In ‘The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility’, Benjamin (2008) makes the point that, ‘in the case of film, the fact that the actor represents someone else before the audience matters much less than the fact that he represents himself before the apparatus’ (31). This is essentially because in film, the element of semblance – the primary aspect of mimesis – has been ‘entirely displaced for the element of play’ (49). The direct automatism of photography renders the aspect of semblance secondary to the element of play – the unique possibility for experimentation to which the medium of film gives rise. Mersch (2012) expands on this notion by claiming that the film performer is ‘caught between being and seeming, the role and reality, figuration and embodiment or presence and re-presentation’ (448). This is because ‘the body marks the real as surplus that cannot be removed from the playing field’ (450). Del Río (2008) goes even further and identifies the cinema as a ‘privileged medium for the exhibition of bodies’ (10). In film, as Del Río specifies, ‘whatever happens to a body becomes instantly available to perception. Thus, the performing body presents itself as a shock wave of affect, the expression-event that makes affect a visible and palpable materiality’ (10). Del Rio considers performance to be the source of the real in cinema, the element that defies and disrupts film’s narrative and formal structuring principles: ‘as an event, performance is cut off from any preconceived, anterior scenario or reality. In its fundamental ontological sense, performance gives rise to the real’ (4). Del Rio sees affect as an intrusion of the new into repetitive and familiar structures in film, and the moving (performing) body – which is quite distinct from the subjectivity of the performer – as being the very source of this disruption, in this manner offsetting the ‘totalizing imposition of generic meaning’ (15).