be produced and cannot be contained in an artifact, or in practices, or in a medium. It is not equal to the practices, and the artifacts and the medium. So maybe I am fully wrong, but this is where I situate phenomena. So, an artistic phenomenology would be a phenomenology substantiated through artistic practices. This would be my take.

 

I was thinking, when I was thinking about the sense of practices: what is stake in showing or sharing practices, or wanting to publish practices? There was interesting sense of ‘where’ is the practice – not what is the practice, butwhere is the practice? Not even how is the practice, but where is it? Even to the point that it made me wonder, maybe this is wrong, are practices themselves phenomenal?

 

I think everything is a phenomenon if it is thematised. So the relation between phenomena and observation is circular. If I observe something given in experience, I turn it into a phenomenon, I would say. And the other way around, a phenomenon can appear without me calling or me focusing awareness, and can mobilise my awareness. So practices can be a phenomenon if this what I observe? So if I observe how this practice appears in my experience, if I ask my question: how is this practice and my way to address this question is to observe how this practice is appearing in my experience, then practice is a phenomenon. That is the way I would think about it. And in this sense, this is a relevant question for this aim of publishing practices. Which is easy to say, not absolutely easy because it sounds a bit forced or weird, but this was our aim. And I think in this regard, and in relation to possibilities variations of relation between artistic research and phenomenology, also in regard to publishing practices in this Special Issue, is also a research endeavour.Because clearly, at least for me, we were formulating this without knowing what it was. And the radicality is that we are saying we want to publish practices, and not the results of practices. No, we want to publish the practices themselves. In the strict sense there is the question, is this operation possible. Is a practice able to be published? …. In a journal. Because if we think about making public, then yes. No problem. I can show it and share, I can display live my practices. No doubt. Well, or maybe. But the field of possibility is quite open but in a journal, or through a journal. There with these constraints.

 

I guess this is why I am interested, maybe this is the wrong question, but where is the practice? Where does a practice manifest? Or where is a practice operative? And this was leading me to the phenomenal dimension of practice. Or maybe even thinking in the sense of how a phenomenological practice is manifested within that frame? And the emphasis perhaps on writing. Does the writing (noun) manifest the practice of writing? Or is what we encounter an artifact? Because we have been talking in these terms – the result or outcome of a practice might be considered as an artifact, but not the practice itself, or not necessarily the practice itself. What does that show or reveal of the relation of writing within phenomenology more broadly?

 

Yes, now I understand your where. Where is the practice? Because I would say the fact is that we can only publish artifacts … in a journal. For the fact is that in a journal only artifacts can be published. Departing from this, which I would take as a fact, what we could clearly see in advance, was that we need diversity of media. But nevertheless we continue publishing artifacts. So on a first level of the meaning of publishing, so in the sense of what we will make public on the first level, will be artifacts, and then is you question: where in these artifacts is the practice, we could add, to be found?

 

I actually think that what we publish or what seems to be being published are two moments within the practising, in the sense that many of the contributions have some dimension of score or outline of a practice, so there is a kind of pre- moment, or a to-come moment within that. And then there is the artifact, which is in a way after the fact of practising to a certain extent. And what is interesting is that there is this gap, which opens up between the description of what a practice involved and what emerges through the practising of that practice. Yes, I am curious whether something does appear or emerge through the conjunction of those two moments of showing in a way, or is there something that is revealed through the combination of different kinds of manifestation or tangibility … because all of those things seems to be to do with how do you give expression to a first person experience of observation. On the one hand, I was wondering, what is this, is this to do with the externalisation of an experience of observing, or the giving of tangibility to the experience of observation, or attention, or noticing. Practices of the attending to, or noticing, or observing of a phenomenon, and through what means can that be made sharable with others. So conventionally, writing would be one of those means. But then I thought, it seems, maybe this relates to what you were saying about the artifact, it seems as if it is not quite as straight forward as that. And more about how you might create a set of conditions that allow that, maybe this is it, how do you create a set of conditions that allow that phenomenon to arise again for the reader, viewer.

 

Yes, yes – that is an interesting point. Because I was thinking, if we go one of these three possible ways, I saw more, but I see three now: so score, an artifact describing the actions to be made in order to practice. Or the artifact or artifacts that are produced or that emerge through the practising of the practice. If the score is before, or somehow, before and maybe also somehow at the same time, because the score is somehow present in the performance of the practice. And the artifacts are mainly afterwards although also maybe in the in-between, because they emerge through the practice. And then there is a third way which is the description of the practice which is what we were calling the about-ness mode. And we were insisting that we don’t want description of practices, we want the practices themselves. The interesting thing is that under this condition that the practice themselves, or the practice itself, can only appear as an absence. So the practice itself as a phenomenon is a possibility. And the question for me is, is this not always the case? If a phenomenon is not always, or if a phenomenon observed phenomenologically is not always a field of possibilities and I would say yes. And that is what I would connect with this ‘source of meaning’, it is not meaning, it is the source of meaning. So what is a field of possibility is temporal, not only because of the temporal dimension of experience, of this the way I like to call it, this flow of sense, which crystalises as a phenomenon, which is objectified as a phenomenon. So probably the practices we might publish in this Special Issue are published as their absence, and therefore as presence of a possibility of practice. And probably this is the only way to publish practices in a journal. Yes, for sure this is a way to address this. This is a possible way to address this impossibility.

 

It feels as if, that sense of variations of things – on the one hand, one of the things that you pointed to in the last conversation was … there is a different notion of the making public of practices, a different sense of what is at stake in making public practices. There was something about how within artistic research – because artists think of themselves as practitioners – there is more of a familiarity with what it means to share practice and to share practices. Whereas there was something … even like the ‘how do you do it?’ dimension. So how do you do that? This has been one of my major intrigues I guess in relation to how some of the phenomenological methods are described. Particularly with something like epoché. So I can get a sense of the intentions of the epoché, but how do you do that? How do you actually do it? My sense is, my experience is, that within an artistic research context there is something very close to that, but it is difficult to practise. Or there are many ways of practising it? But I am left with this question of so how is it to practise it then? Yes, I have a sense of where it is heading or the state or attitude which it is trying to get towards, but I don’t get any sense of how it is practised. Maybe this would correspond to the publishing of scores dimension of this project in the sense of something of this – how do you do it?, I do it like this.The outlining of a procedure (this sounds too formulaic) but still this sense of how do you do this?

 

But ‘you’ there should be strong and not in the sense of impersonal, and what I mean by that is, so when I was listening to you I was van Manen’s text is resonating, and the frustration that appears from time to time. When you think, so now he is going to tell, he is going to address this question. Because … well the goal of this practice is this, this practice is about, and then say, OK, OK, I am not sure if it is often, but in a couple of moments he writes, Of course, we cannot say how to do it because it is very personal, and it is situated and in the moment. That is why in this sense I said, how to you do it? It is a strong ‘you’ and not the impersonal because if the question is “how this should be done?”, which is impersonal, ‘by everyone’, then I understand van Manen. But if the question is ‘how do you, specifically you do it?’, this question can be answered. Of how have you been doing it? And this is a possible question, and this is where for me the concept of practice is interesting. Not in the sense of a closed method defined in advance. So, you want to do this, then this is the way to do it. No, this is not what I mean by a practice. A practice is a specific way of doing something, and there is where the necessary balance between specificity (I can tell you how I do it) and the open-ness of ‘it can be done in different ways’ meet. This is an interesting point. And this, if this is right, leads to the necessity of affirming that phenomenology is a field of practices, even phenomenological reduction or epoché. It is a field of practices – why, because you can do it in different ways, but these different ways can be systematised, sufficiently systematised, because you can do it again. You can do it again. And so, and yes, and I understand that the way van Manen says in the book, but this can be compensated, not compensated, but avoided by saying that we can show practices. As examples but not in a normative sense, and somehow he does it, he comes close to that in the chapter on the vocative, the examples of modalities of the vocative. He brings examples, so Sartre for example. This is the way he did it – so it is possible to identify a practice, which is not described but is in this part or fragment of the artifact, the book, can be seen, the practice that generates it. But the practice is the presence of an absence.

 

So in those examples that van Manen uses – there were two things I was thinking, is this expressed in ‘how might that be done?’. So removing the pronoun, but it is still not how it ‘should be done’ … but it may be done in this way, shown through the proliferation of possibilities of practice. But when you were describing van Manen’s examples, is what we encounter when we encounter the example of Sartre, the artifact. Is it?

 

Yes. Because a practice is a process, we cannot find it, we cannot directly observe it. Even if we would directly see Sartre writing, we would not see the practice. So, somehow even in this case of a direct exposition of someone practising, even in this case, the practice will not be evident. So maybe this is a point – maybe a practice is never evident. Maybe a practice is somehow a kind of infrastructure of the visible or what can be seen, yes the visible. So in this sense, to publish a practice can only follow indirect strategies. Because even a description of the practice would be somehow direct. Probably the most direct way would be indirect. Because maybe a practice, I don’t know, I am just speculating, maybe the practice can only be expressed directly as a structure. But even this would not be the practice, as practising. So the structure of a practice can be grasped, can be expressed, can be formulated, can be described, but not the practice. So there is something of the practice that can be expressed, formulated, clearly formulated, but not the practice.

 

That makes me think, I am thinking about practices that have an indexical relation to them, now what do I mean by that.

 

To what, to themselves?

 

What do I mean? Somehow I thinking of Katja’s work, where there is an indexical relation to what is observed, but I wonder if it is also indexical to the practice? I suppose what I am trying to think through, is the unfolding, maybe this is the temporal dimension of an artifacts unfolding places you in the time-space of the practising of it.So there is a degree that film, that lens-technologies, maybe is one of those technological-mediations which creates a temporal unfolding that somehow provides access to the actual practice, I am not sure.

 

I think that there can be an intuitive of it, but it is not, I mean there can be an intuition of a practice.So I am imagining myself watching one of Katja’s videos or even the photos, and thinking oh I think I know how you do it. Well a lot of things can be said very clearly about a practice – so I do that, and I do that, and I do that. Which would be, might be, formulated as a score: do that, do that, do that, or don’t do that, don’t do that, don’t do that. But even the score is a frame for the practice.

 

And the score, even a sense of watching or engaging with an artifact, and having a sense of understanding how you do that, is not access to the practice. Because the practice also contains, also contains also the experience of the phenomenon.

 

I would say that a practice is invisible and irreducible. In the sense that it is pure action, it is pure organised action. But organised in the sense, in a way which is intrinsic to the action. So it is framed. As you know, from time to time I tend to compare this with a game. I can formulate the rules and the rules enable me to play. Without the rules I cannot play, but the playing is clearly not the rules. And I wonder if this is also the case with a practice. There is part of the practice, there are components of the practice which are maybe these enabling conditions, or frameworks, or goals or departing points, that can be expressed. But it is not the practice itself, in the same way that each game is unique in this sense. And this uniqueness, this is what I mean with the irreducibility of a practice.

 

Is that also related to its liveness, the liveliness of something?

 

Yes, I would say.

 

But then it feels as if, so if I think about how van Manen writes about the vocative, it seems as if part of the let’s say drive, is to re-enliven this sense of liveliness.

 

It is this idea of attunement with the phenomenon. On the one hand, the attunement with the phenomenon, and on the other, for others to attune to that. So I think the phenomenon is at the point … there is an attunement of the one who is writing and the one who is reading.

 

But in the way that it has been described in the last part of this conversation there are two interwoven livenesses, one in the sense of the appearing phenomenon and the other in the sense of the liveness of the practice.

 

Yes. Yes.

 

I find this interesting, also in the sense that this fluidity between the practice that is adopted through which to engage with phenomena, or through phenomena, and then how that practice also becomes, or has a phenomenal dimension. I mean, I would use the term ‘reflexive’ to describe this dimension, but I know this is a term that you would not use so much? But that idea, that in the practising, the practising also becomes part of the emerging phenomenon, also being observed. It seems as if, it is not common to all of the submissions, but it seems to be a dimension that is present within many of the submissions.

 

Which dimension?

 

Of observing, the practice engages with a particular phenomenon, but at times, it is also engaging with its own appearance, its own unfolding.

 

In the journal yes, because this is a requirement of publishing practices.

 

Is it a requirement?

 

Do you mean that phenomenological practices are always self-reflective?

 

Not that they always are – but it seems that there is a self-reflexive dimension that is more … but maybe it is this requirement to show the practice or to demonstrate the practice.

 

In this case, I see it clear. So we are, we were asking people to, and reflection is a term that I use more and more, and I wasn’t using it because I needed this what I call aesthetic reflection, which is also a term that I use as a phenomenological reflection. It is not reflection through construction and articulation but reflection in the original sense of ‘giving back’. So the mirror sense of reflection. So we were asking, in these terms we were asking people to reflect, and I would say not on their practices, but to reflect their practices which are reflective practices in the same way. So the submission reflects practices that reflect phenomena … aesthetically. In order to say, within whichever version of it, that these are aesthetic-phenomenological practices.

 

Maybe there is something in the reflection of that phenomenon, in reflecting that phenomenon, there seems at times that there is something also of the practice that is also reflected back. Or is also reflected.

 

Yes, yes. And I think that for me this is also the sense of the vocative, the idea, and also the sense of Cezanne being a phenomenologist, because it allows me to see. And in this sense, I can say it is exactly what a mirror does. We say, which is not really true I would say, that the mirror reflects an image. Actually a mirror reflects light. So where is the image in the mirror, or is it on the mirror? Well, even the question would be different if it was is the picture in the mirror? The picture is in the painting or in the photography but the mirror it is difficult to say. Anyway, I got lost. Anyway, the mirror is not keeping anything it is just giving back. And, and, the idea of the vocative is the idea of a text that mirrors the phenomenon, in the sense of allowing the phenomenon to be seen. Maybe in a way, not in the way that I have a mirror in front of me, but in a way I have a mirror that is positioned so that I can see something which is not myself.

 

I guess I have been mulling over this sense of, in this research enquiry of seeking to publish practices in this journal, what is it that is at stake in the pursuit? What is it that is at stake in publishing practices? And maybe as you were talking then, there was something about in showing or sharing or presenting practices, is there something about showing the mirror at the same time as what is mirrored? I don’t know. Is the practice the mirror?

 

It is complicated because even as I was saying this with the displaced mirror, I mean, there is the point that metaphors work for a while, but we are not talking about an object. And a mirror might reflect an object or to be more precise, the light falling on an object, but a phenomenon is not an object, it is objectified of course. I think that the whole point, not the whole point but an important aspect, of epoché is that I change the relationship to my experience, so I don’t look at it, at the content of my experience, but I look at the way I experience it. And there is where I can, in this turn, is the turn of experience, of content-led experience to phenomena. And this is the way I understand this question of thematising it. A theme. If I thematise it because I direct my attention to the way it appears in my experience, I am not really looking at my experience, I am looking at it in my experience. Then, I turn it in a phenomenon.So a phenomenon is not only an appearance, but it is a thematised appearance. This is what I would say.

 

Even as I was describing this simultaneity of the mirror and the mirrored, I thought no actually the earlier description of the impossibility of showing practices, or of practices only being able to be shown through their absence felt a more adequate way of describing it.

 

But it is the idea of making an absence present. So it is about the accessibility of a absence. Not as an absence but as a presence to which the absence refers. So maybe the reasonable goal is that the reader acquires a sense of what this practice is, or even better, might be.

 

I think that the mirror metaphor risks objectification and what you describe there of making an absence present but not through objectification, but through having a sense of, or an experiential connection.

 

One of the problems of this metaphor is that we see the mirror outside, but the idea is that the practitioner becomes the mirror, and the practice is what allows the practitioner to become the mirror. So the practitioner is reflecting, or even better, the practitioner is reflective, or is reflecting in the sense of performing its reflective skills.

 

Or it is reflective agency. In the same way that the mirror, we could say, has a reflective agency, and is performing this, or is actualising this agency probably when someone looks at the mirror, still this is the metaphor. The core of the metaphor is that there is matter and that matter has agency, and that agency is reflective. It could be absorbing, an absorbing agency. So all light that falls into it disappears and is not reflected. But the mirror has the agency of reflection. Andwe also have subjectivity, which also has the agency of reflecting. And I think it is the practice which mobilises this, or actualises this potentiality of reflecting. Not reflecting on, because this is another agency, the agency of constructing, logical construction, construction in logical terms. But reflecting.

 

Then I am interested in how various media interplay with that.

 

Exactly.

 

So on the one hand there is this agency that can be described as this reflective agency, and then how is it then in relation to media? Is that agency mediated through those technologies, or mediatized through different technologies, or how does that entanglement with the media also, I want to say produce again, inform or influence the nature of that reflection. You could say that conventionally language or writing, is this right, is the form of mediation bridges between the reflective agency and the capacity for making this sharable?

 

Well, I think that every reflection is sharable by definition, no? Coming back again to the metaphor of the mirror, the reflection of the mirror is sharable. And I think language makes, each medium, this is what I would say, each medium provides certain conditions of mobilisation of different forms of reflection. And, of certain forms of sharability of these reflections, or the results of these reflections. And clearly language, is a fantastic medium for constructed reflection, so logic, so it is probably. So I say it right, logic can be instantiated through language and has been mainly instantiated through language. So if I turn the expression around I would say that language is a medium that provides adequate enabling conditions for logical reflection to be activated and realised. And I think that for example images might have it easier for the form of reflection that we are talking about. Maybe language has to be mobilised in other ways, like through poetry or the writing of Merleau-Ponty, you know, in order to activate these agencies of mirror reflection, or aesthetic reflection.

 

This sense of language being mobilised in other ways I find interesting. It made me think that in the case of a poetic form, is language mobilised as image? I am not sure. Or even, thinking of the more semantic, alliterative dimensions that van Manen talks about language is then mobilised as sound in a way.

 

Yes, that is why poetic images.

 

I guess I am interested in this sense of not only through other media, but that other dimension of language, which is evident in the submissions. It is more than non-linguistic mediality but something to do with the capacity of language to be mobilised in different ways, beyond this discursive, propositional register.

 

Sure, and there it is useful to talk about media and practices. Because for me, practices mobilise certain capacities of the medium,so if we consider language, even written language as a medium, and I think we can, because it provides certain conditions of possibility and certain enabling and constraining conditions for practices. Then there are certain practices that activate a certain sphere, a certain terrain, a set of these conditions, and other practices activate others. And the same thing happens with images by the way. If we compare a diagram, an icon, a logo, and a poetic image, or with sounds. This is not exclusive to language, you can do a lot of different things with all of these media. So, and you do it because you perform different practices that are situated in - is we use a certain topological metaphor of a medium – they are situated in different areas of this medium.

 

In the conversation yesterday, one of things that you were saying was something to do with how attitude is expressed in action, and I was thinking about this relation between action and practices. And I guess in this sense, practice is systematised action, would it be?

 

Yes, this is my idea. This is the minimal definition of practice, minimal in order to be sufficient. Practice as a set of actions. Yes.

 

And, we were talking about a sense of attitude, perspective, disposition, orientation, so those actions are … practice is a set of systematised actions that are imbued with a certain quality – they are expressive of a certain attitude.

 

I think so, because the common take is that an attitude precedes an action or precedes a practice. But I see the point in that, but I can see an attitude is already a set of practices, it is something I do, there are different things I do. For example, when we talk about phenomenology, we talk about the phenomenological attitude. If I take a phenomenological attitude, I have to have done a lot of things already and actually this taking of a phenomenological attitude is the practice of epoché. Or you could say that the attitude is what results of this. OK, fine. Like an attitude or disposition.

 

Maybe this is my struggle with understanding epoché – in the sense, is it a practice, or does it describe an attitude, and therefore what are the practices required for or what are the practices that give expression to, how is it a practice?

 

I think it is a practice and it might be that the attitude is a synonym for the disposition which is a result of these practices. It can be understood also that the attitude, as a disposition, is the result of the practice of epoché. And actually this is the way it is normally described – so the practice of epoché allows me to pass from the natural attitude to the phenomenological attitude. So an attitude, a phenomenological attitude, is a consequence of practising the epoché. And there for van Manen, you have bracket this, to bracket that, to bracket that. So then main action of epoché is this bracketing, or suspending, or neutralising. But also there is another action which is necessary to this action which is this being aware of what you have to bracket, so I am aware that I have this predisposition, and then I can bracket it. But then there is also another aspect which makes clear – I take a position, not only bracketing but I also refer to, establish another relationship to my experience. And this relationship is to thematise it, and this is why I don’t take something for given or as given, but I take it as given in my experience, and this is also part of the epoché. I think that epoché as a whole is a field of practices, or a set of systematised actions, I would say that.

 

Maybe it comes back then to this dual question: So how do you do that? And/or How might that be done?

 

Exactly.

 

Or even, and how else might that be done, because I guess the phenomenological methods describes it as a predominantly linguistic set of systematised actions.

 

And there we can also link to the point saying that the practices we want to, or we aim at publishing in this Special Issue, are they practices that have to include or even instantiate epoché? So even then, further reduction? And then we could also by trying to answer this question we could scan our different varieties and say what is it with aesthetic-phenomenological, or if we take this sense of 100%/ 100% model, we have to say yes because there is no phenomenology without the epoché and reduction. But if we take phenomenologically oriented then I think we enter a field of relativity – we could say maybe epoché, but not reduction. This is a possibility. Or if we go to this other one, the unnamed one, this is the question. I think that this is a good example for these different varieties.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

    

1st Distillation

Conversation 3 [29 March 2022] Distillation of transcript through marking

 

Transcript from Tuesday 29 March 2022

Conversation (Part III)

 

So reading the transcriptions there were some themes or some issues that I annotated in another piece of paper which I would like to talk about, as a proposition, as an offering. So there is this question of the through, which we haven’t talked directly about. So this idea of through practices, and the idea of through Special Issue, researching through practices, researching through a Special Issue, publishing in but you could also say through a Special Issue, publishing practices through a Special Issue. And this is for me connected somehow with this beautiful, and increasingly beautiful idea for me, of the not fully. So in English, this ‘no longer and not yet’. So this idea of the liminal which was exactly the expression I was looking for in German – so nicht mehr und noch nicht. So this idea of liminality, I think, relates to this through, or can be related to this through. And this relates to a third point, or a third conglomerate of issues, connected to indirect strategies; the question of live or liveness; the issue of absence or invisibility, even no-phenomenality, or maybe better as forms of phenomenality. I think this is a group of issues that relate to one another and were present in different forms in our conversations, so for me it already has for me a quality of distillation.

