Radio broadcast:

2020 „N.N-Zwischenliegend“– non-calculable time, space and body,

non-calculable space, Time and Body Vol. 1 

Kurzstrecke 95

Feature, Hörspiel, Klangkunst, Deutschlandfunk Kultur, Germany (broadcast date: February 27, 2020)

I conceptualized with realism literary, but it is non-fiction.

People who have exceeded standards as they could. It means thereby that they had overcome their own fortune, as well as misery in relates to together with others fortune.

There is no winner in life.

These are about what I'd like to express in this auditory painting that I cannot create in other creative mediums.

Until 1990, Berlin as well as West-Berlin was not a rich city. During the 1990s, there were many happen in Berlin-city. It was very different from before 1990.

A woman in interviews, she came to Berlin for study psychology at the Freie Universität Berlin (She didn't finish her study. In West Germany at that time, the university entrance rate was around 30%.), after then she had the professional education as a physiotherapist in Berlin, and she had worked at the hospital. She had to start to work at 7 am. The interviews were about the life between1970 and 1990 in Berlin, who was (has been living) there. In the interview, who was born in Berlin and who was exiled from the DDR (German Democratic Republic), have explained about the special status of Berliner until 1990. She had the BRD (Federal Republic Germany) passport, who had moved in Berlin from a town in BRD. "Berliner" was at that time, who had the special status in Berlin until 1990.

Even if one needs to receive social welfare, it is impossible to receive the social welfare that one lives in an illegally occupied house. In the social democratic country like in Germany, it is impossible to live without the Health insurance, and other social obligations like in the USA. Since born in the social democartic country, it requires social status. The artist (Künstler) like Andy Warhol is a protected profession, and a profession must to be independent status due to the creative copy-right. (Creative copyright does not mean value. Why the image as creation is able to be protected, this is a long story about the image. Also, Art is a kind of contribution by the artist.)

What I protected in this sound piece, that is the experiences, memories of people, and their feelings for living space in the city which has a special history. During the 1990s in Berlin, it was a heavy time for Berliner, the German Chancellor was Dr. Helmut Kohl until 1998.

We have to deal with the reality now...

Big Data. Analysen zum digitalen Wandel von Wissen, Macht und Ökonomie (ed.) (2014)

This is a chapter in: Group Privacy: New Challenges of Data Technologies, edited by byLinnet Taylor,Luciano Floridi, andBart van der Sloot(Springer, 2017).

Group Privacy: a Defence and an Interpretation

Luciano Floridi

Division: Oxford Internet Institute

Organization: University of Oxford

Address:1 St Giles Oxford OX1 3JS United Kingdom

Email: luciano.floridi@oii.ox.ac.uk

Abstract

In this chapter I identify three problems affecting the plausibility of group privacy and argue in favour of their resolution. The first problem concerns the nature of the groups in question. I shall argue that groups are neither discoverednor invented, but designedby the level of abstraction (LoA) at which a specific analysis of a social system is developed. Their design is therefore justified insofar as the purpose, guiding the choice of the LoA, is justified. This should remove the objection that groups cannot have a right to privacy because groups are mere artefacts (there are no groups, only individuals) or that, even if there are groups, it is too difficult to deal with them. The second problem concerns the possibility of attributing rights to groups. I shall argue that the same logic of attribution of a right to individuals may be used to attribute aright to a group, provided one modifies the LoA and now treats the whole group itself as an individual. This should remove the objection that, even if groups exist and are manageable, they cannot be treated as holders of rights. The third problem concernsthe possibility of attributing a right to privacy to groups. I shall argue that sometimes it is the group and only the group, not its members, that is correctly identified as the correct holder of a right to privacy. This should remove the objection that privacy, as a group right, is a right held not by a group as a group but rather by the group’s members severally. The solutions of the three problems supports the thesis that an interpretation of privacy in terms of a protection of the information that constitutes an individual—both in terms of a single person and in terms of a group—is better suited than other interpretations to make sense of group privacy. 

