Undoubtedly, Creed herself strayed when she took the poignant phrase “I stray in order to be” (p. 8) from the English translation of Kristeva’s Pouvoirs de l’horreur: Essai sur l’abjection (1980) and refers to it without context. In the French passage, Kristeva invokes a linguistically complex mental state of delusion, “où je me perds pour être” (Kristeva 1980, p. 19) [“in which I lose myself in order to be,” or in the published English translation “in which I stray in order to be” (Kristeva 1982, p. 12). But through Creed’s abbreviated recitation, straying develops into a condition for existence, rather than dissolving in a psychological turmoil that may or may not lead to some existential insight.
I argue that artistic straying could be a contemporary practice that develops in response to the existence of stray animals. It is also a possibly feminist update of related (art) historically relevant exercises formulated by the flâneurs Charles Baudelaire and Walter Benjamin or the situationists Ivan Chtcheglov and Guy Debord. For example: The flâneur strolled through the cities of the twentieth century without a destination; he submerged himself unnoticed in the big city wandering wherever he wanted. He idly experienced his surroundings.
Strays, on the other hand, have motives and boundaries. They cannot dissolve undisturbed in sensations but remain single-mindedly vigilant. Because of their precautious situation, they can be chased away or harmed at any time, and so they must be vigilant. Rather than lingering, strays are motivated: running to safety, hunting for food, claiming and marking their territory, or even hiding. As a result, straying is highly active and driven by individual motives.