 

This sounds good. I think that one of the things I was interested in diving into more deeply was maybe connected but also maybe different from that, was more of a sense of the characteristics and traits that might be in common. We have spoken a lot about the different modalities, or the different varieties of affinities, but not always so much about the different traits or characteristics. One is this through-ness, this through phenomena. There was also this identification of observation. And then potentially, what we were talking upon at the end of yesterday’s conversation was whether the practice of reduction, or of epoché and reduction proper, would be characteristics or traits that are deemed necessary. I was also thinking about the difference between criteria and characteristic.

 

I mean, in this case, if we are talking about one of the varieties of affinity, I think characteristics can be used as criteria. What I mean is, there are a set of characteristics of artistic research that can be identified, there are a set of characteristics of phenomenological research that can be identified, and then, for the sake of this publication, of our editorial work in this publication, we could say if we recognise these characteristics. Then we will publish this submission. So the presence of the characteristic, of the possibility of recognising these characteristic is the criteria for the edition. Somehow it is also the way this journal operates with characteristics, that are the traits that van Manen lists of a phenomenological research. These are very used in this journal in this way.

 

But we can also come back to these characteristics and maybe begin with some of the things that you were identifying. Maybe with the characteristics, I was thinking, maybe there are some more obvious common characteristics that we are not even saying: so something about embodiment, or lived-through-ness, or an engagement with the pre-reflective. So some of these things maybe are not explicitly said in our conversation but are commonalities none-the-less.

 

We can continue with that. This listing. So common, or possible common, possible characteristics of this affinity. Or maybe this is not accurate enough. So common characteristics of phenomenological and artistic research practices.

 

We can come to this later. Start with some of what links to or comes from the last conversation, what you are drawing out.

 

I could also use this idea of characteristics to maybe point to a possible different variety of realisation of these affinities. So a fifth. Which I can only touch not grasp conceptually. I don’t know if I can provide an example of that, or at least I don’t come through an example to it, but I let’s say come conceptually, or purely through an image. Let’s say liminality. So what if we think, OK, step back. If we think in terms of the common, so there is something in common, then in all cases a common ground for all these varieties is the existence of, or the affirmation of, these two fields of practices. And then, in this variety, which is not the hyphen variety (so not the 100%/100%, if this is one possibility of the hyphen variety) there is a common ground. OK. What if, we do not depart from common ground, but from a void. And this is the idea of the liminal space. So the starting point would not be the hypothesis of an existing common ground but of a liminal space between artistic research and phenomenological research. And, well, this is thinkable. Probably I will continue saying that the practices that realise this affinity through liminality, would inhabit this liminal space in touch somehow with these two others because it is a liminal space. I guess a liminal space is not only an empty space, it is an empty space but it is a framed space, that is why it is liminal. That is why it is in touch with the two sides, let’s say. So the ‘no longer and not yet’ is in touch with what is no longer and what is not yet. It is not an absolute void. It is a contact space, it is a space in contact. So the question will not then be, what, ah, I don’t know. The question would not be to begin with even characteristics but it would be a radically generative practice that somehow inhabits this ‘not knowing’ what this practice is, and not aiming at any form of addition or hybridisation or any kind of concrete operation in relation to artistic research and phenomenological research but somehow it is in touch.I am not sure if this is something, but it is at least so far thinkable and intriguing and attractive somehow.

 

Yes, there are some interesting trains of thought that this sets in motion through holding in mind a few of those things that you placed as coordinates. This sense of through, this emphasis on through folded back to the liminal.Let me think how to organise it, as it is a bit of a swirl. In the first instance, what came to mind was an emphasis on passage. In the sense of through-ness in relation to liminality, in that the liminal is also understood as part of a rite of passage. Actually, now it is making me think of porous in the sense of passage. Now I am taking tangent. Properly speaking, liminality is the middle phase of a rite of passage, and I thinking that this is interesting. Is there a way that this might connect with the movement of epoché and reduction. In that the first stage of a rite of passage is a practice of separation, so radical disassociation with all structural ways of being and structural knowledges, in order to enter this liminal phase, as an initiate, someone with no knowledge. Then the third phase of the rite of passage is this reaggregation or ‘return’, where you return with those knowledges gleaned from the liminal.I don’t know, it feels as if there could be something there. That epoché somehow affects a kind of separation, but there is something then to do with extending or dwelling in the space of liminality that this then opens up, that this separation enables or opens up. And then I guess, listening to what you were saying about this fifth variation, and what this opened up, it was almost making me think, is this to say that the radical ground of that particular variation is epoché, in the sense of … that also what is bracketed in that ground is all preconceptions and conventions of either artistic research or phenomenological research.

 

It might be, but I think I was going another way. Because inhabiting this liminal space, in my imagination of that, would not mean to suspend my knowledge about artistic research and phenomenology. No, actually, the contrary, or maybe not the contrary, but not suspending but being in touch. Yes, OK, being in touch, OK, maybe I don’t see your point with epoché, but I see a point with epoché. Because one of the most tricky things of phenomenology I think is this idea of suspending but not excluding. So this is one of the most tricky things. So it is a certain distance or at least difference from the world, but remaining in the world, which fits to this famous expression of the ‘wonder in the face of the world’. So, the difference that epoché as practice, or one of the differences that epoché as practice enables, is exactly a difference towards the world, so it opens a space. And we are in touch with the world, we continue being, we cannot not be, but or maybe and, we are attending to this world as it appears in my experience. So we suspend the validity of the world, so in terms of saying, the reality of the given-ness. I don’t know, in this sense, there is maybe a suspension in this sense of phenomenology and artistic research in terms of saying – this is there, but this is now not what I am doing. And in this sense, I see a connection with the practice of epoché, of opening a space, of making a difference, making a difference, remaining in the issue in which this difference is made. I don’t know, I don’t really know what I am talking about. I was going to say it is highly speculative, but no, it is an incipient intuition what I am talking about. So, I don’t know if I can say anything else. This relates also for me, maybe I can say something with the through rather as a medium and not a means. When we say through practices, we don’t mean that the practices are the means but rather a medium in terms of a set of conditions of possibility. And somehow this liminal space could have this character of medium, but a medium which maybe does not exist yet, a medium in its own constitution, through the suspension – yes that might be an epoché - of established media or the media of media, in terms of understanding artistic research as media and phenomenological research as media.

 

I guess I am thinking a little about the way in which potentially, that expression of a different variety relates to or might differ from the already-named ‘no-named’ version. It feels as if, even this language of medium is making me think in terms of the medial, and the middle, this middle. This open space between phenomenological research practices or phenomenology and artistic research … and how that middle space is inhabited.

 

This departs from, if this is a possible fifth or sixth variety, it is maybe in the opposite case of the artistic-phenomenological in the sense of what we were saying 100% and 100%, because this is based on ‘I know what artistic research is, and I know what phenomenological research is’ and I bring the two together. And now we are in the completely opposite situation in which we say ‘I don’t know what artistic research is, and I don’t know what phenomenological research is’. And I don’t know where I am.

 

Or in the sense, let me think how I am thinking this … it is also a practice or a modality that activates the hyphen. But I imagine in the formulation of the hyphenation we already have, of artistic-phenomenological, it is as if the hyphen is very short somehow. And here, the hyphen is really big … or the emphasis is on the hyphen as a space of opening which is in touch with both of these terrains of practice, but it is really opening up this space of possibility that is not-yet defined or is no longer and not yet.

 

Yes, yes. Actually we were treating the hyphen as a plus.

 

In the second model?

 

In the sense of 100% plus 100%, so artistic plus phenomenology. And now the hyphen becomes an empty space, something that separates. You said this in the first phase, so the hyphen can be something that brings together or marks a difference. So in this case, it would be an exaggeration of this marking a difference, opening up a space in between which is unknown, and it defines itself originally only as being ‘in between’, in touch but without this touch meaning a form of participation in, which is like the idea of the characteristics. I am in between but I participate in both, I bring things from both sides of this space. This is not the operation I am trying to see now, this is not the aim. The aim is really through osmosis, as you say these porous boundaries, that enable this liminal space to exist, to become really porous, or to mobilise the porosity of these membranes in order to enable something like spontaneous processes of osmosis, as if this space attracts what is beyond the membranes. Attracts by itself, attracts but not extracts. This would be the idea. Because the characteristics is an extraction – I take this out from here and then I have a set of characteristics and I organise them and this is the way I was imagining it. And this would be like the phenomenological-oriented or I mean in this oriented or adjectivized, aesthetic phenomenology or probably this procedure works for these two.

 

I don’t know how to say this ... it is almost like somehow making me think of a model where rather than the characteristics being drawn from here or being drawn from there, as if they already exist. These traits – I take something from here, and I take something from here. I don’t know. There is something like a real ground zero dimension to it, where the characteristics of a practice emerge in total fidelity to the pursuit of a certain truth in a way. I don’t know how to say it, it is like really stripping it all away and if the enquiry is around unveiling, the characteristics will be present. I don’t know. No I cannot say it, I cannot say what I mean. Like the characteristic of wonder is immanent, is it?

 

To this space?

 

Yes, to this space. Or the, yes maybe.

 

And even the process of observation, the process of observation is a process that leads to the constitution of the practices that will inhabit this space. So I am in touch, so this idea of the spontaneous osmosis. I don’t know anything. I observe and I observe what happens and this is a practice which will not begin knowing itself. So it is really a radical space of not knowing. So it is really a space that mobilises the agency of not knowing, the constitutive agency of not knowing. I don’t know and I will inhabit this space in between. I know it is a space in between,this I know.  And I know the other spaces, I have been there, let’s say. But then I suspend again these knowledges, and then this is probably the moment of epoché.

 

But I think, is it is also, I don’t know …at times, One of the things I am struck by is I guess my interest in Buddhist meditation, and there is so much overlap from that perspective as well. Other contexts, which are neither artistic research or phenomenological research. Whether that constitutive space of not knowing is dependent on the presence of these two framing edges.

 

Only in this case. I think too that not knowing is actually a common trait of artistic research and phenomenology. I think epoché is also a way of achieving a state of not knowing. It allows me to see what I could not see by knowing. So there is this idea that all this knowledge occludes other knowledges. I think that this is a constitutive idea in phenomenology and in a much more unarticulated way in artistic research, or even in art. This is really what comes from art practices. I get in touch, I allow myself to don’t do anything, to be somewhere and don’t do anything, to suspend my intentions, to see what happens, to not know what I am doing. All of these are actions, are procedures that are constitutive of art practices.

 

Yes, and I think in that sense, in artistic practice – I think in artistic research as well, but maybe to a lesser extent, but certainly in art– there are a whole arsenal of tactics for this, from a profound sense of doing nothing … as you were talking about this liminal space, the profound encounter with boredom, a deep profound encounter with boredom as a way of estrangement, or exhaustion. Actually, the opposite of ‘not doing’, doing and doing and doing to the point that something exhausts itself, to the point of defamiliarization. There is a whole spectrum of concrete practices for reaching this point of wonder, I mean, this interesting overlap of terminology – not knowing, or wonder, or astonishment, or perplexity, or bewilderment.

 

I think that this idea of wonder is one expression of not-knowing. And I think somehow, for the first time, this expression ‘wonder in the face of the world’, so wonder contains already ‘in the face of the world’, because it is the wonder, and I think van Manen tries to make this clear – it is not astonishment, it is not surprise. It is a very specific state, it is a very specific emotion, which is this ‘what is that’ being in something familiar. I think that this ‘in the face of the world’ is intrinsic in the wonder. I think that wonder is always in the face of the world. And I think that this is also, this particular or very common situation in art practices, ‘what it this, that has been here all the time’, and then suddenly it is estranged, suddenly, what it is that.

 

I am wondering whether this feels … it feels that there are two quite different vectors particularly as activated in an artistic register. The not knowing vector towards defamiliarization, can have a vector that leads towards alienation and separation, yes alienation, cut off, like a nihilistic trajectory of not knowing; and then there is this sense of wonder, and there feels as if there is a profound sense of connection in that somehow.

 

I wonder if this is not, I think this alienation or even rejection, if this is one of the possible vectors of this original event, I would say, this is the very right word, of wonder. So it is clear. There is a discontinuity, there is a clear moment of discontinuity, but it is an intrinsic movement. So this is how I came to think that wonder is always in the face of the world. And, the question is if feeling this wonder, follows a rejection or an attraction, and then an intensification of the object of wonder. I think that the promise of wonder as source of research is that the second happens, that there is an even more, so there is an intensification of this familiarity. No not a familiarity, no, no. Because it is a defamiliarization, it is an intensification of a familiar object. It is no longer familiar, which makes it more intense. In the sense that the familiar domesticises or softens the relationship. But of course, there can be a sense of rejection which would not lead to the positive, it would not be positive in the sense of research. But I tend to think these are like reactions in the face of wonder.

 

Yes, and I suppose, what I am trying to think, there is something about reaction, the reactions you describe there are repelled back or pushing away, and pulling towards – so attraction and aversion in a sense. But it is making me think … I have been thinking about constitutive characteristics, also in relation to the criteria that you have been formulating around aesthetic thinking. And whether, instead of thinking about this in terms of reaction, how it might be to conceive of wonder as opening up a space of interaction.

 

Yes. Yes. But I think this is possible if attraction takes place. Because I continue being there. If I continue being there, a redistribution of agencies can take place.

 

But you call this receptivity rather than attraction. It could be receptivity rather than attraction. The thing I am interested in, in terms ofthinking back to the liminal, is the sense of keeping something open. I mean, in a weird kind of way, there is something about the liminal … I don’t know, it feels confused in my mind. But it feels like, even though the liminal is a space of passage, there is no real vector towards or away. It is actually, you have this sense, maybe this connects to the dynamic of suspension. Whereas, the reaction momentums of rejection or attraction, contain within them the vector of moving towards or moving away from something. Whereas receptivity, or openness, or even liminality, there is a concern for just holding the space open.

 

Yes, exactly. I was wondering if acceptance is better than attraction. I took attraction because something is happening and I thought let’s say I move towards or against. And somehow, if we take this as a basic category then of course acceptance would be understood as a form of attraction because I stay, I do not move away. So then I begin to inhabit it. But actually what I was trying to express feels better with acceptance rather than attraction. It is not that I move towards. I stay where I am and I accept this.

 

Yes, I mean, I even think in the sense of, in terms of the observation of phenomena, is there something about allowing, the sense of letting the momentum come from the emerging phenomenon, so actually the language is almost like … how do I imagine this, I imagine this as almost like a stilling in the agency of the subject. Even as you were describing the term acceptance, the word welcome felt strong for me. But all of these terms, acceptance, welcome, receptivity, is to do with creating conditions or working with conditions that allow something to appear, rather than moving towards something.

 

Exactly, exactly. I am thinking about a German term which is very nice, which is Aufmerksamkeit. Auf is also to open and merksamis to notice. So my image of this word would be something like an old camera, so it opens and it is marked on the film, and I think that this is, we are now beginning a semantic field, this acceptance, this opening, and this welcoming idea of becoming vulnerable, fragile, vulnerable, open. I think that this is something that can happen when this event of wonder occurs, and if this is what happens, then the possibility of research is open. Then there is the possibility of the research in the sense that I recognise, and again this could be added to our list of commonalities, in the sense of revealing unconcealment. Terms that are also connected with observation, showing, allowing to see. It is really striking how philosophy begins to talk in aesthetic terms when it becomes phenomenology. The phenomenon is not thought, it is seen. You see the phenomenon, so this is a key word. In terms of aesthetic phenomenology, I really begin to wonder if phenomenology is fundamentally aesthetic, and I would say yes, definitely. So this epiphanic moment when Husserl says ‘when I see that two plus two is four’.

 

This is interesting – there are these two moments, in that, that is the inceptual moment right, this moment of epiphany, or breakthrough or revelation. But before you were saying this, the feeling that I was having was much more like waves. So there is something about this prolonging of the space of wonder. And I think that wonder does have, that attraction/repulsion reaction is triggered by wonder, and I think that there is something about how this holding of the space open requires an incredibly subtle navigation or negotiation of those forces. It feels like … and I know this also in the experience of meditation … you lean in a bit too much and it becomes graspy, and then there is this leaning back which becomes disinterested. So there is this very dynamic space of trying to prolong, to prolong maybe even that zone of liminality, in order, no, not in order, because that is already a little instrumental, with the possibility that something emerges. But all the time, that push and pull dynamic … I mean you can feel this also in conversation. There is something and if you follow it too quick the space that was opening disappears but you were too eager, not holding the space open. I don’t know where I am going with this. Oh yes, maybe it connects back to slowness, this relationship between the slowness and duration and extending the space of openness, in order for the possibility of this inceptual glimpse, or flashes.

 

Yes, yes. I mean this is what I mean by this sense of inhabiting, in terms of dwelling. This is also this beautiful expression of dwelling with the phenomena, so don’t go away. But I think that this going away, I think that there are two possible forces. And maybe Buddhists also talk about a third, which is the neutral. So a mental formation can be positive, negative or neutral. The positive falls into this attraction, in all possible forms from acceptance to really moving towards. Or this aversion or rejection is the negative. Maybe the neutral is a “positive neutral”, an acceptance that does not turn to be so active as in the case that you were describing when we are talking and we jump into something, which is in itself a positive sign. Because if not, you say no. But if you say yes, yes, there is an attraction and a moving towards this. But I think … this space of affinity between artistic research and phenomenology requires this kind of positive neutral, and this also connects with the idea of passivity, reaction or action in touch with wonder. And as I was saying that, an idea that crossed my mind was, I was saying, the field of art is much more diverse than the field of phenomenology. That is why I can address this issue of the Special Issue, much better from the perspective of aesthetic practices and phenomenology. Because artistic practices, artistic research practices … there could always be a case where I say no, this is not artistic. Or, in the positive sense, that there are artistic practices that have nothing to do with that. And maybe maybe maybe maybe, we are talking about an area in artistic research and I think what we tend to qualify this as aesthetic research, or denominate as aesthetic research which makes emphasis in perception. Or what I prefer to call it, also perception-sensing, perceiving-sensing-feeling. Not so much areas dominated or grounded in imagination or speculation but in terms of seeing. So areas that somehow come closer to or can come closer to … no not necessarily, I stop there, because this is the interesting point. If you look at the history of aesthetics there is this tension between imagination and aisthesis, and I think that this is a very interesting issue. And I think it is there in the aisthesis that I see a common ground. Or the possibilities for affinity between phenomenology and artistic research or better aesthetic research. But maybe all of this is only said, moved by, my own affinities. Someone else might say, well there can also be an affinity between artistic research and phenomenology based on the use of imagination, and I guess this is true.

 

I am trying to move between now and the beginning of this. Going back to the neutral feels interesting in the sense of whether the neutral relates to the liminal, or even to the fourth variation, the ‘no-name’, there is a neutrality to it. Yes, it is interesting that in the two expressions of neutral – one is neutral in the model, from a buddhist context, one expression of neutral might be ignorance or delusion. It is neither moving in the direction of craving or aversion, but it is the third poison of delusion or ignorance. In terms of vedana or felt sensation, it is ‘I don’t know’, I don’t know what I am feeling. It is neither craving or aversion but a grey space. Maybe there is something there about practising in complete ignorance of either phenomenology or artistic research. But the positive expression of neutral is equanimity.

 

Or availability. I think that this sense of neutral anticipates the positive. Because it is somehow I am saying I feel it, I am here, and I am available.

 

Yes. I felt a sense of myself leaning in as it activated a train of associations, where the neutral and its relationship to equanimity (this is in this text I referred to where I am talking about lichen), there is an Ancient Greek use of the term epoché, which is connected to equanimity, or called ataraxia, a state of serene calm. I was thinking that this is interesting. Somehow this neutral has, you already said this, the quality of the neutral in the epoché.

 

But it needs to be an engaged neutral

 

Yes.

 

Or neutrally engaged. Because, or in terms of a vulnerable neutral. A sensible neutral. A sensible .. so it is a neutral not in a sense of negation, it is an affirmative neutral, maybe without expressing any kind of affirmation.

 

That also seems to relate to the sense of dwelling, I was thinking to remain neutral in the face of wonder.

 

Yes, because the whole thing is to be able to see the phenomenon itself. The whole idea is that the phenomenon itself is revealed. So it is not me, that is what I have to try to suspend, all those forms of being myself, which is I know what my preferences are and so on. And somehow the epoché, this aspect of the epoché which I think is extremely complex is this idea of making space, of making myself available. And then available for what, available for the phenomenon itself to be revealed. Yes. So it is being attentive, so listening, listening to the question ‘how are you, what are you’, but not providing or not constructing an answer. But creating the conditions for it to “answer”.

 

I wonder whether, I am thinking of some of the phrases that have been coming through our Thinking Aesthetic Thinking discussions. And something to do with the misconception of what first-person perspective might mean.

 

Yes, absolutely.

 

There is the heightening of that sensible, sensory-perceptual register of subjectivity, and at the same time the reduction or diminishing of the I-ness of that.

 

And this connects with the idea of reflection we were talking about. So I activate my capacities of reflecting, seeing and reflecting become somehow one. And actually become one, become I am seeing what I reflect. This is me looking at my experience, I guess. So, yes, yes, so also when teaching very tricky – so, ‘I have to talk about my feelings’. I say no, you have to talk about the phenomenon through your feelings. So people begin to talk about themselves, and I say, no, it is not about you, it is through you. You become a medium, that is my point, you become a reflector. It is not about you, you are a medium and the medium is always invisible, providing potentiality, providing agency. But it is never in focus.