Introduction

The debate on Big Data (including Open Data) and Data Protection focuses on individualprivacy. How can the latter be protected while taking advantage of the enormous potentialities offered by ever-larger data sets and ever-smarter algorithms and applications? The tension is sometimes presented as being asymmetric: between the ethicsof privacy and the politicsof security. In fact, it is ultimately ethical. Two moral duties need to be reconciled proactively: fostering human rights and improving human welfare. The tension is obvious if one considers medical contexts and biomedical big data, for example, where protection of patients’ records and the cure or prevention of diseases need to go hand in hand.1

            Currently, the balance between these two moral duties is implicitly understood within a classic ontological framework. The beneficiaries of the exercise of the two moral duties are the individual person vs. the whole society to which the individual belongs. At first sight, this may seem unproblematic. We work on the assumption that these are the only two ‘weights’ on the two sides of the scale. Such a framework is not mistaken, but it is dangerously reductive, and it should be expanded urgently. For there is a third ‘weight’ that must be taken into account by data protection: that of groups and their privacy.

(...)

Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness by Henri Bergson

"In Time and Free Will, written as his doctoral thesis, Bergson tries to dispel the arguments against free will. These arguments, he shows, come from a confusion of different ideas of time. Physicists and mathematicians conceive of time as a measurable construct much like the spatial dimensions. But in human experience, life is perceived as a continuous and unmeasurable flow rather than as a succession of marked-off states of consciousness — something that can be measured not quantitatively, but only qualitatively. And because human personalities express themselves in acts that cannot be predicted, Bergson declares free will to be an observable fact."

Scientific law versus Scientific theories

- Scientific laws

- Naturgesetz

Als Naturgesetz wird in der Wissenschaftstheorie eine Regelmäßigkeit von Vorgängen in der Natur bezeichnet. Die Pluralform „Naturgesetze“ bezeichnet darüber hinaus die Gesamtheit dieser Regelmäßigkeiten, einschließlich solcher, die noch nicht entdeckt oder formuliert wurden, unabhängig von ihrer spezifischen Formulierung. Von anderen Gesetzen unterscheiden sich Naturgesetze darin, dass sie nicht von Menschen nach deren Belieben in Kraft oder außer Kraft gesetzt werden können. Eine genaue, einheitliche abschließende Definition des Begriffs existiert derzeit nicht.

Die Abgrenzung gegenüber den Gesetzen der Einzelwissenschaften, wie insbesondere den physikalischen Gesetzen als Grundlage der Naturwissenschaften, das wahre Wesen der Naturgesetze – Abstraktion oder ontologische Tatsache –, sowie die Frage, ob auch Axiome wissenschaftlicher Modelle und chemische, physikalische oder kosmologische Konstanten zu ihnen zählen, sind Gegenstand anhaltender Debatten.^[1] Durch die Entwicklung der modernen Physik und den damit verbundenen Reduktionismus und Naturalismus hat sich ein paradigmatisches Verständnis von Naturgesetzen als notwendiger Regelmäßigkeit in Abfolgen von beobachtbaren Ereignissen herausgebildet, die ausnahmslos alle Ereignisse ihres jeweiligen Typs bestimmen. Dadurch wurden einige wissenschaftliche Regeln aus dem Bestand der Naturgesetze ausgeschlossen. Formal wird von wissenschaftlichen wie von Naturgesetzen erwartet, dass sie erlauben, beobachtbare Ereignisse zu erklären und vorherzusagen. Dieses Kriterium reicht jedoch für die Abgrenzung nicht aus: Die Frage nach der Kausalität, insbesondere im Fall bestätigter statistischer Gesetze, und ihrer Verifizierbarkeit ist ein weiteres Problem. In der Debatte um wissenschaftliche Gesetze betont das eine Lager (in Folge von David Hume) die Regularität, was ein Verständnis statistischer Gesetze als Ausdrücke von Naturgesetzen ermöglicht, oder die Notwendigkeit einer zugrunde liegenden Ursache-Wirkungs-Beziehung.

Zwischen den aktuell als gültig angesehenen wissenschaftlichen Gesetzen der Einzelwissenschaften (selbst der Physik) einerseits und Naturgesetzen im allgemeinen Sinn besteht zumindest dem Anspruch nach ein Unterschied. So wird z. B. im Pragmatismus oder Falsifikationismus angenommen, dass die wissenschaftlichen Gesetze nur eine Annäherung an die Naturgesetze darstellen, die Ausdruck einer das Naturgeschehen bestimmenden Notwendigkeit sind. Der logische Positivismus betrachtet dagegen die Naturgesetze lediglich als aus dem beobachteten Naturgeschehen abgeleitete Regeln, die sich erfahrungsgemäß immer wieder bestätigen; er geht davon aus, dass über die Erfahrung hinausgehend keine sinnvolle Aussage getroffen werden kann (Sinnkriterium des Empirismus).