 

And maybe this sense of the neutral is active there.

 

Exactly.

 

I am thinking of neutral of I, and thinking back to the image you were describing yesterday, the metaphor of the mirror, and the displacement of the mirror so it is not yourself reflected back.

 

Exactly, this was the reason I was introducing this displacement. Exactly.

 

So this sense of a heightened capacity, an increased sensible, sensorial, perceptual capacities as a means for or as way for maximising that reflective agency.

 

Absolutely.

 

But at the same time that not being the personal.

 

Yes. Yes.

 

And I think that this is a shared characteristic. Is it, I am not sure. I think it is a shared characteristic of aesthetic research, but maybe this is also a difference between aesthetic and artistic, this getting out of the way. I make a judgement … on the agency of ego.

 

Yes, it is not by chance you make this judgement. I have been working with my students with Epistemologies of Aesthetics from Mersch, especially this chapter which is called A Short History of Truth in Art, and there is this moment where he writes that when Baumgarten renounced the original goal and situated aisthesis or perception at the centre of his project. And I think yes, it is in this turn, if we go with Mersch, artistic research which I think aligned with aesthetic research, is to be recovered. So aesthetic research or aesthetic research practices, as aisthetic research practices is where I see the possibilities for any common ground, or for a common ground between this kind of research and phenomenology. And since we don’t have so much time, and this is the last conversation … there is an issue which I think is interesting.

 

The only thing I was going to add there, was if another person was conceiving of these varieties of affinity, I wonder, I am thinking about Esa’s thinking on ‘artistic phenomenology’ differentiated from aesthetic phenomenology and also some of the things coming up in Michael Bigg’s text around fiction and the non-existent. Whether there are, actually two distinctive varieties of affinity, one of which follows this aesthetic trajectory that you are describing, but there might also be another variety which follows the route of the artistic within a closer link to the imaginal and imagination.

 

I think so, I think so. First, there is why I see one differentiation between aesthetic and artistic, not the only one, but the most fundamental one. So practices that remains, that dwells with phenomena, and those that construct on this basis. And then there are two different common grounds between phenomenology and artistic research. And there we could say if this is true, so definitely the second can be named as aesthetic research and definitely the second can be named as artistic research. And there are other possibilities for possible transitions between both. For example, Katja’s is a clear example of aisthesis of perception, so non-construction. And maybe Michael Croft is an in-between, but rather observing. Super interesting, but the question I would like to touch before we finish, is the question you propose in two formulation: to what effect, or what is at stake? And I look at the … because I think that this is relevant. So why are we doing that. And I look at the open call and there is a line about that. We are convinced that in pushing this subject matter we are contributing to an original methodological development of both fields: artistic research and phenomenology.

 

But does it need to say … actually I have had this dilemma all along, how explicit do the findings or conclusions need to be. I mean, this is also present in a lot of the contributions – is it necessary to say what kind of contribution it makes to the methodological field.

 

No, I don’t think so. I was not so much thinking about the contribution or the goal of the contribution, but what is our goal in this Special Issue. But also in this regard, the question of how explicit. I don’t think we have to be explicit about that. I don’t think that this Editorial should include a list of the ways in this Special Issue contributes to develop both fields. I don’t think we need to do that. But what struck me when I read this – this is a possibility. But considering the last two realisations of the affinities where we affirm a ‘third’, which is an expansion of this goal which is not only contributing to known fields of phenomenology and artistic research but also the possibility of contributing to research in general in which new, unknown varieties of research might appear through the realisation or instantiation of these affinities. I think that this is very nice, but we did not foresee this when we wrote the call.

 

The other thing is the sense of … it is interesting that we phrase it as making a methodological contribution. One of the things that comes to mind is the sense that one of the commonalities for both fields of practice is that there is method without method. And in that sense, thinking about what you were saying about van Manen getting close to describing how to do something, and then withholding, saying of course there are only singular examples of practice. What struck me was that for both fields of practice there is this common principle of showing, and of showing through example. Van Manen uses this term agogical, which I guess is the etymological half of ped-agogical. So showing what the phenomenological attitude looks like through example. Rather than describe through procedure, it can only be shown through example or through practice. It feels as if this is what is at stake in the showing of practices and in the presentation of artifacts, that in both fields of practice there is only method without method. It can only be given expression through singular examples of practices.

 

I mean there is always this problem with this word methodological or methodical or method. Because the common interpretation probably comes from the scientific method, as if there would be a prescription, method would be something prescriptive. This is the way you do it. Now go and work. But if we take this is a wider and not prescriptive but responding to what happens, as methodus or the way. The prescriptive is: this is the way, so go. The other one is: walk, lay down a path. And this is I think correct to talk about method in these terms. I remember when we wrote that I accepted because I understand that a method emerges from the conjunction of practices and because we are dealing with practices. This Special Issue is about practices, and I think it is justified to talk about method in these terms.

 

You are describing this laying down of a path. I was thinking of the showing of practices as the showing of a way, not the showing of the way. This goes back to yesterday and the conversation on the differentiation between ‘how do you do it?’ and ‘how do you do it?’

 

Exactly. How it must be done is like the scientific method. And then how do you do it, or how do I do it in terms of the partial repeatability of any method. I prefer to soften the term method that to fully renounce it.

 

That also feels as if it might correspond to approach method with the principle of epoché.

 

Van Manen describes a methodological epoché and he claims for methodological creativity. So suspend the ways you know that work in doing research. But all this is in terms of let the phenomenon tell you how to deal with it. So this idea of situated methods, or situated and embodied concept of method. Embodiment is already there in the ‘you’. You do it here now. You do it here now and in touch with this issue, this phenomenon. Because if the last element is not present, then this redistribution of agencies is missing and then I would say neither aesthetic or phenomenological research can be made, can be recognised.

 

It is making me think there about contingent method in all of its meanings

 

Exactly. It is a network of contingencies.

 

 

 

 

 

2nd Distillation

Transcript from Tuesday 29 March 2022

Conversation (Part III)

 

So reading the transcriptions there were some themes or some issues that I annotated in another piece of paper which I would like to talk about, as a proposition, as an offering. So there is this question of the through, which we haven’t talked directly about. So this idea of through practices, and the idea of through Special Issue, researching through practices, researching through a Special Issue, publishing in but you could also say through a Special Issue, publishing practices through a Special Issue. And this is for me connected somehow with this beautiful, and increasingly beautiful idea for me, of the not fully. So in English, this ‘no longer and not yet’. So this idea of the liminal which was exactly the expression I was looking for in German – so nicht mehr und noch nicht. So this idea of liminality, I think, relates to this through, or can be related to this through. And this relates to a third point, or a third conglomerate of issues, connected to indirect strategies; the question of live or liveness; the issue of absence or invisibility, even no-phenomenality, or maybe better as forms of phenomenality. I think this is a group of issues that relate to one another and were present in different forms in our conversations, so for me it already has for me a quality of distillation.

 

This sounds good. I think that one of the things I was interested in diving into more deeply was maybe connected but also maybe different from that, was more of a sense of the characteristics and traits that might be in common. We have spoken a lot about the different modalities, or the different varieties of affinities, but not always so much about the different traits or characteristics. One is this through-ness, this through phenomena. There was also this identification of observation. And then potentially, what we were talking upon at the end of yesterday’s conversation was whether the practice of reduction, or of epoché and reduction proper, would be characteristics or traits that are deemed necessary. I was also thinking about the difference between criteria and characteristic.

 

I mean, in this case, if we are talking about one of the varieties of affinity, I think characteristics can be used as criteria. What I mean is, there are a set of characteristics of artistic research that can be identified, there are a set of characteristics of phenomenological research that can be identified, and then, for the sake of this publication, of our editorial work in this publication, we could say if we recognise these characteristics. Then we will publish this submission. So the presence of the characteristic, of the possibility of recognising these characteristic is the criteria for the edition. Somehow it is also the way this journal operates with characteristics, that are the traits that van Manen lists of a phenomenological research. These are very used in this journal in this way.

 

But we can also come back to these characteristics and maybe begin with some of the things that you were identifying. Maybe with the characteristics, I was thinking, maybe there are some more obvious common characteristics that we are not even saying: so something about embodiment, or lived-through-ness, or an engagement with the pre-reflective. So some of these things maybe are not explicitly said in our conversation but are commonalities none-the-less.

 

We can continue with that. This listing. So common, or possible common, possible characteristics of this affinity. Or maybe this is not accurate enough. So common characteristics of phenomenological and artistic research practices.

 

We can come to this later. Start with some of what links to or comes from the last conversation, what you are drawing out.

 

I could also use this idea of characteristics to maybe point to a possible different variety of realisation of these affinities. So a fifth. Which I can only touch not grasp conceptually. I don’t know if I can provide an example of that, or at least I don’t come through an example to it, but I let’s say come conceptually, or purely through an image. Let’s say liminality. So what if we think, OK, step back. If we think in terms of the common, so there is something in common, then in all cases a common ground for all these varieties is the existence of, or the affirmation of, these two fields of practices. And then, in this variety, which is not the hyphen variety (so not the 100%/100%, if this is one possibility of the hyphen variety) there is a common ground. OK. What if, we do not depart from common ground, but from a void. And this is the idea of the liminal space. So the starting point would not be the hypothesis of an existing common ground but of a liminal space between artistic research and phenomenological research. And, well, this is thinkable. Probably I will continue saying that the practices that realise this affinity through liminality, would inhabit this liminal space in touch somehow with these two others because it is a liminal space. I guess a liminal space is not only an empty space, it is an empty space but it is a framed space, that is why it is liminal. That is why it is in touch with the two sides, let’s say. So the ‘no longer and not yet’ is in touch with what is no longer and what is not yet. It is not an absolute void. It is a contact space, it is a space in contact. So the question will not then be, what, ah, I don’t know. The question would not be to begin with even characteristics but it would be a radically generative practice that somehow inhabits this ‘not knowing’ what this practice is, and not aiming at any form of addition or hybridisation or any kind of concrete operation in relation to artistic research and phenomenological research but somehow it is in touch.I am not sure if this is something, but it is at least so far thinkable and intriguing and attractive somehow.

 

Yes, there are some interesting trains of thought that this sets in motion through holding in mind a few of those things that you placed as coordinates. This sense of through, this emphasis on through folded back to the liminal.Let me think how to organise it, as it is a bit of a swirl. In the first instance, what came to mind was an emphasis on passage. In the sense of through-ness in relation to liminality, in that the liminal is also understood as part of a rite of passage. Actually, now it is making me think of porous in the sense of passage. Now I am taking tangent. Properly speaking, liminality is the middle phase of a rite of passage, and I thinking that this is interesting. Is there a way that this might connect with the movement of epoché and reduction. In that the first stage of a rite of passage is a practice of separation, so radical disassociation with all structural ways of being and structural knowledges, in order to enter this liminal phase, as an initiate, someone with no knowledge. Then the third phase of the rite of passage is this reaggregation or ‘return’, where you return with those knowledges gleaned from the liminal.I don’t know, it feels as if there could be something there. That epoché somehow affects a kind of separation, but there is something then to do with extending or dwelling in the space of liminality that this then opens up, that this separation enables or opens up. And then I guess, listening to what you were saying about this fifth variation, and what this opened up, it was almost making me think, is this to say that the radical ground of that particular variation is epoché, in the sense of … that also what is bracketed in that ground is all preconceptions and conventions of either artistic research or phenomenological research.

 

It might be, but I think I was going another way. Because inhabiting this liminal space, in my imagination of that, would not mean to suspend my knowledge about artistic research and phenomenology. No, actually, the contrary, or maybe not the contrary, but not suspending but being in touch. Yes, OK, being in touch, OK, maybe I don’t see your point with epoché, but I see a point with epoché. Because one of the most tricky things of phenomenology I think is this idea of suspending but not excluding. So this is one of the most tricky things. So it is a certain distance or at least difference from the world, but remaining in the world, which fits to this famous expression of the ‘wonder in the face of the world’. So,the difference that epoché as practice, or one of the differences that epoché as practice enables, is exactly a difference towards the world, so it opens a space. And we are in touch with the world, we continue being, we cannot not be, but or maybe and, we are attending to this world as it appears in my experience. So we suspend the validity of the world, so in terms of saying, the reality of the given-ness. I don’t know, in this sense, there is maybe a suspension in this sense of phenomenology and artistic research in terms of saying – this is there, but this is now not what I am doing. And in this sense, I see a connection with the practice of epoché, of opening a space, of making a difference, making a difference, remaining in the issue in which this difference is made. I don’t know, I don’t really know what I am talking about. I was going to say it is highly speculative, but no, it is an incipient intuition what I am talking about. So, I don’t know if I can say anything else. This relates also for me, maybe I can say something with the through rather as a medium and not a means. When we say through practices, we don’t mean that the practices are the means but rather a medium in terms of a set of conditions of possibility. And somehow this liminal space could have this character of medium, but a medium which maybe does not exist yet, a medium in its own constitution, through the suspension – yes that might be an epoché - of established media or the media of media, in terms of understanding artistic research as media and phenomenological research as media.

 

I guess I am thinking a little about the way in which potentially, that expression of a different variety relates to or might differ from the already-named ‘no-named’ version. It feels as if, even this language of medium is making me think in terms of the medial, and the middle, this middle. This open space between phenomenological research practices or phenomenology and artistic research … and how that middle space is inhabited.

 

This departs from, if this is a possible fifth or sixth variety, it is maybe in the opposite case of the artistic-phenomenological in the sense of what we were saying 100% and 100%, because this is based on ‘I know what artistic research is, and I know what phenomenological research is’ and I bring the two together. And now we are in the completely opposite situation in which we say ‘I don’t know what artistic research is, and I don’t know what phenomenological research is’. And I don’t know where I am.

 

Or in the sense, let me think how I am thinking this … it is also a practice or a modality that activates the hyphen. But I imagine in the formulation of the hyphenation we already have, of artistic-phenomenological, it is as if the hyphen is very short somehow. And here, the hyphen is really big … orthe emphasis is on the hyphen as a space of opening which is in touch with both of these terrains of practice, but it is really opening up this space of possibility that is not-yet defined or is no longer and not yet.

 

Yes, yes. Actually we were treating the hyphen as a plus.

 

In the second model?

 

In the sense of 100% plus 100%, so artistic plus phenomenology. And now the hyphen becomes an empty space, something that separates. You said this in the first phase, so the hyphen can be something that brings together or marks a difference. So in this case, it would be an exaggeration of thismarking a difference, opening up a space in between which is unknown, and it defines itself originally only as being ‘in between’, in touch but without this touch meaning a form of participation in, which is like the idea of the characteristics. I am in between but I participate in both, I bring things from both sides of this space. This is not the operation I am trying to see now, this is not the aim. The aim is really through osmosis, as you say these porous boundaries, that enable this liminal space to exist, to become really porous, or to mobilise the porosity of these membranes in order to enable something like spontaneous processes of osmosis, as if this space attracts what is beyond the membranes. Attracts by itself, attracts but not extracts. This would be the idea. Because the characteristics is an extraction – I take this out from here and then I have a set of characteristics and I organise them and this is the way I was imagining it. And this would be like the phenomenological-oriented or I mean in this oriented or adjectivized, aesthetic phenomenology or probably this procedure works for these two.

 

I don’t know how to say this ... it is almost like somehow making me think of a model where rather than the characteristics being drawn from here or being drawn from there, as if they already exist. These traits – I take something from here, and I take something from here. I don’t know. There is something like a real ground zero dimension to it, where the characteristics of a practice emerge in total fidelity to the pursuit of a certain truth in a way. I don’t know how to say it, it is like really stripping it all away and if the enquiry is around unveiling, the characteristics will be present. I don’t know. No I cannot say it, I cannot say what I mean. Like the characteristic of wonder is immanent, is it?

 

To this space?

 

Yes, to this space. Or the, yes maybe.

 

And even the process of observation, the process of observation is a process that leads to the constitution of the practices that will inhabit this space. So I am in touch, so this idea of the spontaneous osmosis. I don’t know anything. I observe and I observe what happens and this is a practice which will not begin knowing itself. So it is really a radical space of not knowing. So it is really a space that mobilises the agency of not knowing, the constitutive agency of not knowing. I don’t know and I will inhabit this space in between. I know it is a space in between,this I know.  And I know the other spaces, I have been there, let’s say. But then I suspend again these knowledges, and then this is probably the moment of epoché.

 

But I think, is it is also, I don’t know …at times, One of the things I am struck by is I guess my interest in Buddhist meditation, and there is so much overlap from that perspective as well. Other contexts, which are neither artistic research or phenomenological research. Whether that constitutive space of not knowing is dependent on the presence of these two framing edges.

 

Only in this case. I think too that not knowing is actually a common trait of artistic research and phenomenology. I think epoché is also a way of achieving a state of not knowing. It allows me to see what I could not see by knowing. So there is this idea that all this knowledge occludes other knowledges. I think that this is a constitutive idea in phenomenology and in a much more unarticulated way in artistic research, or even in art. This is really what comes from art practices. I get in touch, I allow myself to don’t do anything, to be somewhere and don’t do anything, to suspend my intentions, to see what happens, to not know what I am doing. All of these are actions, are procedures that are constitutive of art practices.

 

Yes, and I think in that sense, in artistic practice I think in artistic research as well, but maybe to a lesser extent, but certainly in art– there are a whole arsenal of tactics for this, from a profound sense of doing nothing … as you were talking about this liminal space, the profound encounter with boredom, a deep profound encounter with boredom as a way of estrangement, or exhaustion. Actually, the opposite of ‘not doing’, doing and doing and doing to the point that something exhausts itself, to the point of defamiliarization. There is a whole spectrum of concrete practices for reaching this point of wonder, I mean, this interesting overlap of terminology – not knowing, or wonder, or astonishment, or perplexity, or bewilderment.

 

I think that this idea of wonder is one expression of not-knowing. And I think somehow, for the first time, this expression ‘wonder in the face of the world’, so wonder contains already ‘in the face of the world’, because it is the wonder, and I think van Manen tries to make this clear – it is not astonishment, it is not surprise. It is a very specific state, it is a very specific emotion, which is this ‘what is that’ being in something familiar. I think that this ‘in the face of the world’ is intrinsic in the wonder. I think that wonder is always in the face of the world. And I think that this is also, this particular or very common situation in art practices, ‘what it this, that has been here all the time’, and then suddenly it is estranged, suddenly, what it is that.

 

I am wondering whether this feels … it feels that there are two quite different vectors particularly as activated in an artistic register. The not knowing vector towards defamiliarization, can have a vector that leads towards alienation and separation, yes alienation, cut off, like a nihilistic trajectory of not knowing; and then there is this sense of wonder, and there feels as if there is a profound sense of connection in that somehow.

 

I wonder if this is not, I think this alienation or even rejection, if this is one of the possible vectors of this original event, I would say, this is the very right word, of wonder. So it is clear. There is a discontinuity, there is a clear moment of discontinuity, but it is an intrinsic movement. So this is how I came to think that wonder is always in the face of the world. And, the question is if feeling this wonder, follows a rejection or an attraction, and then an intensification of the object of wonder. I think that the promise of wonder as source of research is that the second happens, that there is an even more, so there is an intensification of this familiarity. No not a familiarity, no, no. Because it is a defamiliarization, it is an intensification of a familiar object. It is no longer familiar, which makes it more intense. In the sense that the familiar domesticises or softens the relationship. But of course, there can be a sense of rejection which would not lead to the positive, it would not be positive in the sense of research. But I tend to think these are like reactions in the face of wonder.

 

Yes, and I suppose, what I am trying to think, there is something about reaction, the reactions you describe there are repelled back or pushing away, and pulling towards – so attraction and aversion in a sense. But it is making me think … I have been thinking about constitutive characteristics, also in relation to the criteria that you have been formulating around aesthetic thinking. And whether, instead of thinking about this in terms of reaction, how it might be to conceive of wonder as opening up a space of interaction.

 

Yes. Yes. But I think this is possible if attraction takes place. Because I continue being there. If I continue being there, a redistribution of agencies can take place.

 

But you call this receptivity rather than attraction. It could be receptivity rather than attraction. The thing I am interested in, in terms of thinking back to the liminal, is the sense of keeping something open. I mean, in a weird kind of way, there is something about the liminal … I don’t know, it feels confused in my mind. But it feels like, even though the liminal is a space of passage, there is no real vector towards or away. It is actually, you have this sense, maybe this connects to the dynamic of suspension. Whereas, the reaction momentums of rejection or attraction, contain within them the vector of moving towards or moving away from something. Whereas receptivity, or openness, or even liminality, there is a concern for just holding the space open.

 

Yes, exactly. I was wondering if acceptance is better than attraction. I took attraction because something is happening and I thought let’s say I move towards or against. And somehow, if we take this as a basic category then of course acceptance would be understood as a form of attraction because I stay, I do not move away. So then I begin to inhabit it. But actually what I was trying to express feels better with acceptance rather than attraction. It is not that I move towards. I stay where I am and I accept this.

 

Yes, I mean, I even think in the sense of, in terms of the observation of phenomena, is there something about allowing, the sense of letting the momentum come from the emerging phenomenon, so actually the language is almost like … how do I imagine this, I imagine this as almost like a stilling in the agency of the subject. Even as you were describing the term acceptance, the word welcome felt strong for me. But all of these terms, acceptance, welcome, receptivity, is to do with creating conditions or working with conditions that allow something to appear, rather than moving towards something.

 

Exactly, exactly. I am thinking about a German term which is very nice, which is Aufmerksamkeit. Auf is also to open and merksamis to notice.Somy image of this word would be something like an old camera, so it opens and it is marked on the film, and I think that this is, we are now beginning a semantic field, this acceptance, this opening, and this welcoming idea of becoming vulnerable, fragile, vulnerable, open. I think that this is something that can happen when this event of wonder occurs, and if this is what happens, then the possibility of research is open. Then there is the possibility of the research in the sense that I recognise, and again this could be added to our list of commonalities, in the sense of revealing unconcealment. Terms that are also connected with observation, showing, allowing to see. It is really striking how philosophy begins to talk in aesthetic terms when it becomes phenomenology. The phenomenon is not thought, it is seen. You see the phenomenon, so this is a key word. In terms of aesthetic phenomenology, I really begin to wonder if phenomenology is fundamentally aesthetic, and I would say yes, definitely. So this epiphanic moment when Husserl says ‘when I see that two plus two is four’.

 

This is interesting – there are these two moments, in that, that is the inceptual moment right, this moment of epiphany, or breakthrough or revelation. But before you were saying this, the feeling that I was having was much more like waves. So there is something about this prolonging of the space of wonder. And I think that wonder does have, that attraction/repulsion reaction is triggered by wonder, and I think that there is something about how this holding of the space open requires an incredibly subtle navigation or negotiation of those forces. It feels like … and I know this also in the experience of meditation … you lean in a bit too much and it becomes graspy, and then there is this leaning back which becomes disinterested. So there is this very dynamic space of trying to prolong, to prolong maybe even that zone of liminality, in order, no, not in order, because that is already a little instrumental, with the possibility that something emerges. But all the time, that push and pull dynamic … I mean you can feel this also in conversation. There is something and if you follow it too quick the space that was opening disappears but you were too eager, not holding the space open. I don’t know where I am going with this. Oh yes, maybe it connects back to slowness, this relationship between the slowness and duration and extending the space of openness, in order for the possibility of this inceptual glimpse, or flashes.

 

Yes, yes. I mean this is what I mean by this sense of inhabiting, in terms of dwelling. This is also this beautiful expression of dwelling with the phenomena, so don’t go away. But I think that this going away, I think that there are two possible forces. And maybe Buddhists also talk abouta third, which is the neutral. So a mental formation can be positive, negative or neutral. The positive falls into this attraction, in all possible forms from acceptance to really moving towards. Or this aversion or rejection is the negative. Maybe the neutral is a “positive neutral”, an acceptance that does not turn to be so active as in the case that you were describing when we are talking and we jump into something, which is in itself a positive sign. Because if not, you say no. But if you say yes, yes, there is an attraction and a moving towards this. But I think … this space of affinity between artistic research and phenomenology requires this kind of positive neutral, and this also connects with the idea of passivity, reaction or action in touch with wonder. And as I was saying that, an idea that crossed my mind was, I was saying, the field of art is much more diverse than the field of phenomenology. That is why I can address this issue of the Special Issue, much better from the perspective of aesthetic practices and phenomenology. Because artistic practices, artistic research practices … there could always be a case where I say no, this is not artistic. Or, in the positive sense, that there are artistic practices that have nothing to do with that. And maybe maybe maybe maybe, we are talking about an area in artistic research and I think what we tend to qualify this as aesthetic research, or denominate as aesthetic research which makes emphasis in perception. Or what I prefer to call it, also perception-sensing, perceiving-sensing-feeling. Not so much areas dominated or grounded in imagination or speculation but in terms of seeing. So areas that somehow come closer to or can come closer to … no not necessarily, I stop there, because this is the interesting point. If you look at the history of aesthetics there is this tension between imagination and aisthesis, and I think that this is a very interesting issue. And I think it is there in the aisthesis that I see a common ground. Or the possibilities for affinity between phenomenology and artistic research or better aesthetic research. But maybe all of this is only said, moved by, my own affinities. Someone else might say, well there can also be an affinity between artistic research and phenomenology based on the use of imagination, and I guess this is true.

 

I am trying to move between now and the beginning of this. Going back to the neutral feels interesting in the sense of whether the neutral relates to the liminal, or even to the fourth variation, the ‘no-name’, there is a neutrality to it. Yes, it is interesting that in the two expressions of neutral –one is neutral in the model, from a buddhist context, one expression of neutral might be ignorance or delusion. It is neither moving in the direction of craving or aversion, but it is the third poison of delusion or ignorance. In terms of vedana or felt sensation,it is ‘I don’t know’, I don’t know what I am feeling. It is neither craving or aversion but a grey space. Maybe there is something there about practising in complete ignorance of either phenomenology or artistic research. But the positive expression of neutral is equanimity.

 

Or availability. I think that this sense of neutral anticipates the positive. Because it is somehow I am sayingI feel it, I am here, and I am available.

 

Yes. I felt a sense of myself leaning in as it activated a train of associations, where the neutral and its relationship to equanimity (this is in this text I referred to where I am talking about lichen), there is an Ancient Greek use of the term epoché, which is connected to equanimity, or called ataraxia, a state of serene calm. I was thinking that this is interesting. Somehow this neutral has, you already said this, the quality of the neutral in the epoché.

 

But it needs to be an engaged neutral

 

Yes.

 

Or neutrally engaged. Because, or in terms of a vulnerable neutral. A sensible neutral. A sensible .. so it is a neutral not in a sense of negation, it is an affirmative neutral, maybe without expressing any kind of affirmation.

 

That also seems to relate to the sense of dwelling, I was thinking to remain neutral in the face of wonder.

 

Yes, because the whole thing is to be able to see the phenomenon itself. The whole idea is that the phenomenon itself is revealed. So it is not me, that is what I have to try to suspend, all those forms of being myself, which is I know what my preferences are and so on. And somehow the epoché, this aspect of the epoché which I think is extremely complex is this idea of making space, of making myself available. And then available for what, available for the phenomenon itself to be revealed. Yes. So it is being attentive, so listening, listening to the question ‘how are you, what are you’, but not providing or not constructing an answer. But creating the conditions for it to “answer”.

 

I wonder whether, I am thinking of some of the phrases that have been coming through our Thinking Aesthetic Thinking discussions. And something to do with the misconception of what first-person perspective might mean.

 

Yes, absolutely.

 

There is the heightening of that sensible, sensory-perceptual register of subjectivity, and at the same time the reduction or diminishing of the I-ness of that.

 

And this connects with the idea of reflection we were talking about. So I activate my capacities of reflecting, seeing and reflecting become somehow one. And actually become one, become I am seeing what I reflect. This is me looking at my experience, I guess. So, yes, yes, so also when teaching very tricky – so, ‘I have to talk about my feelings’. I say no, you have to talk about the phenomenon through your feelings. So people begin to talk about themselves, and I say, no, it is not about you, it is through you. You become a medium, that is my point, you become a reflector. It is not about you, you are a medium and the medium is always invisible, providing potentiality, providing agency. But it is never in focus.

 

And maybe this sense of the neutral is active there.

 

Exactly.

 

I am thinking of neutral of I, and thinking back to the image you were describing yesterday, the metaphor of the mirror, and the displacement of the mirror so it is not yourself reflected back.

 

Exactly, this was the reason I was introducing this displacement. Exactly.

 

So this sense of a heightened capacity, an increased sensible, sensorial, perceptual capacities as a means for or as way for maximising that reflective agency.

 

Absolutely.

 

But at the same time that not being the personal.

 

Yes. Yes.

 

And I think that this is a shared characteristic. Is it, I am not sure. I think it is a shared characteristic of aesthetic research, but maybe this is also a difference between aesthetic and artistic, this getting out of the way. I make a judgement … on the agency of ego.

 

Yes, it is not by chance you make this judgement. I have been working with my students with Epistemologies of Aesthetics from Mersch, especially this chapter which is called A Short History of Truth in Art, and there is this moment where he writes that when Baumgarten renounced the original goal and situated aisthesis or perception at the centre of his project. And I think yes, it is in this turn, if we go with Mersch, artistic research which I think aligned with aesthetic research, is to be recovered. So aesthetic research or aesthetic research practices, as aisthetic research practices is where I see the possibilities for any common ground, or for a common ground between this kind of research and phenomenology. And since we don’t have so much time, and this is the last conversation … there is an issue which I think is interesting.

 

The only thing I was going to add there, was if another person was conceiving of these varieties of affinity, I wonder, I am thinking about Esa’s thinking on ‘artistic phenomenology’ differentiated from aesthetic phenomenology and also some of the things coming up in Michael Bigg’s text around fiction and the non-existent. Whether there are, actually two distinctive varieties of affinity, one of which follows this aesthetic trajectory that you are describing, but there might also be another variety which follows the route of the artistic within a closer link to the imaginal and imagination.

 

I think so, I think so. First, there is why I see one differentiation between aesthetic and artistic, not the only one, but the most fundamental one. So practices that remains, that dwells with phenomena, and those that construct on this basis. And then there are two different common grounds between phenomenology and artistic research. And there we could say if this is true, so definitely the second can be named as aesthetic research and definitely the second can be named as artistic research. And there are other possibilities for possible transitions between both. For example, Katja’s is a clear example of aisthesis of perception, so non-construction. And maybe Michael Croft is an in-between, but rather observing. Super interesting, but the question I would like to touch before we finish, is the question you propose in two formulation: to what effect, or what is at stake? And I look at the … because I think that this is relevant. So why are we doing that. And I look at the open call and there is a line about that.We are convinced that in pushing this subject matter we are contributing to an original methodological development of both fields: artistic research and phenomenology.

 

But does it need to say … actually I have had this dilemma all along, how explicit do the findings or conclusions need to be. I mean, this is also present in a lot of the contributions – is it necessary to say what kind of contribution it makes to the methodological field.

 

No, I don’t think so. I was not so much thinking about the contribution or the goal of the contribution, but what is our goal in this Special Issue. But also in this regard, the question of how explicit. I don’t think we have to be explicit about that. I don’t think that this Editorial should include a list of the ways in this Special Issue contributes to develop both fields. I don’t think we need to do that. But what struck me when I read this – this is a possibility. But considering the last two realisations of the affinities where we affirm a ‘third’, which is an expansion of this goal which is not only contributing to known fields of phenomenology and artistic research but also the possibility of contributing to research in general in which new, unknown varieties of research might appear through the realisation or instantiation of these affinities. I think that this is very nice, but we did not foresee this when we wrote the call.

 

The other thing is the sense of … it is interesting that we phrase it as making a methodological contribution. One of the things that comes to mind is the sense that one of the commonalities for both fields of practice is that there is method without method. And in that sense, thinking about what you were saying about van Manen getting close to describing how to do something, and then withholding, saying of course there are only singular examples of practice. What struck me was that for both fields of practice there is this common principle of showing, and of showing through example. Van Manen uses this term agogical, which I guess is the etymological half of ped-agogical. So showing what the phenomenological attitude looks like through example.Rather than describe through procedure, it can only be shown through example or through practice. It feels as if this is what is at stake in the showing of practices and in the presentation of artifacts, that in both fields of practice there is only method without method. It can only be given expression through singular examples of practices.

 

I mean there is always this problem with this word methodological or methodical or method. Because the common interpretation probably comes from the scientific method, as if there would be a prescription, method would be something prescriptive. This is the way you do it. Now go and work. But if we take this is a wider and not prescriptive but responding to what happens, as methodus or the way. The prescriptive is: this is the way, so go. The other one is: walk, lay down a path. And this is I think correct to talk about method in these terms. I remember when we wrote that I accepted because I understand thata method emerges from the conjunction of practices and because we are dealing with practices. This Special Issue is about practices, and I think it is justified to talk about method in these terms.

 

You are describing this laying down of a path. I wasthinking of the showing of practices as the showing of a way, not the showing of the way. This goes back to yesterday and the conversation on the differentiation between ‘how do you do it?’ and ‘how do you do it?’

 

Exactly. How it must be done is like the scientific method. And then how do you do it, or how do I do it in terms of the partial repeatability of any method. I prefer to soften the term method that to fully renounce it.

 

That also feels as if it might correspond to approach method with the principle of epoché.

 

Van Manen describes a methodological epoché and he claims for methodological creativity. So suspend the ways you know that work in doing research. But all this is in terms of let the phenomenon tell you how to deal with it. So this idea of situated methods, or situated and embodied concept of method. Embodiment is already there in the ‘you’. You do it here now. You do it here now and in touch with this issue, this phenomenon. Because if the last element is not present, then this redistribution of agencies is missing and then I would say neither aesthetic or phenomenological research can be made, can be recognised.

 

It is making me think there about contingent method in all of its meanings

 

Exactly. It is a network of contingencies.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I think that we can easily agree that this form of dialogue should be, could be, one of aesthetic dialogue. So we try not to much to elaborate discursively but see how these issues resonate, the resonance or the reflection, in terms of giving back. Resonances more than constructing discourse.

 

I agree.

 

I think we know what we mean when I say that. And the second point is the project which takes the form of the call.

 

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Do we want to refer to the literality of the call or to the spirit of the call?

 

I think what I have been trying to do or tune into is two-fold: one is the sense of going back to the call and looking at it again, now, with fresh eyes, to see what might be invoked by some of the propositions or statement of the call. How is it that these have been phrased and what arises from the fresh encounter with those ideas? So on the one hand, almost like newly going back to the call in its detail and yet at the same time holding in mind the journey travelled between the writing of the call and now, and all of what has been encompassed in that journey – from the initial expressions of interest, to the process of reading and encountering people’s contribution, to where we are now at this moment. So there are these two related but different experiences that I am holding in relation – this going back to the call as if I have not read it, and at the same time what can be understood of the call with the hindsight now of the journey travelled. 

 

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And in addition to it, maybe, and what I think would be nice, and useful and enriching, to consider let’s say where it all started which was in the preparation for Venice. There is a continuity from this moment, from the proposal for the research cell, to the preparatory meetings which were especially interesting, especially maybe the first. And then, not so much the experience of Venice, I would not go into that … but thinking a little bit of the continuation – where this call came from. Because for me the call crystallises some developments that took place there, yes.

 

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should be the criteria for this conversation – so new for me. But why not. It doesn’t have to be because it is an editorial text and it is for others, no, no. It can be a prospective thing. It can be part of the journey that we have travelled, being an arrival point and a view, let’s say a depth view, of the past.

 

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So there is this question of the through, which we haven’t talked directly about. So this idea of through practices, and the idea of through Special Issue, researching through practices, researching through a Special Issue, publishing in but you could also say through a Special Issue, publishing practices through a Special Issue.

 

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. Super interesting, but the question I would like to touch before we finish, is the question you propose in two formulation: to what effect, or what is at stake? And I look at the … because I think that this is relevant. So why are we doing that. And I look at the open call and there is a line about that. We are convinced that in pushing this subject matter we are contributing to an original methodological development of both fields: artistic research and phenomenology.

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Varieties of Affinity

 

And I think that the whole journey as you say, is an attempt to explore a field which, a field, a field of research, which takes two references, or which refers to two fields which can be outlined as autonomous fields: one is artistic research or aesthetic research, and the other one is phenomenology. I mean, what I am saying is quite obvious, but maybe it is quite nice to revisit this obviousness. And somehow it is guided by an intuition that there is a common field, that there is something in common.

 

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And I guess that one of the things that I have been coming back to I guess, is what is meant by, or what is implied by, or how is this ‘in common’? And, again, in part looking at and encountering some of the contributions and thinking about this sense of ‘in common’ and how this sense of ‘in common’ manifests? Interestingly, at times the sense of ‘common’ is manifested in its opposite – to it becomes demonstrated through difference. So you get in some of the contributions, an attempt to delineate the difference between artistic research and phenomenological practice. And then, I suppose, something about these different registers of ‘being in common’, or actually even, a sense of being-in-touch. whether it might be possible to think about these two fields of practice as being in touch and what that mode of being in touch might open up? I suppose, I imagine them almost like a Venn diagram, two spheres of practice, and then different possibilities emerge depending on how these two spheres of practice overlap or how they overlap or how they touch or how they repel even. Actually, as I am saying this, I am thinking about magnets. Is there a kind of pull between these two fields of practice, like magnetically, towards some kind of contact, or actually is it something like, interestingly with magnets, sometimes the closer you bring them, it is only then that the repellent force becomes evident, and they push themselves away. And I can even see a sense of this – while ever there was a little bit of distance the commonalities seem strong, but where there is an attempt in places to bring the two together somehow the differences became more magnified. Something to do with different registers of in-touch-ness, or connection, or contact or commonality, and what these different registers might open up in terms of how we think about these fields of practice, or even what might exist in between.

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Another term could be affinity. So this intuition of an affinity between these two fields of practice. Maybe this is better than saying in common, because in common is already a form of affinity. Affinity is an interesting starting point. And there is also something which inhabits, two different problematics which inhabits each of these fields in my opinion, that come also into expression when this affinity is explored. And this can be on the one hand the tension between artistic and/or aesthetic practices – where practices is not questioned in this sphere. But the tension is between these practices and these practices being practices of research. We affirm that. The one’s who practice in this field of so-called, just to take a term, artistic research; we affirm that, but we know that this remains problematic. So, so how artistic and aesthetic practices can be affirmed, and especially practices, as practices of research is still a question. And the other field, at least originally, is a field of philosophy. So phenomenology was born and was mainly developed as a philosophical endeavour. And so it is not a question that this is a form of research. This is research let’s say – this is not questioned there. But the question there is the question of practices, which in my opinion should be out of debate, because it was affirmed by Husserl. But, let’s say, the system of philosophy is not so used to identified practices or accepting that they are practitioners as are artists. So in standard terms, artists are practitioners and philosophers are theorists. Which is then to not be practitioners. So I see this tension, and this tension comes to take different forms of expression and also in terms of demarcating differences when we explore the possibilities of affinities. 

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I think that the sense of degrees of, how would it be, qualifying or the nuance at each of those levels feels important. So if I understand, you were differentiating … not only is it artistic practices but it is artistic research practices. But again the thing that becomes a further point of nuance within this particular journal call is: not only artistic practices but artistic research practices, but not only artistic research practices but artistic research practices that have a particular relationship to phenomenology. I think maybe even the relationship between artistic research and phenomenology could be a different way of describing it. So I am curious in that nuance – is it to say: not only artistic practices but artistic research practices, and not only artistic research practices but artistic “hyphen” phenomenological research practices; or is it phenomenologically-oriented artistic research practices, or is it artistic research practices with an affinity to phenomenology … so that last nuance feels not yet clarified in a sense or maybe that this feels to be the terrain of exploration in a way. I think that the clarity of not only artistic pr

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actices but also artistic research practices, yes. This is very clear. But this transition into the meeting or the relationship with phenomenology opens up into a whole range of possibilities of connection. And I am curious about that really. This closeness to or distance from phenomenology – whether those artistic research practices also have to be phenomenological research practices or if it is this range of relation that we are exploring? Its closeness to, its distance from, its difference from, its proximity but difference – there is a whole set of nuances there that feels very generative somehow. Yes, these formulations are interesting because they show different possibilities.

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There are lots of variations. Maybe going back to one of things that you started with, the sense of orientation or the directionality between artistic research and phenomenological research. If I look at the call again I think that there is something in the language of that spoke more to a sense of mutuality, mutual transformation, reciprocity, cross-contamination, hybridisation, where the sense of the one to the other was less defined and felt more like it could be a passage between both in a way. There is this question of whether that directionality from artistic research towards phenomenological research indicates hierarchy. What kind of relation does that set up in the sense of deference even?

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I am taking a tangent here, but one of the things I have been thinking about a lot in relation to the last rounds of review is these terms like “not enough” or “not phenomenological enough”. So there are a few terms: “almost” so “almost phenomenological” or “not enough”, “not phenomenological enough”. And also the presence of terms like “but” and “however”. And perhaps rather than seeing these as like deficits, maybe within there is a germ for really understanding the distinctiveness of artistic research within this terrain. I think that this sense of it not being 'enough’, ‘not being phenomenological enough’, signals that it somehow fails to be phenomenological, but I wonder whether there is something about the distinctiveness of certain artistic research practices where rather than it being a deficit or a failure, it really points to what artistic research does. That might be different from phenomenology. I am not sure, I have a suspicion that there is something about this sense of withholding or holding back or not quite following through into a phenomenological insight that seems to recur, that might be, there might something about the nature of artistic research practices that hold things open but don’t then follow all the way through into conclusion. There is something of this ‘not enough’, that also speaks of a ‘not yet’ or … I don’t know. I am not sure, but it feels like there is something there.

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I mean, one thing I see there is also, I mean, starting from the beginning again, there is the affirmation of these two fields or spheres of practice. OK.  So we take this for granted: there is artistic research, there is phenomenology. OK. But now, how is this being expressed, in a normative closed way, in terms of a definitional way. This is artistic research, which mean all this is not. Or as you say ‘not enough’ or ‘not really’. Because there is artistic research. The positive side of this ‘not enough’ is the affirmation ‘this is’, this is artistic research, this is phenomenology.

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Interestingly both fields, and this is quite exceptional in philosophy or in humanities, in both fields, the definition of both fields has always been a question.  the beginning of The Phenomenology of Perception is “What is the question, what is phenomenology?”. And the sense that it is strange that we keep asking the question almost fifty years after the foundation of it. I mean this could be the beginning of a book about artistic research: “What is artistic research?”. It is interesting that we keep asking this. So somehow this, in my opinion, this should make difficult to affirm that this is not phenomenology or this is ‘not enough’, this is ‘not phenomenological enough’. And somehow I think this openness, this definition of openness, about these two spheres could be, or probably should be if I am honest, a necessary starting point for this enquiry into these affinities. Let’s say as a norm, as a rule of the game, this cannot be said: it cannot be said it is not phenomenological or it is not artistic enough. Nevertheless, this rule should always be possible to be violated because it is interesting when someone says this is not artistic enough or phenomenological enough. It is interesting because even though I am affirming the impossibility to really say ‘this is artistic’ or ‘this is phenomenological’, we are using these terms. So there is a demarcation. We have a sense of ‘what is’ and ‘what is not’.

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I was reading again Michael Biggs’ text, and was struck again by his comments in it that artistic research has almost, the historical definition making of it, has been through this sense of negative affirmation: what artistic research is not. There was a point where I was interested in the possibility of saying declaratively that artistic research is not phenomenology. Or even what the difference might be between saying ‘this is not phenomenology’ and ‘this is not phenomenological enough’. Whether even the second statement implies that there is already the attempt for one practice to be like the other, or be the other. And actually, maybe in the clarity of saying that artistic research is not phenomenology, that kind of deficit, deferent relation to phenomenology is somehow short-circuited. So if you were to say that artistic research is not phenomenology, is that even a pre-condition for exploring what the relationship is. I even wondered, is it possible to explore a relationship if things are considered to be “as”? Can there be any relationship between artistic research and phenomenology if they are considered to be one and the same practice? Is this condition of not-ness a precondition for exploring relations, or exploring connection or affinity?

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It can be. What I am seeing is a triangle. One vertex of the triangle is this issue of definition. So how defined or how open are these fields or these concepts, of artistic research and phenomenology, or artistic research and phenomenological research to establish a common base? Because this common base was never doubted in this instance. Well, well, well – in some cases, in some submissions, it is an issue in terms of art and research. Because also

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there is this model of artistic research or this concept of artistic research which I call the additive model, which is “I am making art” and “I make research”. And it can happen in two different combinations, first I make art and then I make research, or first I make research and then I make art. And we have these expressions: art-based research or theory-based art, or research-based art. We have them. And we have these cases too. But the point is, this triangle I wanted to describe …  on the one hand, the definition of these fields, not so much of what or with what definition but rather than -finitional combination. So how much defined, positively or negatively as you said. The other point for me is the operations between them. You talk about mutual transformation, hybridization, being-in-touch … I would also say “addition”. Philosophical “and”, so “plus”. So this is phenomenological plus artistic research, artistic research plus phenomenology. This is the second vertex of this triangle, and the third is this, at least for me now, four possibilities of expression of this field that results from the performance of these affinities so: artistic-phenomenological research; phenomenology- or phenomenologically-based or -informed or -oriented artistic research; and this aesthetic phenomenology, that we can also always invert and talk about phenomenological art or phenomenological aesthetics, and this which I can the “third”, this unnamed function, this unnamed possibility. I think that these three (diagramming a triangle) elements have a systemic dynamic, in the sense that they are mutually conditions of possibility and results. So somehow I think that we are constantly between these three points of these three polarities, or fields of operation: definition, relation and resulting entanglement

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And then there is this additive sensein the way that you were talking in terms of art ‘and’ research, in the sense that first there is art and then there is research, it gets added to it.You could see this in some cases where first there is the artistic research and then there is the phenomenological practice which is applied to, so it follows. The one comes first and then the other is applied to it. There was another one … something else about and-ness. I guess the thing with the ‘and’ in this sense, and I don’t know whether there is a cautionary dimension to it, to this addition of the methods and practices of others fields and disciplines, from other fields of practice, to artistic research in a defensive way. That often within artistic research that nature of addition is one of bolstering or propping or validating or justifying or retrospectively rationalising the research that is done artistically. It is added on after the artistic research as a way of giving that research some credibility or research credentials.

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This can also happen in different ways. So, me personally, I believe in this, in the model in which I affirm that artistic research is an autonomous form of research, and saying that, I am at least as structurally, or I keep writing this, so equating this with philosophy or humanities or mathematics or natural sciences or social sciences or whatever. And then, as is always the case, all these autonomous forms of research are connected. So, in different ways. So sociologists refer to philosophers, philosophers refer to physicians, physicians refer to anthropologists, is this the case, so to biologists ... and so on. So all these autonomous research forms are in touch with one another, and this is not a strategy of legitimation, it is a function of our thinking. So our being society: we think in different ways but there is this unity let’s say, that we are a group, one group, society or culture. And this is not a legitimising strategy. It can be in the say that good science is the one that can be used by engineering. Then this is a criteria of quality but I do not mean it necessarily in this way. I mean it in the spontaneous flux of everything: of practices, of results, of methods, of approaches, of ideas, of concepts in between all these autonomous fields, and also this enables the autonomy of these fields. It is also because natural science is autonomous that engineering, or applied research, can work. So I believe this is the way it works and I believe this is also the case for artistic research and in this sense, if a phenomenologist refers in his or her work to an artistic research practice or process or project, nothing to be added, this is what is happening the whole time. But I would say that this is not the form of relation that we are, I would say that this is not the form of relation that we are interested in within this Special Issue. And I think make it very clear … no this is another point. So it is not, we were not interested in artistic research which in the most common case is art-based phenomenology, or phenomenology of artistic research nor in the other way around. I would say this is was not our interest: the form of relationship between these two fields that we were interested to enquire into for this Special Issue, for this Special Issue is research, is itself an enquiry, it is not only a form of publishing or disseminating, it is a research endeavour. This maybe should be made clear – we are researching these affinities through or by means of a Special Issue in a journal.

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The way that you were describing different research fields or practices somehow being in touch, was bringing to mind conversations around ‘ecologies of practices’. I think that the sense of an ecological language for thinking about the relation of things …. I have been finding this helpful, particularly a different way of describing mutual, reciprocal, transformative relations might be symbiotic, a form of symbiosis. But I think that the way that you were describing it as a spontaneous, a spontaneous ecology of in-touch-ness differentiated from a more instrumental sense of how one field of practice might “use” another. I guess there was … I need to delve into this … something about different species or varieties of symbiosis also felt interesting. On the one hand, there is a kind of predatory or parasitic form, where you are ‘using’ the other, for one’s own ends, so an instrumentalised relation to the other, perhaps even causing harm to the other. There is a kind of relationship that might cause harm or damage to the other in some kind of way. And then is something where there is a form which is more like mimicry, which is based on mimicry, which I think could also be interesting and is observable within the field – where one field of practice mimics the practices, approaches, methods, languages of the other, or appropriates. So mimicry or appropriation on the one hand, and a parasitic using or adopting or theft even on the other, both of which feel that any sense of reciprocity is lacking. It is somehow, maybe there is something about how to avoid those tendencies in practice. Or maybe that is a bit moral.

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The basis of this is a judgement of course. I think that all these operations are possible and I would not discard or devaluate one. Now I am talking as a third person, so not as an artist, as in what I do. So I can say this is not a devaluation, but this is not what I do, this is what I do. I am not saying this is not worth to be done, because there is a for me added to it.

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because very often I have the feeling that operating or handling these categories artistic or phenomenological, I was going to say we don’t really touch the point or the points or these points are not clear enough. So this would be like the situation where someone says ‘this is not phenomenological enough’, and then the question might be well what do you mean by phenomenological, which is a good question. The question is why is this not enough, but actually I think a more interesting question is ‘how, so, what do you mean then with phenomenology?’. And then I think maybe it will follow a model of doubt or maybe not, but with or without doubt comes a ‘well, phenomenology is this’. And that is why this is not enough or why this is not really. But there the focus is the definition of the field but not what are the constitutive traits of this, the specificities of these forms of research and this is what for me is interesting.

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One issue in this first preparation meeting for the research pavilion in Venice, and I come back again and again to this moment with Mika Elo who asked this question – is this about artists making phenomenology? Or is this about artists trying to be phenomenologists, which implies a clear hierarchy. So this is like by means of elevation, so art is elevated to an implicitly higher category which is philosophy. So this Hegelian model, yes. And we say we were surprised by the question, not because it is a weird question, but probably because we had not been facing this question enough ourselves. And then I think the answer was ‘no, of course not’, without having prepared the answer, OK then what. And I think this is the line of enquiry which for me is interesting. No clearly not, so I don’t want to move in a hierarchical field. I don’t consider any of these two fields as being more valuable or superior to the other, OK

 

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There are two, I am thinking about there being these two almost different momentums within this commonality or in-touch-ness or relation. On the one hand, we talked about this almost at the beginning which was to conceive of a kind of taxonomy or typology of all of the possible connections between these two fields of practices, all of the varieties of connection between artistic research and phenomenology. Touching on what we are already saying: informed by, influenced by, oriented towards, mimicking, appropriating, using. There is a whole list. But the thing that strikes me as interesting within those relations is I wonder how much transformation functions or operates. That it feels as if there is a sense that both practices remain reasonably intact, that there is something about the use of one practice within another – does it actually transform or open up into a space of actual enquiry, even a folding back of enquiry to interrogate the sense of that research practice in its own right. So on the one hand there is a list of possible varieties of connection, and then there are these other species of connection which ‘force’, I use this term but not in a violent way, that force an opening or a rethinking or a re-evaluation of ways of doing things. So it doesn’t leave the practices intact, it requires transformation.

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And then there was something about how is the mode of touch or contact between artistic and phenomenological research practices? So specific examples of this and then maybe this, maybe this sounds a bit instrumental, but ‘to what effect?’.

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And this ‘not fully’ is really different I think from ‘not enough’.

 

Absolutely, I notice this when I say it, I felt that. Exactly.

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Because we are already very focused on these modalities of relationship and the operations that lead or might lead to them. Actually, when we touched on the point of the lichen and we move on in this, there is a point for me that is still interesting, I mean interesting in the sense that for me it is new. Which I don’t know if this

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Maybe I would return having reread the transcript, to return to the four variations

 

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But maybe first to touch on this. I think one of the things that really struck me, was a line that you said about how the Special Issue itself is not a means of dissemination but a means of research, and for researching these relations. That felt very significant to acknowledge that. So that expression of these different formulations felt, maybe there is a sense of it being, I mean I know it was also already there in your own thinking, but an expression of these different variations. So if I understood them properly or in the way that they were expressed.

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The other, let’s say ‘soft variations’, which funnily enough had two variants now, I am realising this for the first time. So a phenomenologically-oriented or -based artistic research practice. We never, or at least I never formulated it in the other way – so, an artistically-oriented or -based or informed phenomenological research practices. The whole time it seems to me that, and this is just a feeling, not just, this is a feeling, that phenomenology and by this I mean phenomenologists are fine where they are, there is no need. We are philosophers and we are doing phenomenology, our way of doing philosophy is phenomenology or our philosophical approach is phenomenological. But we are fine, you know. So self-sufficient. And so this impulse comes from us, from artistic research, from artistic researchers, to refer to them. That is why we are constantly thinking about phenomenologically-oriented or -based or -informed practices. So this for me, expresses this reference. From practices that are at least not born in this field, but attend to it, refer to it.

 

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I think in this journey where these expressions were referring to phenomenology, nevertheless, there was one case, and it was my submission, when there was a common ‘is this artistic?’. No doubt this is aesthetic, but is it artistic? In this case, there was another term, that somehow justified (but not really again), but in the case of phenomenology there is no equivalent term, in terms of saying ‘well it is not phenomenology’ but it could be something like phenomenological. We would probably go with this phenomenologically-oriented or it is partly phenomenological.

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I think that the sense of aspect that I was drawn to, I was drawn to its etymology – a sense of ‘a relative position to’, but also something to do with ‘appearance’ within the definition or the etymology of aspect. I need to look at this more – an observing or to look, it also has this specare like perspective. Meaning the look one wears or the appearance of things, meaning the way one is facing.

 

Meaning the aspect of someone. I don’t know if you use it this way in English, do you say someone has a good aspect?

 

You could, it is not so common. But this sense of leaning in the direction of, or facing in the direction of … but maybe this goes back to a sense of deference. Artistic research facing in the direction of phenomenology. There is something still about orientation.

 

‘Aspect’ in the sense that Esa wrote, could be understood as some ‘faces’ of it. So it is not the whole image, it is not the whole, but part of it.

 

I think that this feels really interesting to explore more – this ‘not fully’, these ‘faces’ or ‘facets’ of something.

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The first variation was described as a ‘soft variation’, in the sense that it was phenomenologically oriented, informed, influenced or based artistic research practices. And the interesting thing is that this relationship can be inverted though we noticed it was present to a lesser degree in that you could also have arts oriented, informed, influenced or based phenomenological research practices.

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And the other one, this oriented one has a softer, more dynamic relationship. But when I read that, so more commonly we think phenomenologically-based artistic research, so the weight is in the artistic, I think, well actually there is a think a tendency within phenomenology, within language-based phenomenology, or phenomenology within philosophy, which is, this tendency of phenomenology to be literary. Maybe this is a move from phenomenology to the arts. So this exists, also in the realm of philosophical phenomenology. When philosophy, I was going to say, goes to become literature, and as we mentioned in the work of Merleau-Ponty, it is really amazing to see, to see the last text which was published as a manuscript after his death, the way he is really thinking through writing, but this is another thing.

 

I think that this is really interesting because maybe it might complicate some of the consequences that seemed to come from some of these relationships. Because as we were talking it seemed that this particular variation tended to express a reference and also potentially a hierarchy. But maybe this dimension of the literary, the relation of phenomenology to literature as an art form, maybe complicates that a little. I am not sure.

 

It allowed or for me is proof, that this inversion takes place. So whether in the first case, for me, the stronger variation of artistic-phenomenological, I also wonder if the inversion changes. We could say, but we could also say not really. But in this phenomenologically-oriented or artistically-oriented or in the case of aesthetic phenomenology or inverse as phenomenological aesthetics, in this case, the order, this inversion matters. And it indicates at least a certain hierarchy, I would say. Or different forms of hierarchy.

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And this ‘not really’ or ‘not enough’ is probably best expressed for me in the phenomenology-oriented … so I can say it is not really phenomenology, but it is phenomenologically oriented. And whereas if I say artistic-phenomenological practice then it is both – fully or at least enough. This is my feeling of the expression.

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But if for example, if we go for phenomenologically-oriented. We can say well I don’t need to depart from a definition of phenomenology, I can depart from a sense that phenomenology is, I can depart from certain traits. And I can take that in order to say this is the orientation. But I am not referring to a full definition, if it exists, of phenomenology, independently of if it exists or not, of the idea of the possibility of, I don’t need to depart from the possible definition of phenomenology.

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Because the characteristics is an extraction – I take this out from here and then I have a set of characteristics and I organise them and this is the way I was imagining it. And this would be like the phenomenological-oriented or I mean in this oriented or adjectivized, aesthetic phenomenology or probably this procedure works for these two.

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I don’t know how to say this ... it is almost like somehow making me think of a model where rather than the characteristics being drawn from here or being drawn from there, as if they already exist. These traits – I take something from here, and I take something from here. I don’t know.

 

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VARIETY: HYPHENATION

 

Actually, I would say, that our take for this call was, a let’s say, a strong name. Naming this with a hyphen. Even there, we could have two variations: we could say it’s the same because the order does not matter, but I think that it matters. So I mean, artistic “hyphen” phenomenological research practices. We have always thought in this way, the two of us. Maybe because the impulse for this project came from us, came from the field of artistic research. But we never formulated it, or at least I never formulated it as phenomenological “hyphen” artistic research practices.We can say it is the same, but we can say it is not. We can say that this order matters or has a meaning or value. And this, anyway this I could call it the strong variation. So we are affirming, and I think that this is the approach within this call, the approach or the starting point of this Special Issue, we say yes we affirm that there are research practices that at the same time are artistic and phenomenological.

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What you are pointing to is the sense of the organisation of artistic “hyphen” phenomenological, it is arrived at but never seen in the opposite orientation of phenomenological “hyphen” artistic, and there is something interesting that emerges there, a kind of taken-for-granted-ness about that particular correlation.So this struck me as interested. Then there is something about this hyphenation which feels as if it could also invite exploration. I think about this in relation to “choreo-graphic figures” where there is the use of the hyphen, and this practice of hyphenation had a dual function in a way: it holds the two things together but it also keeps them apart. So there is a dual function in hyphenation: there is a sense of holding in relation and also holding in separation. So there is something about the irreconcilability of the two sides of the hyphen, or the impossibility of synthesis indicated through that. And I think the thing that you were talking about … so yes, the hyphen on the one hand might suggest that they are the same, that they are the same, that they are interchangeable, no, that artistic and phenomenological practices are one and the same within a certain set of practices. But then you were talking about the sense that maybe the difference matters. So maybe I am interested in how this difference might matter.

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I think that the thing around addition and the relation to “and” also seems interesting in relation to this hyphenation of artistic “and” phenomenological. On the one hand, to say something is artistic “and” phenomenological could suggest “at the same time”, it is both at the same time, it is both. It is both artistic “and” phenomenological. But there is already the question of ‘how’, in the sense of – is that in combination, or is that through integration, or through synthesis, so the nature of this ‘and as both’ is also open to a whole set of variations and possibilities.

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So there are these fields [gesturing two fields] and I take this and this and this and this and this, and [gesturing a gathering together] with this I work. Not with the whole. So in this sense, it could be also said that this is not phenomenology, in terms that this is not ‘fully’ phenomenology. And it could also be said the same way – it is not fully art. And yes it is true but it has these elements and this selection and organisation of constitutive traits of both fields is the way that this affinity between both fields is expressed.

 

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Yes, exactly. So there is also a third. So ‘not fully’, ‘not enough’, and the aspect of course of the ‘enough’. So, in terms of saying, actually what I am tending to decide is the ‘not fully’ or ‘not really’ or the ‘not enough’, no the ‘not enough’, no what I want to say is ‘enough’. So I recognise ‘enough’ as a criteria of validity, I recognise enough elements of artistic research practices and enough of phenomenological research practices to affirm that these practices crystalises enough an affinity between artistic research and phenomenology. This is different than to say this practice is artistic and is phenomenological. This other way, this other approach is different – because it doesn’t agree to this strong being.

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the one with the hyphen. So it was much more affirmative that this is both.

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So in this second variation that you mention already, this hyphenated variation, or strong variation, we were talking about as you say, artistic-phenomenological research practices and also noticing to maybe a lesser extent or maybe not-even-extent phenomenological-artistic research practices. But there was still the question of how is the quality of this hyphen – what does it indicate towards, there was something about it having an additive dimension, of both-ness, of combination, also this quality of plus-ness, artistic research plus phenomenology. And I think even within this category there was this notion that something, that there could be ‘enough’ presence of a research practice but it might not be fully expressed, it might not express the full depth and breadth of phenomenology to be able to be considered in this category.

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I am not sure about that. I tend to think, two comments on that. I tend to think that artistic-phenomenological or the other way around, I wonder say no real difference between them, implies that, it implies two things for me. One is that it is artistic, it is enough artistic and it is enough phenomenological.This for me is embedded in this, in this construction but maybe not.

 

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So let me just think again. So the criteria of this would be enough but it might not be fully. There was a line that I was really struck by, this sense that enough, that enough crystalises the sense of affinity between the two practices, the two fields of practice, but not so fully as to be. One of the things I was struck by in the conversation was this almost refusal of this category of being: artistic research is, or phenomenology is. Or maybe refusal is a bit too heavy, but maybe deviation .. but maybe I am not understanding this fully.

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I think it depends on the model right, because if the model is based on transformation or on contamination or at least a certain kind of  … then I would say, I would repeat what I said, that in order for this it is necessary to have a certain definitional softness. So if I say this is, and this is  and there is a clear barrier between both, then I would say this model of 100% and 100%, all this artistic and all this phenomenological, you find all of this in these practices, so this would be like, there you can have a strong definition of each field, not a problem.

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One of the things that seemed characteristic of this particular variation is that the constitutive parts of artistic research and phenomenology may possibly be transformed in each direction, but there is not the production of this ‘third’ possibility that is described in the fourth variation. So the mode is combination or addition but not the birth of the new, no-name yet. At least that is how I could see this hyphenated practice – as combination or as both-ness or even as mutual transformation, but not necessarily producing properties that are distinct from those constitutive fields of practice.

 

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Yes, yes. Actually we were treating the hyphen as a plus.

In the second model?

 

In the sense of 100% plus 100%, so artistic plus phenomenology

 

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I am in between but I participate in both, I bring things from both sides of this space.

 

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VARIETY: Aesthetic/Artistic Phenomenology or Phenomenological Aesthetics/Art

 

But there is a third. Wait a second, what is the second already. Well no. No I think it is the third which I think is the idea of an aesthetic phenomenology. I think that this is a third variation, which is clearly that it is phenomenology instantiated aesthetically.

 

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So I wonder whether that “third” … there were two models that you were talking about. One seems to be, let me think of how to say it, one is an “and” but which is not ‘additive’, so it is aesthetic phenomenology or artistic phenomenology. Actually, the hyphen has disappeared here in a way. There has been the emergence of a new species which  is not so much to do with the in-touch-ness of two separate fields of practice but the emergence of a fully integrated or fully synthesized form that has its own autonomy perhaps. Yes and no. The hyphen has disappeared but there is a substantive and an adjective, and this implies a hierarchy. Because the adjective qualifies the substantive. So if I say aesthetic phenomenology, I am making strong, phenomenology. This is my feeling. So what do you do, I do phenomenology, but aesthetically, and aesthetically. Is this the case? Now I go on a tangent. I am in the last stage of editing a book on live coding, a performance practice. And the copyeditors at MIT, when we have written something like ‘live coding performance’, they have hyphenated live coding as if it is used in an adjectival sense. So live-coding becomes an adjective that qualifies. But we have argued that this is not the case as it creates hierarchy, it privileges the term performance and diminishes live coding in relation to that. And actually live coding is not used adjectivally but is a proper noun.

 

But then there would be the possibility of performative live coding and then performative is the adjective and live coding is the substantive.

 

I mean this is getting into semantics in a way but I wonder whether there is a way of conceiving of aesthetic phenomenology where that relationship between how is it, the noun and the adjective is disqualified, in order to, in order to really avoid this hierarchisation of the one above the other.

 

Yes I agree. And actually I was affirming this. What I was interested in, and I am saying it in past form, was an aesthetic phenomenology. And there were two, and actually

 

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Because for me aesthetic phenomenology meant the transformation of phenomenology. For example, phenomenological practices that can be realised in other media and not only in the media of language. Or, even in the medium of language, with different practices of language which are not propositional or discursive. And this is a transformation – so phenomenology was this, and now it becomes that. It is phenomenology but it is transformed.

 

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What I was curious about was whether that sense of ‘new-ness’ is present in the third or the fourth variation, in that, whether this sense in the third variation as it was described as phenomenology instantiated artistically or aesthetically, in other media.  This feels as if it could also be something to explore, the sense of what might it mean to do phenomenology through other media than language, or also the variation there was with and through other media than language, and with language in other ways beyond discursive, propositional forms. So there is also a split at that point, and whether this leads to a ‘new’. I don’t know – this possibility in the third variation of artistic or aesthetic phenomenology somehow through this expression of phenomenology through artistic means or through other media leads to the possibility of new forms, new practices.

 

I think new practices for sure. I think when I say that I have as a reference Cezanne’s Doubt by Merleau-Ponty. It is funny because when you talk to people about this everyone has a very different interpretation of this text. But my interpretation is that, at least one aspect of this, is that Merleau-Ponty affirms that Cezanne makes phenomenology through painting. Why? Because it allows us to see how colours or how a colour or how a landscape emerges. How we come to see a colour. He is not showing us the colour but allowing us to have access to this source of meaning, to observe the source of meaning. And because I think this was the -finitive of phenomenology for Merleau-Ponty, he affirmed that. Cezanne was doing phenomenology in the medium of paint. So this is what is in the back of my head when I affirm an aesthetic phenomenology. This is part of it.

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The only thing I was going to add there, was if another person was conceiving of these varieties of affinity, I wonder, I am thinking about Esa’s thinking on ‘artistic phenomenology’ differentiated from aesthetic phenomenology and also some of the things coming up in Michael Bigg’s text around fiction and the non-existent. Whether there are, actually two distinctive varieties of affinity, one of which follows this aesthetic trajectory that you are describing, but there might also be another variety which follows the route of the artistic within a closer link to the imaginal and imagination.

 

I think so, I think so. First, there is why I see one differentiation between aesthetic and artistic, not the only one, but the most fundamental one. So practices that remains, that dwells with phenomena, and those that construct on this basis. And then there are two different common grounds between phenomenology and artistic research. And there we could say if this is true, so definitely the second can be named as aesthetic research and definitely the second can be named as artistic research. And there are other possibilities for possible transitions between both. For example, Katja’s is a clear example of aisthesis of perception, so non-construction. And maybe Michael Croft is an in-between, but rather observing

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“Third” Liminality

 

And I think there could be a third possibility, which for me has been increasingly interesting which probably comes closer to the second or is easy to be thought through the second or starting from the second which is one for which I have no name. And this is like this third. So we relate there to practices … actually there is a fourth one. What I was trying to describe would be the fourth one.

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And the fourth variation would be this third, it is something that cannot properly be described as artistic or aesthetic nor as phenomenology.

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So, yes, yes, there are all these operations on two fields more or less defined, that come to a third field, anyway, that can more or less autonomous in relation to these two. So I think that the highest point of autonomy is in this fourth, this what can be called this ‘third’, so cannot be, or should not be named as either artistic nor phenomenological. And I have to say now this is a variation I am more interested in,

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. So, what is this form of research I am interested in. And now do it without using the terms phenomenology and art.

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in order I think to realise this what you are seeing as a non-hierarchical relationship, I think that this new thing, this ‘no name’ possibility is needed. Because, and the operation there is not of transformation. OK. Interesting, for sure. But I think now I am much more interested in making a step further in talking about a form of research, acknowledging the genealogy, acknowledging that in its genealogy phenomenology and artistic research can be found. Or even stronger, that these fields are the origin of this new one, but this new one is a new one. Of course, due to this genealogy it is connected to them, but it is not the same. I don’t know if what I say is what I mean but would it be the same for a case like urban studies. So urban studies is not architecture, it is not sociology, it is not anthropology, it is not geography, it comes from all these fields. Without all these fields there will not be urban studies. But urban studies is something else. Funnily enough these fields also in academia, especially in the States, they exist not as their own discipline or department or faculty, so the institutionalisation sense, but as something else, and with their own name, yes. And I think I am going in this way. I think it is interesting to say, for me, but this is too much what I am interested in and not the issue, so I would say better to change track.

 

But there is something in trying to get close to the kind of relation or correlation that is present there, because as you are describing that I am thinking of terms like ‘composite’. Or even the sense of a research practice being a bricolage of other research practices, or an assemblage. Thinking about the sense that a bricolaged practice or an assemblage has its own identity even though it is comprised of a composite of parts.

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I would talk about hybridisation. There is something new, and there is a recognition that this something new comes from something established or something already existing. This is my sense of hybrid, a hybrid is something that is neither/nor but is both at the same time. So it includes, but it takes another form. So not so much the idea of transformation but really a new birth.

 

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Yes, and then on the other hand there is something that is … maybe it is the same. I am thinking … tonight I am doing a talk from a text I wrote recently which draws on the organism of lichen, but lichen is a particular, specific organism which is actually fungus and algae.

 

It is a symbiotic.

 

No it is not – because lichen is comprised as fungus and algae, and yet it has properties that are distinct from either of them.

 

Exactly, exactly.

 

So it is interesting, so it preserves the presence of its two constitutive parts – fungus and algae – (or we might think of artistic research and phenomenology) and yet at the same time it has characteristics that are not properties of either of them.

 

Yes, that is interesting.

 

There probably is a name for it biologically. But really it is about trying to be precise about the nature of the relation of those two things: they are not synthesised, they are not reconciled in some kind of way, they are held in relation where they are allowed to retain their distinctiveness, and yet there is something else which is neither the property of the one nor the other. And there is something about this that I am interested in.

 

Yes. Yes. And I think that this goes further than this than what I was thinking about, because what I was thinking about was let’s say, following your example, an entity that has qualities of both, but with the example of the lichen, you add this ‘and new properties’. So it is true that lichen has properties of the algae and the fungus, but it is not true that the algae and the fungus has properties of the lichen. And this is a step farther. I think that this is a fifth model I would say, or maybe in the fourth but I don’t see it. The fourth is still somehow additional, in terms of these threads and these threads – I am not sure.

 

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It is also making me think about the model of conversation, I am not sure if this does relate. The nature of the in-touch could have a quality of conversation or of dialogue, where in that meeting of the one and the other, there is something that emerges that does not belong to the one or the other but emerges through the nature of the contact.

 

Yes, a conversation is let’s say, more than my talk and your talk. There we have the lichen.

 

And even the idiom of something being more than the sum of its parts seems to resonate.

 

Exactly, exactly. There must be a name for that. I have to look at it. But I thought lichen was thought as a symbiotic.

 

It probably is, but symbiosis has a whole set of sub-categories. So, symbiosis, I think that this is true in terms of its organisation, let me think, there are three main forms: commensalism, and then parasitic and mutualistic. But then there are others within this, so the nature of symbiosis varies in terms of degrees of relationship, of hierarchy, of harm, or mutual benefit, which I think makes it an interesting term for considering the in-touch-ness of practices. But it could also, maybe I go on a tangent now, maybe my concentration is wavering, but it could be that in terms of the call we sort of enter in with this question of ‘how is the commonality?’, but it may be that this is not the place of entry, or not the only place of entry. Oh no, there were two things in my mind – one was to go back to this typology and all these different varieties of in-touch-ness, and whether there is a way if avoiding, or whether there is an implicit sense of a hierarchy within that?

 

Yes, maybe this is a nice moment to literally read the call, because I am aware that I am working with my memories of the call but not the text. So here is the question, how did we formulate. Do we want to do that now? Should I read it.

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Yes, and this is the logic of this ‘unnamed variation’, the identification of constitutive traits of both fields, that these, that in this unnamed form of research can be found.

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The other phrase that comes to mind is not longer and not yet’, Victor Turner’s term for describing the liminal and I wonder whether this could be in relation to this ‘third other’ or the ‘not-yet-named’, it is no longer, but it is not yet.

 

Yes, I mean the negativity, I know there is a positivity of that, the positivity exactly of the liminal but actually what I am trying to reject is the ‘not enough’. And actually going in the direction of the ‘enough’ but the ‘enough’ not in the sense of affirming this practice as being, as being a practice of phenomenology. This is not the enough, the enough does not refer to that, but it is enough to be considered a realisation of this affinity. So I am referring to the affinity, not to the defined terms. And this is a big difference. So the argument is not that it is enough phenomenological, in order to be affirmed as being phenomenological, but it is enough phenomenological and enough artistic to be considered in this space, this liminal space, this third space, this space of affinity.So if someone says this enough phenomenological for this, and someone asks but is it phenomenology, the answer could be yes or not. But it would not be relevant, for our endeavour. And then we are affirming a kind of autonomy of this third space.

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Yes. Yes, and I have to say, in reading the transcription, there was a point. There is the idea of the lichen as the inspiration, for me, it is a model.

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There was something that was not, at least not fully, constitutive either in one side or the other. And looking at it in this way, I saw the work of something new departing from the affirmation of a common ground, a minimal, or even empty common ground. I cannot really grasp it. I wonder if there are four or five models of this no-named or non-named or not-yet-named model, implied by let’s say the lichen model. So the emergence of new properties, different from the original one. I don’t know but I see at least a potentiality in that.

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And this is for me connected somehow with this beautiful, and increasingly beautiful idea for me, of the not fully. So in English, this ‘no longer and not yet’. So this idea of the liminal which was exactly the expression I was looking for in German – so nicht mehr und noch nicht. So this idea of liminality, I think, relates to this through, or can be related to this through.

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I could also use this idea of characteristics to maybe point to a possible different variety of realisation of these affinities. So a fifth. Which I can only touch not grasp conceptually.  don’t know if I can provide an example of that, or at least I don’t come through an example to it, but I let’s say come conceptually, or purely through an image. Let’s say liminality. So what if we think, OK, step back. If we think in terms of the common, so there is something in common, then in all cases a common ground for all these varieties is the existence of, or the affirmation of, these two fields of practices. And then, in this variety, which is not the hyphen variety (so not the 100%/100%, if this is one possibility of the hyphen variety) there is a common ground. OK. What if, we do not depart from common ground, but from a void. And this is the idea of the liminal space. So the starting point would not be the hypothesis of an existing common ground but of a liminal space between artistic research and phenomenological research. And, well, this is thinkable. Probably I will continue saying that the practices that realise this affinity through liminality, would inhabit this liminal space in touch somehow with these two others because it is a liminal space. I guess a liminal space is not only an empty space, it is an empty space but it is a framed space, that is why it is liminal. That is why it is in touch with the two sides, let’s say. So the ‘no longer and not yet’ is in touch with what is no longer and what is not yet. It is not an absolute void. It is a contact space, it is a space in contact. So the question will not then be, what, ah, I don’t know. The question would not be to begin with even characteristics but it would be a radically generative practice that somehow inhabits this ‘not knowing’ what this practice is, and not aiming at any form of addition or hybridisation or any kind of concrete operation in relation to artistic research and phenomenological research but somehow it is in touch.I am not sure if this is something, but it is at least so far thinkable and intriguing and attractive somehow.

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Yes, there are some interesting trains of thought that this sets in motion through holding in mind a few of those things that you placed as coordinates. This sense of through, this emphasis on through folded back to the liminal.Let me think how to organise it, as it is a bit of a swirl. In the first instance, what came to mind was an emphasis on passage. In the sense of through-ness in relation to liminality, in that the liminal is also understood as part of a rite of passage. Actually, now it is making me think of porous in the sense of passage. Now I am taking tangent. Properly speaking, liminality is the middle phase of a rite of passage, and I thinking that this is interesting. Is there a way that this might connect with the movement of epoché and reduction. In that the first stage of a rite of passage is a practice of separation, so radical disassociation with all structural ways of being and structural knowledges, in order to enter this liminal phase, as an initiate, someone with no knowledge. Then the third phase of the rite of passage is this reaggregation or ‘return’, where you return with those knowledges gleaned from the liminal.I don’t know, it feels as if there could be something there. That epoché somehow affects a kind of separation, but there is something then to do with extending or dwelling in the space of liminality that this then opens up, that this separation enables or opens up. And then I guess, listening to what you were saying about this fifth variation, and what this opened up, it was almost making me think, is this to say that the radical ground of that particular variation is epoché, in the sense of … that also what is bracketed in that ground is all preconceptions and conventions of either artistic research or phenomenological research.

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It might be, but I think I was going another way. Because inhabiting this liminal space, in my imagination of that, would not mean to suspend my knowledge about artistic research and phenomenology. No, actually, the contrary, or maybe not the contrary, but not suspending but being in touch. Yes, OK, being in touch, OK, maybe I don’t see your point with epoché, but I see a point with epoché.

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I don’t know, I don’t really know what I am talking about. I was going to say it is highly speculative, but no, it is an incipient intuition what I am talking about. So, I don’t know if I can say anything else.

 

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And somehow this liminal space could have this character of medium, but a medium which maybe does not exist yet, a medium in its own constitution, through the suspension – yes that might be an epoché - of established media or the media of media, in terms of understanding artistic research as media and phenomenological research as media.

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I guess I am thinking a little about the way in which potentially, that expression of a different variety relates to or might differ from the already-named ‘no-named’ version. It feels as if, even this language of medium is making me think in terms of the medial, and the middle, this middle. This open space between phenomenological research practices or phenomenology and artistic research … and how that middle space is inhabited.

 

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This departs from, if this is a possible fifth or sixth variety, it is maybe in the opposite case of the artistic-phenomenological in the sense of what we were saying 100% and 100%, because this is based on ‘I know what artistic research is, and I know what phenomenological research is’ and I bring the two together. And now we are in the completely opposite situation in which we say ‘I don’t know what artistic research is, and I don’t know what phenomenological research is’. And I don’t know where I am.

 

Or in the sense, let me think how I am thinking this … it is also a practice or a modality that activates the hyphen. But I imagine in the formulation of the hyphenation we already have, of artistic-phenomenological, it is as if the hyphen is very short somehow. And here, the hyphen is really big … or the emphasis is on the hyphen as a space of opening which is in touch with both of these terrains of practice, but it is really opening up this space of possibility that is not-yet defined or is no longer and not yet.

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. And now the hyphen becomes an empty space, something that separates. You said this in the first phase, so the hyphen can be something that brings together or marks a difference. So in this case, it would be an exaggeration of this marking a difference, opening up a space in between which is unknown, and it defines itself originally only as being ‘in between’, in touch but without this touch meaning a form of participation in, which is like the idea of the characteristics. This is not the operation I am trying to see now, this is not the aim. The aim is really through osmosis, as you say these porous boundaries, that enable this liminal space to exist, to become really porous, or to mobilise the porosity of these membranes in order to enable something like spontaneous processes of osmosis, as if this space attracts what is beyond the membranes. Attracts by itself, attracts but not extracts. This would be the idea.

 

There is something like a real ground zero dimension to it, where the characteristics of a practice emerge in total fidelity to the pursuit of a certain truth in a way. I don’t know how to say it, it is like really stripping it all away and if the enquiry is around unveiling, the characteristics will be present. I don’t know. No I cannot say it, I cannot say what I mean. Like the characteristic of wonder is immanent, is it?

 

To this space?

 

Yes, to this space. Or the, yes maybe.

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And even the process of observation, the process of observation is a process that leads to the constitution of the practices that will inhabit this space. So I am in touch, so this idea of the spontaneous osmosis. I don’t know anything. I observe and I observe what happens and this is a practice which will not begin knowing itself. So it is really a radical space of not knowing. So it is really a space that mobilises the agency of not knowing, the constitutive agency of not knowing. I don’t know and I will inhabit this space in between. I know it is a space in between,this I know.  And I know the other spaces, I have been there, let’s say. But then I suspend again these knowledges, and then this is probably the moment of epoché.

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But I think, is it is also, I don’t know …at times, One of the things I am struck by is I guess my interest in Buddhist meditation, and there is so much overlap from that perspective as well. Other contexts, which are neither artistic research or phenomenological research. Whether that constitutive space of not knowing is dependent on the presence of these two framing edges.

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I am trying to move between now and the beginning of this. Going back to the neutral feels interesting in the sense of whether the neutral relates to the liminal, or even to the fourth variation, the ‘no-name’, there is a neutrality to it. Yes, it is interesting that in the two expressions of neutral – one is neutral in the model, from a buddhist context, one expression of neutral might be ignorance or delusion. It is neither moving in the direction of craving or aversion, but it is the third poison of delusion or ignorance. In terms of vedana or felt sensation, it is ‘I don’t know’, I don’t know what I am feeling. It is neither craving or aversion but a grey space. Maybe there is something there about practising in complete ignorance of either phenomenology or artistic research. But the positive expression of neutral is equanimity.

 

Or availability. I think that this sense of neutral anticipates the positive. Because it is somehow I am saying I feel it, I am here, and I am available.

 

Yes. I felt a sense of myself leaning in as it activated a train of associations, where the neutral and its relationship to equanimity (this is in this text I referred to where I am talking about lichen), there is an Ancient Greek use of the term epoché, which is connected to equanimity, or called ataraxia, a state of serene calm. I was thinking that this is interesting. Somehow this neutral has, you already said this, the quality of the neutral in the epoché.

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But does it need to say … actually I have had this dilemma all along, how explicit do the findings or conclusions need to be. I mean this is also present in a lot of the contributions – is it necessary to say what kind of contribution it makes to the methodological field.

 

No, I don’t think so. I was not so much thinking about the contribution or the goal of the contribution, but what is our goal in this Special Issue. But also in this regard, the question of how explicit. I don’t think we have to be explicit about that. I don’t think that this Editorial should include a list of the ways in this Special Issue contributes to develop both fields. I don’t think we need to do that. But what struck me when I read this – this is a possibility. But considering the last two realisations of the affinities where we affirm a ‘third’, which is an expansion of this goal which is not only contributing to known fields of phenomenology and artistic research but also the possibility of contributing to research in general in which new, unknown varieties of research might appear through the realisation or instantiation of these affinities. I think that this is very nice, but we did not foresee this when we wrote the call.

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Common characteristics and traits

 

I am thinking about this term ‘characteristic’ and this idea, as you are saying, of a list of characteristics. So yes, characteristics. Is this something, is this towards the ‘what-ness’ of this field of practice?

 

So in the attempt of the characterising, because it would not be a definition of a new form of research, which crystallises a form of affinity between artistic research and phenomenology. And I say characterises, because it would be a list, at least a list of characteristics, it would be characterising. It would be this.

 

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Sure, sure. Yes, absolutely. So what is, there is always a very tricky relationship between the ‘what’ and the ‘how’. So is this, is this the answer to the question ‘what is this practice?, or is the question more ‘how is this practice?’. Probably it is more related to the 'what’.

 

I guess I was wondering whether there is a kind of corresponding list of hows. I guess the terms, the field that was coming to mind more was the tending or tendencies of practice, or the inclination or leaning of a practice, of practising in a particular kind of way, and whether that actually is closer to a sense of a shared attitude between artistic research and phenomenological research practices. So, yes, I can’t really conceive of which is the one and which is the other and how they meet in a way, but there feels to be something to do with a shared tendency or a shared attitude, and whether this is the same as describing the characteristics, or where the overlap is between these two registers of identification in a way.

 

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Yes, and the question before the last one, could be also put in these terms. What elements, what characteristic traits of artistic research, and of phenomenology are to be found in this practice.

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I noticed in Esa’s contribution he talks about there being ‘aspects of’. And this felt interesting – what is an aspect?

 

I recognise there my use of the terms ‘characteristics’ or ‘traits’. For me, this is another expression of the same.

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This sounds good. I think that one of the things I was interested in diving into more deeply was maybe connected but also maybe different from that, was more of a sense of the characteristics and traits that might be in common. We have spoken a lot about the different modalities, or the different varieties of affinities, but not always so much about the different traits or characteristics.

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I was also thinking about the difference between criteria and characteristic.

 

I mean, in this case, if we are talking about one of the varieties of affinity, I think characteristics can be used as criteria. What I mean is, there are a set of characteristics of artistic research that can be identified, there are a set of characteristics of phenomenological research that can be identified, and then, for the sake of this publication, of our editorial work in this publication, we could say if we recognise these characteristics. Then we will publish this submission. So the presence of the characteristic, of the possibility of recognising these characteristic is the criteria for the edition. Somehow it is also the way this journal operates with characteristics, that are the traits that van Manen lists of a phenomenological research. These are very used in this journal in this way.

 

But we can also come back to these characteristics and maybe begin with some of the things that you were identifying. Maybe with the characteristics, I was thinking, maybe there are some more obvious common characteristics that we are not even saying: so something about embodiment, or lived-through-ness, or an engagement with the pre-reflective. So some of these things maybe are not explicitly said in our conversation but are commonalities none-the-less.

 

We can continue with that. This listing. So common, or possible common, possible characteristics of this affinity. Or maybe this is not accurate enough. So common characteristics of phenomenological and artistic research practices.

 

We can come to this later. Start with some of what links to or comes from the last conversation, what you are drawing out.

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Through phenomena

 

I have it printed out also. It would be nice to read it. The thing that shone out on reading it again was the statement that ‘both sets of practices share a basic aspect, they approach their object of research as phenomena, that is, through their phenomenal presences’. So there was something about this through-ness, this ‘through phenomena’ that could also be the entry point.

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And this could be one. So, yes, I affirm that this form of research operates with phenomena. And in saying that, I was going to say, I am somehow affirming a definition of what a phenomenon is given by phenomenology. And then the critic of the hierarchy again can appear, yes, but the I am saying from the very beginning in this new form of research, you will find elements that comes from both, but these elements will not relate to one another hierarchically. This is the difference. But even there I think, even there I think, there will be, I mean, it is field, I was going to say battle field, it is not true, but it is a field of discussion. And even there, even the question what is a phenomena, can be answered in different ways, or has been answered in different ways in the history of what calls itself phenomenology. For example, the big debate about the relationship between the phenomenon and the thing, is the phenomenon the thing or not? This a big issue, an open issue for phenomenology.

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So this form of research operates with phenomena. And now it must be necessary to provide at least a minimal definition of what is meant – being the phenomena. For example, another characteristic would be, or could be, this form of research operates with or through the observation of phenomena. So this would exclude other forms like analysis or interpretation, of course, everything is problematic for can you really establish such a clear difference between observation and analysis, or observation and interpretation. Ok, whatever I say is going to be problematic, I know. But nevertheless we have to say this, something. This is what I imagine and as you say we try to provide an anchor in this call: we came from that, which was also the movement we made, you and me made, in Helsinki, starting from Mika’s question. The name of our research cell was going to be a different one, I don’t know if I can recall it, but it was not as it went, as it was Through Phenomena Themselves. I think it was closer to the original inspiration which is ‘to the things themselves’ which is Husserl. Do you remember?

 

It was Back to the Things Themselves.

 

But we took the ‘through’ and we took the ‘phenomena’, and this was a result of our reflections,

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We believe that these practices in a specific form crystalises this affinity between these two fields, that depart from phenomena, that operate with or on phenomena. This is an unquestionable characteristic of the kinds of practices we are interested in.

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So one – can I identify the phenomenon that is taken as the core of this particular enquiry? Not always so easy to do actually. What is the phenomenon that is taken as the object of study or as the object of enquiry in this particular enquiry?

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For example, one aspect would be – it works with phenomena. Which for me means to be aware, and to be coherent with this awareness, that I am working with an appearance, with something that appears. So, of course, always what comes then is this question is what appears a thing? Or its appearance, I mean, this is the whole debate. But this could be an aspect.

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And then we came to talk about how we, well, how we for example mention these kinds of examples of practice that we are looking for or we want to explore as I say through the Special Issue was that they work with phenomena.And this in this moment, so looking at it, so yes, let’s affirm that, there are two moves, let’s affirm that, artistic research and phenomenology work with phenomena or through phenomena. OK, there we have a common element, there we have an affinity, there we have common ground. And then the next move was but in saying that do we, so what do we understand of these phenomena. And there, there is a possibility in understanding phenomena. Let’s say that artistic research has never defined what a phenomenon is, but phenomenology has. So let’s take this. OK, there is again a hierarchy, a possible hierarchical element in favour of phenomenologylet’s say. But, if instead of going this way we take phenomena somehow as an empty vessel and say, and what do we mean by phenomena, and we don’t take the phenomenological definition. We allow this practice to say or to show what this phenomena is, there we have the moment of novelty.

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One is this through-ness, this through phenomena.

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But it needs to be an engaged neutral

 

Yes.

 

Or neutrally engaged. Because, or in terms of a vulnerable neutral. A sensible neutral. A sensible .. so it is a neutral not in a sense of negation, it is an affirmative neutral, maybe without expressing any kind of affirmation.

 

That also seems to relate to the sense of dwelling, I was thinking to remain neutral in the face of wonder.

 

Yes, because the whole thing is to be able to see the phenomenon itself. The whole idea is that the phenomenon itself is revealed. So it is not me, that is what I have to try to suspend, all those forms of being myself, which is I know what my preferences are and so on. And somehow the epoché, this aspect of the epoché which I think is extremely complex is this idea of making space, of making myself available. And then available for what, available for the phenomenon itself to be revealed. Yes. So it is being attentive, so listening, listening to the question ‘how are you, what are you’, but not providing or not constructing an answer. But creating the conditions for it to “answer”.

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Observation + Reflective agency

 

I am also curious, one of the things I have been trying to think, I think it was mentioned in the conversation before – one of the characteristics or traits might be that these practices are engaged in the observation of phenomena. And it seemed as if there are various practices or media that highlight or amplify that experience of observation, in some kind of capacity. I think even the sense that there might be technologically-mediated forms of observation or practices that somehow allow the experience of observation to be sharable with others. Maybe this is a territory that is quite big on its own. The other dimension was aesthetic or artistic phenomenology has this capacity, it is engaged in the observation of phenomena, but there is also this phenomena-producing component to it. Or I am curious about that – is that true? Is this true only of aesthetic or artistic phenomenological practices or does phenomenological practices also do that – not only observing the phenomena but also simultaneously producing phenomena. I know that Esa has talked about this as ‘artistic phenomena’. This also seemed to be coming through in Michael Biggs’ contribution in the sense of what fiction can do, fiction in the sense of producing an experience that is not already given.

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In this case, I see it clear. So we are, we were asking people to, and reflection is a term that I use more and more and I wasn’t using it because I needed this what I call aesthetic reflection, which is also a term that I use as a phenomenological reflection. It is not reflection through construction and articulation but reflection in the original sense of ‘giving back’. So the mirror sense of reflection. So we were asking, in these terms we were asking people to reflect, and I would say not on their practices, but to reflect their practices which are reflective practices in the same way. So the submission reflects practices that reflect phenomena … aesthetically. In order to say, within whichever version of it, that these are aesthetic-phenomenological practices.

 

Maybe there is something in the reflection of that phenomenon, in reflecting that phenomenon, there seems at times that there is something also of the practice that is also reflected back. Or is also reflected.

 

Yes, yes. And I think that for me this is also the sense of the vocative, the idea, and also the sense of Cezanne being a phenomenologist, because it allows me to see. And in this sense, I can say it is exactly what a mirror does. We say, which is not really true I would say, that the mirror reflects an image. Actually a mirror reflects light. So where is the image in the mirror, or is it on the mirror? Well, even the question would be different if it was is the picture in the mirror? The picture is in the painting or in the photography but the mirror it is difficult to say. Anyway, I got lost. Anyway the mirror is not keeping anything it is just giving back. And, and, the idea of the vocative is the idea of a text that mirrors the phenomenon, in the sense of allowing the phenomenon to be seen. Maybe in a way, not in the way that I have a mirror in front of me, but in a way I have a mirror that is positioned so that I can see something which is not myself.

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One of the problems of this metaphor is that we see the mirror outside, but the idea is that the practitioner becomes the mirror, and the practice is what allows the practitioner to become the mirror. So the practitioner is reflecting, or even better, the practitioner is reflective, or is reflecting in the sense of performing its reflective skills.

 

Or it is reflective agency. In the same way that the mirror, we could say, has a reflective agency, and is performing this, or is actualising this agency probably when someone looks at the mirror, still this is the metaphor. The core of the metaphor is that there is matter and that matter has agency, and that agency is reflective. It could be absorbing, an absorbing agency. So all light that falls into it disappears and is not reflected. But the mirror has the agency of reflection. And we also have subjectivity, which also has the agency of reflecting. And I think it is the practice which mobilises this, or actualises this potentiality of reflecting. Not reflecting on, because this is another agency, the agency of constructing, logical construction, construction in logical terms. But reflecting.

 

Then I am interested in how various media interplay with that.

 

Exactly.

 

So on the one hand there is this agency that can be described as this reflective agency, and then how is it then in relation to media? Is that agency mediated through those technologies, or mediatized through different technologies, or how does that entanglement with the media also, I want to say produce again, inform or influence the nature of that reflection. You could say that conventionally language or writing, is this right, is the form of mediation bridges between the reflective agency and the capacity for making this sharable?

 

Well, I think that every reflection is sharable by definition, no? Coming back again to the metaphor of the mirror, the reflection of the mirror is sharable. And I think language makes, each medium, this is what I would say, each medium provides certain conditions of mobilisation of different forms of reflection. And, of certain forms of sharability of these reflections, or the results of these reflections. And clearly language, is a fantastic medium for constructed reflection, so logic, so it is probably. So I say it right, logic can be instantiated through language and has been mainly instantiated through language. So if I turn the expression around I would say that language is a medium that provides adequate enabling conditions for logical reflection to be activated and realised. And I think that for example images might have it easier for the form of reflection that we are talking about. Maybe language has to be mobilised in other ways, like through poetry or the writing of Merleau-Ponty, you know, in order to activate these agencies of mirror reflection, or aesthetic reflection.

 

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And this connects with the idea of reflection we were talking about. So I activate my capacities of reflecting, seeing and reflecting become somehow one. And actually become one, become I am seeing what I reflect. This is me looking at my experience, I guess. So, yes, yes, so also when teaching very tricky – so, ‘I have to talk about my feelings’. I say no, you have to talk about the phenomenon through your feelings. So people begin to talk about themselves, and I say, no, it is not about you, it is through you. You become a medium, that is my point, you become a reflector. It is not about you, you are a medium and the medium is always invisible, providing potentiality, providing agency. But it is never in focus.

 

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There was also this identification of observation.

 

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Embodiment: Sensible/sensory capacities

 

But I think … this space of affinity between artistic research and phenomenology requires this kind of positive neutral, and this also connects with the idea of passivity, reaction or action in touch with wonder. And as I was saying that, an idea that crossed my mind was, I was saying, the field of art is much more diverse than the field of phenomenology. That is why I can address this issue of the Special Issue, much better from the perspective of aesthetic practices and phenomenology. Because artistic practices, artistic research practices … there could always be a case where I say no, this is not artistic. Or, in the positive sense, that there are artistic practices that have nothing to do with that. And maybe maybe maybe maybe, we are talking about an area in artistic research and I think what we tend to qualify this as aesthetic research, or denominate as aesthetic research which makes emphasis in perception. Or what I prefer to call it, also perception-sensing, perceiving-sensing-feeling. Not so much areas dominated or grounded in imagination or speculation but in terms of seeing. So areas that somehow come closer to or can come closer to … no not necessarily, I stop there, because this is the interesting point. If you look at the history of aesthetics there is this tension between imagination and aisthesis, and I think that this is a very interesting issue. And I think it is there in the aisthesis that I see a common ground. Or the possibilities for affinity between phenomenology and artistic research or better aesthetic research. But maybe all of this is only said, moved by, my own affinities. Someone else might say, well there can also be an affinity between artistic research and phenomenology based on the use of imagination, and I guess this is true.

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I wonder whether, I am thinking of some of the phrases that have been coming through our Thinking Aesthetic Thinking discussions. And something to do with the misconception of what first-person perspective might mean.

 

Yes, absolutely.

 

There is the heightening of that sensible, sensory-perceptual register of subjectivity, and at the same time the reduction or diminishing of the I-ness of that.

 

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And maybe this sense of the neutral is active there.

 

Exactly.

 

I am thinking of neutral of I, and thinking back to the image you were describing yesterday, the metaphor of the mirror, and the displacement of the mirror so it is not yourself reflected back.

 

Exactly, this was the reason I was introducing this displacement. Exactly.

 

So this sense of a heightened capacity, an increased sensible, sensorial, perceptual capacities as a means for or as way for maximising that reflective agency.

 

Absolutely.

 

But at the same time that not being the personal.

 

Yes. Yes.

 

And I think that this is a shared characteristic. Is it, I am not sure. I think it is a shared characteristic of aesthetic research, but maybe this is also a difference between aesthetic and artistic, this getting out of the way. I make a judgement … on the agency of ego.

 

Yes, it is not by chance you make this judgement. I have been working with my students with Epistemologies of Aesthetics from Mersch, especially this chapter which is called A Short History of Truth in Art, and there is this moment where he writes that when Baumgarten renounced the original goal and situated aisthesis or perception at the centre of his project. And I think yes, it is in this turn, if we go with Mersch, artistic research which I think aligned with aesthetic research, is to be recovered. So aesthetic research or aesthetic research practices, as aisthetic research practices is where I see the possibilities for any common ground, or for a common ground between this kind of research and phenomenology. And since we don’t have so much time, and this is the last conversation … there is an issue which I think is interesting.

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Wonder, not knowing and Epoché

 

 

I think one thing that is in my mind – it might not connect, but it feels present as something to pick up more, is the sense that the result is one of destablisation. I have been trying to look through some of the contributions, and thinking almost of some questions.

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It is complicated because even as I was saying this with the displaced mirror, I mean, there is the point that metaphors work for a while, but we are not talking about an object. And a mirror might reflect an object or to be more precise, the light falling on an object, but a phenomenon is not an object, it is objectified of course. I think that the whole point, not the whole point but an important aspect, of epoché is that I change the relationship to my experience, so I don’t look at it, at the content of my experience, but I look at the way I experience it. And there is where I can, in this turn, is the turn of experience, of content-led experience to phenomena. And this is the way I understand this question of thematising it. A theme. If I thematise it because I direct my attention to the way it appears in my experience, I am not really looking at my experience, I am looking at it in my experience. Then, I turn it in a phenomenon. So a phenomenon is not only an appearance, but it is a thematised appearance. This is what I would say.

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And there we can also link to the point saying that the practices we want to, or we aim at publishing in this Special Issue, are they practices that have to include or even instantiate epoché? So even then, further reduction? And then we could also by trying to answer this question we could scan our different varieties and say what is it with aesthetic-phenomenological, or

 

if we take this sense of 100%/ 100% model, we have to say yes because there is no phenomenology without the epoché and reduction. But if we take phenomenologically oriented then I think we enter a field of relativity – we could say maybe epoché, but not reduction. This is a possibility. Or if we go to this other one, the unnamed one, this is the question. I think that this is a good example for these different varieties.

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And then potentially, what we were talking upon at the end of yesterday’s conversation was whether the practice of reduction, or of epoché and reduction proper, would be characteristics or traits that are deemed necessary.

 

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Because one of the most tricky things of phenomenology I think is this idea of suspending but not excluding. So this is one of the most tricky things. So it is a certain distance or at least difference from the world, but remaining in the world, which fits to this famous expression of the ‘wonder in the face of the world’. So, the difference that epoché as practice, or one of the differences that epoché as practice enables, is exactly a difference towards the world, so it opens a space. And we are in touch with the world, we continue being, we cannot not be, but or maybe and, we are attending to this world as it appears in my experience. So we suspend the validity of the world, so in terms of saying, the reality of the given-ness. I don’t know, in this sense, there is maybe a suspension in this sense of phenomenology and artistic research in terms of saying – this is there, but this is now not what I am doing. And in this sense, I see a connection with the practice of epoché, of opening a space, of making a difference, making a difference, remaining in the issue in which this difference is made.

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Only in this case. I think too that not knowing is actually a common trait of artistic research and phenomenology. I think epoché is also a way of achieving a state of not knowing. It allows me to see what I could not see by knowing. So there is this idea that all this knowledge occludes other knowledges. I think that this is a constitutive idea in phenomenology and in a much more unarticulated way in artistic research, or even in art. This is really what comes from art practices. I get in touch, I allow myself to don’t do anything, to be somewhere and don’t do anything, to suspend my intentions, to see what happens, to not know what I am doing. All of these are actions, are procedures that are constitutive of art practices.

 

Yes, and I think in that sense, in artistic practice – I think in artistic research as well, but maybe to a lesser extent, but certainly in art– there are a whole arsenal of tactics for this, from a profound sense of doing nothing … as you were talking about this liminal space, the profound encounter with boredom, a deep profound encounter with boredom as a way of estrangement, or exhaustion. Actually, the opposite of ‘not doing’, doing and doing and doing to the point that something exhausts itself, to the point of defamiliarization. There is a whole spectrum of concrete practices for reaching this point of wonder, I mean, this interesting overlap of terminology – not knowing, or wonder, or astonishment, or perplexity, or bewilderment.

 

I think that this idea of wonder is one expression of not-knowing. And I think somehow, for the first time, this expression ‘wonder in the face of the world’, so wonder contains already ‘in the face of the world’, because it is the wonder, and I think van Manen tries to make this clear – it is not astonishment, it is not surprise. It is a very specific state, it is a very specific emotion, which is this ‘what is that’ being in something familiar. I think that this ‘in the face of the world’ is intrinsic in the wonder. I think that wonder is always in the face of the world. And I think that this is also, this particular or very common situation in art practices, ‘what it this, that has been here all the time’, and then suddenly it is estranged, suddenly, what it is that.

 

I am wondering whether this feels … it feels that there are two quite different vectors particularly as activated in an artistic register. The not knowing vector towards defamiliarization, can have a vector that leads towards alienation and separation, yes alienation, cut off, like a nihilistic trajectory of not knowing; and then there is this sense of wonder, and there feels as if there is a profound sense of connection in that somehow.

 

I wonder if this is not, I think this alienation or even rejection, if this is one of the possible vectors of this original event, I would say, this is the very right word, of wonder. So it is clear. There is a discontinuity, there is a clear moment of discontinuity, but it is an intrinsic movement. So this is how I came to think that wonder is always in the face of the world. And, the question is if feeling this wonder, follows a rejection or an attraction, and then an intensification of the object of wonder. I think that the promise of wonder as source of research is that the second happens, that there is an even more, so there is an intensification of this familiarity. No not a familiarity, no, no. Because it is a defamiliarization, it is an intensification of a familiar object. It is no longer familiar, which makes it more intense. In the sense that the familiar domesticises or softens the relationship. But of course, there can be a sense of rejection which would not lead to the positive, it would not be positive in the sense of research. But I tend to think these are like reactions in the face of wonder.

 

Yes, and I suppose, what I am trying to think, there is something about reaction, the reactions you describe there are repelled back or pushing away, and pulling towards – so attraction and aversion in a sense. But it is making me think … I have been thinking about constitutive characteristics, also in relation to the criteria that you have been formulating around aesthetic thinking. And whether, instead of thinking about this in terms of reaction, how it might be to conceive of wonder as opening up a space of interaction.

 

Yes. Yes. But I think this is possible if attraction takes place. Because I continue being there. If I continue being there, a redistribution of agencies can take place.

 

But you call this receptivity rather than attraction. It could be receptivity rather than attraction. The thing I am interested in, in terms ofthinking back to the liminal, is the sense of keeping something open. I mean, in a weird kind of way, there is something about the liminal … I don’t know, it feels confused in my mind. But it feels like, even though the liminal is a space of passage, there is no real vector towards or away. It is actually, you have this sense, maybe this connects to the dynamic of suspension. Whereas, the reaction momentums of rejection or attraction, contain within them the vector of moving towards or moving away from something. Whereas receptivity, or openness, or even liminality, there is a concern for just holding the space open.

 

Yes, exactly. I was wondering if acceptance is better than attraction. I took attraction because something is happening and I thought let’s say I move towards or against. And somehow, if we take this as a basic category then of course acceptance would be understood as a form of attraction because I stay, I do not move away. So then I begin to inhabit it. But actually what I was trying to express feels better with acceptance rather than attraction. It is not that I move towards. I stay where I am and I accept this.

 

Yes, I mean, I even think in the sense of, in terms of the observation of phenomena, is there something about allowing, the sense of letting the momentum come from the emerging phenomenon, so actually the language is almost like … how do I imagine this, I imagine this as almost like a stilling in the agency of the subject. Even as you were describing the term acceptance, the word welcome felt strong for me. But all of these terms, acceptance, welcome, receptivity, is to do with creating conditions or working with conditions that allow something to appear, rather than moving towards something.

 

Exactly, exactly. I am thinking about a German term which is very nice, which is Aufmerksamkeit. Auf is also to open and merksamis to notice. So my image of this word would be something like an old camera, so it opens and it is marked on the film, and I think that this is, we are now beginning a semantic field, this acceptance, this opening, and this welcoming idea of becoming vulnerable, fragile, vulnerable, open. I think that this is something that can happen when this event of wonder occurs, and if this is what happens, then the possibility of research is open. Then there is the possibility of the research in the sense that I recognise, and again this could be added to our list of commonalities, in the sense of revealing unconcealment. Terms that are also connected with observation, showing, allowing to see. It is really striking how philosophy begins to talk in aesthetic terms when it becomes phenomenology. The phenomenon is not thought, it is seen. You see the phenomenon, so this is a key word. In terms of aesthetic phenomenology, I really begin to wonder if phenomenology is fundamentally aesthetic, and I would say yes, definitely. So this epiphanic moment when Husserl says ‘when I see that two plus two is four’.

 

This is interesting – there are these two moments, in that, that is the inceptual moment right, this moment of epiphany, or breakthrough or revelation. But before you were saying this, the feeling that I was having was much more like waves. So there is something about this prolonging of the space of wonder. And I think that wonder does have, that attraction/repulsion reaction is triggered by wonder, and I think that there is something about how this holding of the space open requires an incredibly subtle navigation or negotiation of those forces. It feels like … and I know this also in the experience of meditation … you lean in a bit too much and it becomes graspy, and then there is this leaning back which becomes disinterested. So there is this very dynamic space of trying to prolong, to prolong maybe even that zone of liminality, in order, no, not in order, because that is already a little instrumental, with the possibility that something emerges. But all the time, that push and pull dynamic … I mean you can feel this also in conversation. There is something and if you follow it too quick the space that was opening disappears but you were too eager, not holding the space open. I don’t know where I am going with this. Oh yes, maybe it connects back to slowness, this relationship between the slowness and duration and extending the space of openness, in order for the possibility of this inceptual glimpse, or flashes.

 

Yes, yes. I mean this is what I mean by this sense of inhabiting, in terms of dwelling. This is also this beautiful expression of dwelling with the phenomena, so don’t go away. But I think that this going away, I think that there are two possible forces. And maybe Buddhists also talk about a third, which is the neutral. So a mental formation can be positive, negative or neutral. The positive falls into this attraction, in all possible forms from acceptance to really moving towards. Or this aversion or rejection is the negative. Maybe the neutral is a “positive neutral”, an acceptance that does not turn to be so active as in the case that you were describing when we are talking and we jump into something, which is in itself a positive sign. Because if not, you say no. But if you say yes, yes, there is an at

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traction and a moving towards this.

Practices

 

Publishing practices

 

triggered by Mika’s questions and I think that this found a formulation in the call, where we say, however they are, these forms of practices of research - we haven’t so much touched on the point of the practices, because it was one clear attempt of this Special Issue to publish practices, not just artistic research, but practices, specific practices – and then, we proposed this.

 

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What are the practices and how are they activated?

 

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I was thinking, when I was thinking about the sense of practices: what is stake in showing or sharing practices, or wanting to publish practices?

 

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That is the way I would think about it. And in this sense, this is a relevant question for this aim of publishing practices. Which is easy to say, not absolutely easy because it sounds a bit forced or weird, but this was our aim. And I think in this regard, and in relation to possibilities variations of relation between artistic research and phenomenology, also in regard to publishing practices in this Special Issue, is also a research endeavour.Because clearly, at least for me, we were formulating this without knowing what it was. And the radicality is that we are saying we want to publish practices, and not the results of practices. No, we want to publish the practices themselves. In the strict sense there is the question, is this operation possible. Is a practice able to be published? …. In a journal. Because if we think about making public, then yes. No problem. I can show it and share, I can display live my practices. No doubt. Well, or maybe. But the field of possibility is quite open but in a journal, or through a journal. There with these constraints.

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I guess I have been mulling over this sense of, in this research enquiry of seeking to publish practices in this journal, what is it that is at stake in the pursuit? What is it that is at stake in publishing practices?

 

It felt that it was a way of – not even that it needs more elaboration – but to return to it, and then one of the things that came through strongly for me as an area that we have not yet explored is the sense of practices and the distinctiveness of practices

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This relates also for me, maybe I can say something with the through rather as a medium and not a means. When we say through practices, we don’t mean that the practices are the means but rather a medium in terms of a set of conditions of possibility.

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Practices and Actions

 

I mean, attitude is also a word quite fundamentally used in phenomenology, right – like a ‘natural attitude’. And for me, the term attitude is too vague. And I try to, I am not saying it is wrong at all, but I try to specify it in terms of forms of action. If I, in the sense, if I have an attitude or if someone has an attitude towards something, this person is making something, is acting in a way. So it is possible to specify or to clarity attitudes in terms of actions, and I think this brings us, or at least it brings me, to my feeling that in doing so, we know more about what we mean. I think that an attitude is previous stage. There is this attitude, but how is this attitude, and then we, probably the step is to go into actions.

 

Or etymologies also I wonder? The reason I say this is because two words came to mind, not necessarily as alternatives, but in relation to attitude. One was ‘perspective’, thinking about in terms of per-spective, I mean I would have to look this up, but I guess, per- through, seeing. And the other was ‘disposition’, a shared disposition. A sense of this dis-position. I mean, how would this be - a shared un-positioning.

 

Exactly. But in both cases I see the action there. I situate myself in certain relation to this. So this disposition is a set of actions, it is possible to be expressed in terms of a set of actions. So, because a disposition is always taken or adopted. That is what I meant. A perspective, also in an optical sense, is to put oneself in a certain spatial relationship towards something else. You are doing that. So I take a perspective, in the sense that I situate myself here and not there. I move there, I do it. This is what I mean, it is possible to break out of these perspective, these positions, these attitudes as a set of actions. So this is what thinking in terms of practice is for me. Fine, everything is fine – but what do you do, and how do you do it, in the interests of what of course? And probably in this relationship between the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ is what characterises. So in terms of defining traits, this is the sense that I am using characteristics here. Yes. And I think that the move would be what do you and then how do you do it. So in this case, the ‘how’ will follow the ‘what’ in this kind of thinking.

 

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In the conversation yesterday, one of things that you were saying was something to do with how attitude is expressed in action, and I was thinking about this relation between action and practices. And I guess in this sense, practice is systematised action, would it be?

 

Yes, this is my idea. This is the minimal definition of practice, minimal in order to be sufficient. Practice as a set of actions. Yes.

 

And, we were talking about a sense of attitude, perspective, disposition, orientation, so those actions are … practice is a set of systematised actions that are imbued with a certain quality – they are expressive of a certain attitude.

 

I think so, because the common take is that an attitude precedes an action or precedes a practice. But I see the point in that, but I can see an attitude is already a set of practices, it is something I do, there are different things I do. For example, when we talk about phenomenology, we talk about the phenomenological attitude. If I take a phenomenological attitude, I have to have done a lot of things already and actually this taking of a phenomenological attitude is the practice of epoché. Or you could say that the attitude is what results of this. OK, fine. Like an attitude or disposition.

 

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Maybe this is my struggle with understanding epoché – in the sense, is it a practice, or does it describe an attitude, and therefore what are the practices required for or what are the practices that give expression to, how is it a practice?

 

I think it is a practice and it might be that the attitude is a synonym for the disposition which is a result of these practices. It can be understood also that the attitude, as a disposition, is the result of the practice of epoché. And actually this is the way it is normally described – so the practice of epoché allows me to pass from the natural attitude to the phenomenological attitude. So an attitude, a phenomenological attitude, is a consequence of practising the epoché. And there for van Manen, you have bracket this, to bracket that, to bracket that. So then main action of epoché is this bracketing, or suspending, or neutralising. But also there is another action which is necessary to this action which is this being aware of what you have to bracket, so I am aware that I have this predisposition, and then I can bracket it. But then there is also another aspect which makes clear – I take a position, not only bracketing but I also refer to, establish another relationship to my experience. And this relationship is to thematise it, and this is why I don’t take something for given or as given, but I take it as given in my experience, and this is also part of the epoché. I think that epoché as a whole is a field of practices, or a set of systematised actions, I would say that.

 

Maybe it comes back then to this dual question: So how do you do that? And/or How might that be done?

 

Exactly.

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Or even, and how else might that be done, because I guess the phenomenological methods describes it as a predominantly linguistic set of systematised actions.

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Practices and media

 

Sure, and there it is useful to talk about media and practices. Because for me, practices mobilise certain capacities of the medium, so if we consider language, even written language as a medium, and I think we can, because it provides certain conditions of possibility and certain enabling and constraining conditions for practices. Then there are certain practices that activate a certain sphere, a certain terrain, a set of these conditions, and other practices activate others. And the same thing happens with images by the way. If we compare a diagram, an icon, a logo, and a poetic image, or with sounds. This is not exclusive to language, you can do a lot of different things with all of these media. So, and you do it because you perform different practices that are situated in - is we use a certain topological metaphor of a medium – they are situated in different areas of this medium.

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This sense of language being mobilised in other ways I find interesting. It made me think that in the case of a poetic form, is language mobilised as image? I am not sure. Or even, thinking of the more semantic, alliterative dimensions that van Manen talks about language is then mobilised as sound in a way.

 

Yes, that is why poetic images.

 

I guess I am interested in this sense of not only through other media, but that other dimension of language, which is evident in the submissions. It is more than non-linguistic mediality but something to do with the capacity of language to be mobilised in different ways, beyond this discursive, propositional register.

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Yes. I tend to think that, maybe I am wrong, that phenomena are neither, phenomena are neither the media nor the practices or the artifacts that they generate. So in the case of fictionality I would understand this as a field of practices based on in a big part imagination, fantasy, and the activation of these practices creates enabling conditions, or provides enabling conditions, for the emergence of new phenomena. I have to really concentrate. So artistic artifacts, I would tend to understand artistic artifacts in the same sense, so, a novel, a fictional novel, a fictional text – this is not fictionality it is an artifact, and is produced in this field. It is in touch with it that phenomena will appear, it is in the experience, or through the experience, or by virtue of the experience of, the experience of this artifact or that this artifact enables or co-enables that phenomena will appear. So I tend to think that phenomena are always emerging, they are never, cannot be produced and cannot be contained in an artifact, or in practices, or in a medium. It is not equal to the practices, and the artifacts and the medium. So maybe I am fully wrong, but this is where I situate phenomena. So, an artistic phenomenology would be a phenomenology substantiated through artistic practices. This would be my take.

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Where is a practice

 

I guess this is why I am interested, maybe this is the wrong question, but where is the practice? Where does a practice manifest? Or where is a practice operative? And this was leading me to the phenomenal dimension of practice. Or maybe even thinking in the sense of how a phenomenological practice is manifested within that frame? And the emphasis perhaps on writing. Does the writing (noun) manifest the practice of writing? Or is what we encounter an artifact? Because we have been talking in these terms – the result or outcome of a practice might be considered as an artifact, but not the practice itself, or not necessarily the practice itself. What does that show or reveal of the relation of writing within phenomenology more broadly?

 

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now I understand your where. Where is the practice? Because I would say the fact is that we can only publish artifacts … in a journal. For the fact is that in a journal only artifacts can be published. Departing from this, which I would take as a fact, what we could clearly see in advance, was that we need diversity of media. But nevertheless we continue publishing artifacts. So on a first level of the meaning of publishing, so in the sense of what we will make public on the first level, will be artifacts, and then is you question: where in these artifacts is the practice, we could add, to be found?

 

I actually think that what we publish or what seems to be being published are two moments within the practising, in the sense that many of the contributions have some dimension of score or outline of a practice, so there is a kind of pre- moment, or a to-come moment within that. And then there is the artifact, which is in a way after the fact of practising to a certain extent. And what is interesting is that there is this gap, which opens up between the description of what a practice involved and what emerges through the practising of that practice. Yes, I am curious whether something does appear or emerge through the conjunction of those two moments of showing in a way, or is there something that is revealed through the combination of different kinds of manifestation or tangibility … because all of those things seems to be to do with how do you give expression to a first person experience of observation. On the one hand, I was wondering, what is this, is this to do with the externalisation of an experience of observing, or the giving of tangibility to the experience of observation, or attention, or noticing. Practices of the attending to, or noticing, or observing of a phenomenon, and through what means can that be made sharable with others. So conventionally, writing would be one of those means. But then I thought, it seems, maybe this relates to what you were saying about the artifact, it seems as if it is not quite as straight forward as that. And more about how you might create a set of conditions that allow that, maybe this is it, how do you create a set of conditions that allow that phenomenon to arise again for the reader, viewer.

 

Yes, yes – that is an interesting point. Because I was thinking, if we go one of these three possible ways, I saw more, but I see three now: so score, an artifact describing the actions to be made in order to practice. Or the artifact or artifacts that are produced or that emerge through the practising of the practice. If the score is before, or somehow, before and maybe also somehow at the same time, because the score is somehow present in the performance of the practice. And the artifacts are mainly afterwards although also maybe in the in-between, because they emerge through the practice. And then there is a third way which is the description of the practice which is what we were calling the about-ness mode. And we were insisting that we don’t want description of practices, we want the practices themselves. The interesting thing is that under this condition that the practice themselves, or the practice itself, can only appear as an absence. So the practice itself as a phenomenon is a possibility. And the question for me is, is this not always the case? If a phenomenon is not always, or if a phenomenon observed phenomenologically is not always a field of possibilities and I would say yes. And that is what I would connect with this ‘source of meaning’, it is not meaning, it is the source of meaning. So what is a field of possibility is temporal, not only because of the temporal dimension of experience, of this the way I like to call it, this flow of sense, which crystalises as a phenomenon, which is objectified as a phenomenon. So probably the practices we might publish in this Special Issue are published as their absence, and therefore as presence of a possibility of practice. And probably this is the only way to publish practices in a journal. Yes, for sure this is a way to address this. This is a possible way to address this impossibility.

 

It feels as if, that sense of variations of things – on the one hand, one of the things that you pointed to in the last conversation was … there is a different notion of the making public of practices, a different sense of what is at stake in making public practices. There was something about how within artistic research – because artists think of themselves as practitioners – there is more of a familiarity with what it means to share practice and to share practices. Whereas there was something … even like the ‘how do you do it?’ dimension. So how do you do that? This has been one of my major intrigues I guess in relation to how some of the phenomenological methods are described. Particularly with something like epoché. So I can get a sense of the intentions of the epoché, but how do you do that? How do you actually do it? My sense is, my experience is, that within an artistic research context there is something very close to that, but it is difficult to practise. Or there are many ways of practising it? But I am left with this question of so how is it to practise it then? Yes, I have a sense of where it is heading or the state or attitude which it is trying to get towards, but I don’t get any sense of how it is practised. Maybe this would correspond to the publishing of scores dimension of this project in the sense of something of this – how do you do it?, I do it like this.The outlining of a procedure (this sounds too formulaic) but still this sense of how do you do this?

 

But ‘you’ there should be strong and not in the sense of impersonal, and what I mean by that is, so when I was listening to you I was van Manen’s text is resonating, and the frustration that appears from time to time. When you think, so now he is going to tell, he is going to address this question. Because … well the goal of this practice is this, this practice is about, and then say, OK, OK, I am not sure if it is often, but in a couple of moments he writes, Of course, we cannot say how to do it because it is very personal, and it is situated and in the moment. That is why in this sense I said, how to you do it? It is a strong ‘you’ and not the impersonal because if the question is “how this should be done?”, which is impersonal, ‘by everyone’, then I understand van Manen. But if the question is ‘how do you, specifically you do it?’, this question can be answered. Of how have you been doing it? And this is a possible question, and this is where for me the concept of practice is interesting. Not in the sense of a closed method defined in advance. So, you want to do this, then this is the way to do it. No, this is not what I mean by a practice. A practice is a specific way of doing something, and there is where the necessary balance between specificity (I can tell you how I do it) and the open-ness of ‘it can be done in different ways’ meet. This is an interesting point. And this, if this is right, leads to the necessity of affirming that phenomenology is a field of practices, even phenomenological reduction or epoché. It is a field of practices – why, because you can do it in different ways, but these different ways can be systematised, sufficiently systematised, because you can do it again. You can do it again. And so, and yes, and I understand that the way van Manen says in the book, but this can be compensated, not compensated, but avoided by saying that we can show practices. As examples but not in a normative sense, and somehow he does it, he comes close to that in the chapter on the vocative, the examples of modalities of the vocative. He brings examples, so Sartre for example. This is the way he did it – so it is possible to identify a practice, which is not described but is in this part or fragment of the artifact, the book, can be seen, the practice that generates it. But the practice is the presence of an absence.

 

So in those examples that van Manen uses – there were two things I was thinking, is this expressed in ‘how might that be done?’. So removing the pronoun, but it is still not how it ‘should be done’ … but it may be done in this way, shown through the proliferation of possibilities of practice. But when you were describing van Manen’s examples, is what we encounter when we encounter the example of Sartre, the artifact. Is it?

 

Yes. Because a practice is a process, we cannot find it, we cannot directly observe it. Even if we would directly see Sartre writing, we would not see the practice. So, somehow even in this case of a direct exposition of someone practising, even in this case, the practice will not be evident. So maybe this is a point – maybe a practice is never evident. Maybe a practice is somehow a kind of infrastructure of the visible or what can be seen, yes the visible. So in this sense, to publish a practice can only follow indirect strategies. Because even a description of the practice would be somehow direct. Probably the most direct way would be indirect. Because maybe a practice, I don’t know, I am just speculating, maybe the practice can only be expressed directly as a structure. But even this would not be the practice, as practising. So the structure of a practice can be grasped, can be expressed, can be formulated, can be described, but not the practice. So there is something of the practice that can be expressed, formulated, clearly formulated, but not the practice.

 

That makes me think, I am thinking about practices that have an indexical relation to them, now what do I mean by that.

 

To what, to themselves?

 

What do I mean? Somehow I thinking of Katja’s work, where there is an indexical relation to what is observed, but I wonder if it is also indexical to the practice? I suppose what I am trying to think through, is the unfolding, maybe this is the temporal dimension of an artifacts unfolding places you in the time-space of the practising of it.So there is a degree that film, that lens-technologies, maybe is one of those technological-mediations which creates a temporal unfolding that somehow provides access to the actual practice, I am not sure.

 

I think that there can be an intuitive of it, but it is not, I mean there can be an intuition of a practice.So I am imagining myself watching one of Katja’s videos or even the photos, and thinking oh I think I know how you do it. Well a lot of things can be said very clearly about a practice – so I do that, and I do that, and I do that. Which would be, might be, formulated as a score: do that, do that, do that, or don’t do that, don’t do that, don’t do that. But even the score is a frame for the practice.

 

And the score, even a sense of watching or engaging with an artifact, and having a sense of understanding how you do that, is not access to the practice. Because the practice also contains, also contains also the experience of the phenomenon.

 

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I would say that a practice is invisible and irreducible. In the sense that it is pure action, it is pure organised action. But organised in the sense, in a way which is intrinsic to the action. So it is framed. As you know, from time to time I tend to compare this with a game. I can formulate the rules and the rules enable me to play. Without the rules I cannot play, but the playing is clearly not the rules. And I wonder if this is also the case with a practice. There is part of the practice, there are components of the practice which are maybe these enabling conditions, or frameworks, or goals or departing points, that can be expressed. But it is not the practice itself, in the same way that each game is unique in this sense. And this uniqueness, this is what I mean with the irreducibility of a practice.

 

Is that also related to its liveness, the liveliness of something?

 

Yes, I would say.

 

But then it feels as if, so if I think about how van Manen writes about the vocative, it seems as if part of the let’s say drive, is to re-enliven this sense of liveliness.

 

It is this idea of attunement with the phenomenon. On the one hand, the attunement with the phenomenon, and on the other, for others to attune to that. So I think the phenomenon is at the point … there is an attunement of the one who is writing and the one who is reading.

 

But in the way that it has been described in the last part of this conversation there are two interwoven livenesses, one in the sense of the appearing phenomenon and the other in the sense of the liveness of the practice.

 

Yes. Yes.

 

I find this interesting, also in the sense that this fluidity between the practice that is adopted through which to engage with phenomena, or through phenomena, and then how that practice also becomes, or has a phenomenal dimension. I mean, I would use the term ‘reflexive’ to describe this dimension, but I know this is a term that you would not use so much? But that idea, that in the practising, the practising also becomes part of the emerging phenomenon, also being observed. It seems as if, it is not common to all of the submissions, but it seems to be a dimension that is present within many of the submissions.

 

Which dimension?

 

Of observing, the practice engages with a particular phenomenon, but at times, it is also engaging with its own appearance, its own unfolding.

 

In the journal yes, because this is a requirement of publishing practices.

 

Is it a requirement?

 

Do you mean that phenomenological practices are always self-reflective?

 

Not that they always are – but it seems that there is a self-reflexive dimension that is more … but maybe it is this requirement to show the practice or to demonstrate the practice.

 

And maybe as you were talking then, there was something about in showing or sharing or presenting practices, is there something about showing the mirror at the same time as what is mirrored? I don’t know. Is the practice the mirror?

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Even as I was describing this simultaneity of the mirror and the mirrored, I thought no actually the earlier description of the impossibility of showing practices, or of practices only being able to be shown through their absence felt a more adequate way of describing it.

 

But it is the idea of making an absence present. So it is about the accessibility of a absence. Not as an absence but as a presence to which the absence refers. So maybe the reasonable goal is that the reader acquires a sense of what this practice is, or even better, might be.

 

I think that the mirror metaphor risks objectification and what you describe there of making an absence present but not through objectification, but through having a sense of, or an experiential connection.

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: There was interesting sense of ‘where’ is the practice – not what is the practice, but where is the practice? Not even how is the practice, but where is it? Even to the point that it made me wonder, maybe this is wrong, are practices themselves phenomenal?

 

I think everything is a phenomenon if it is thematised. So the relation between phenomena and observation is circular. If I observe something given in experience, I turn it into a phenomenon, I would say. And the other way around, a phenomenon can appear without me calling or me focusing awareness, and can mobilise my awareness. So practices can be a phenomenon if this what I observe? So if I observe how this practice appears in my experience, if I ask my question: how is this practice and my way to address this question is to observe how this practice is appearing in my experience, then practice is a phenomenon.

 

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And this relates to a third point, or a third conglomerate of issues, connected to indirect strategies; the question of live or liveness; the issue of absence or invisibility, even no-phenomenality, or maybe better as forms of phenomenality. I think this is a group of issues that relate to one another and were present in different forms in our conversations, so for me it already has for me a quality of distillation.

 

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Method without method – towards practices

 

The other thing is the sense of … it is interesting that we phrase it as making a methodological contribution. One of the things that comes to mind is the sense that one of the commonalities for both fields of practice is that there is method without method. And in that sense, thinking about what you were saying about van Manen getting close to describing how to do something, and then withholding, saying of course there are only singular examples of practice. What struck me was that for both fields of practice there is this common principle of showing, and of showing through example. Van Manen uses this term agogical, which I guess is the etymological half of ped-agogical. So showing what the phenomenological attitude looks like through example. Rather than describe through procedure, it can only be shown through example or through practice. It feels as if this is what is at stake in the showing of practices and in the presentation of artifacts, that in both fields of practice there is only method without method. It can only be given expression through singular examples of practices.

 

I mean there is always this problem with this word methodological or methodical or method. Because the common interpretation probably comes from the scientific method, as if there would be a prescription, method would be something prescriptive. This is the way you do it. Now go and work. But if we take this is a wider and not prescriptive but responding to what happens, as methodus or the way. The prescriptive is: this is the way, so go. The other one is: walk, lay down a path. And this is I think correct to talk about method in these terms. I remember when we wrote that I accepted because I understand that a method emerges from the conjunction of practices and because we are dealing with practices. This Special Issue is about practices, and I think it is justified to talk about method in these terms.

 

You are describing this laying down of a path. I was thinking of the showing of practices as the showing of a way, not the showing of the way. This goes back to yesterday and the conversation on the differentiation between ‘how do you do it?’ and ‘how do you do it?’

 

Exactly. How it must be done is like the scientific method. And then how do you do it, or how do I do it in terms of the partial repeatability of any method. I prefer to soften the term method that to fully renounce it.

 

That also feels as if it might correspond to approach method with the principle of epoché.

 

Van Manen describes a methodological epoché and he claims for methodological creativity. So suspend the ways you know that work in doing research. But all this is in terms of let the phenomenon tell you how to deal with it. So this idea of situated methods, or situated and embodied concept of method. Embodiment is already there in the ‘you’. You do it here now. You do it here now and in touch with this issue, this phenomenon. Because if the last element is not present, then this redistribution of agencies is missing and then I would say neither aesthetic or phenomenological research can be made, can be recognised.

 

It is making me think there about contingent method in all of its meanings

 

Exactly. It is a network of contingencies.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Thematic Reorganization

Distillation (Redacting)

The short video extract below (screen recording of the process itself) is an attempt to offer a glimpse into the process of distillation through redaction. Click to play, double click to open full screen.