Exploring: Threefoldness and visual logics -->

How do you/I read this graph? ->

If AI gives us/me a graph, we/I have to read, ...

In this graph, at first I though that the postition of AI (satellite) is same and different time of perception by AI. Therefore I started to think, what I want to perceive in this graph. In my opinion, this graph is only an information that could be a seeing as Vorstellung by AI perception.

For what is this graph, that is for scientist's exploring or others, and I started to research in papers. AI informations are sheared, as well in Kunst-Forschung. Also AI Information in my PhD Kunst-Forschung is important, partiuculary in the exploring From threefoldness to multi-foldness.

Therefore I'll back to my artistic research on Philosophy of Perception.

Die Serie I-ARUIWA ist, mein Verständnis zur Gedicht von Dogen


題しらず (Ohne Titel)




(yamanohani honomekuyo(h)ino tsukikageni hikarimousuku tobuhotarukana)


– A Japanese Poem (Waka/和歌: Tanka/短歌) by Dōgen Zenji/ 道元禅師

Zum Thema Bewußtsein.

Was ich aufgenommen habe, "Wassertropfen" und was ich dabei aufnehmen wollte,  "Lichtreflektion der Objekte (Wassertropfen und Raum und räumlicher Zustand)".


Aufnahmen: Spiegelreflexkamera Nikon (Modell aus den 70er Jahren, ohne Autofocus/ohne Automation)

A series, Digital Photography, Doppelbelichtung, ohne Filter, © Erika Matsunami, Berlin, 2019

Minimalism in the visual arts: “There are two distinct terms: the known constant and the experienced variable”, Morris maintained, touching on the philosophical dichotomy of knowing and seeing. “You see a shape – these kinds of shapes with the kind of symmetry they have – you see it, you believe you know it, but you never see what you know, because you always see the distortion and it seems that you know in the plan view.”2 Arnheim3, however, suggested that the brain compensates for or corrects what the eyes see (Minimal Art – The Critical Perspective, Frances Colpitt, 1990). In a way of thinking of minimalism, it is possible to reduce the attribute and to reinforce the message and the perception of the arts; the minimalism is thus a complete art form. But on the other hand the expression and image logic is rejected in minimalism by automating the production. Of course, technology gives us more and more new opportunities that not only serve as a function, but rather (life-) styles and concepts can be developed by new ways of thinking. Whatever is indicated, however, our basic existence is not changed by technology; we live and we die as the law of nature wants.

After the digital revolution of Minimal Art today, minimalism is a kind of reflection of contemporary society. I think simultaneously of humanity in the digital industrial system. The question is what art presents to us and what we see and understand what is made visible with art.


(Excerpt of a comment: Computerised Motion by the Notion as Visual Composition

 - Contemplation for the video work ‘One Motorbike, One Arm, Two Cameras’ (2014) by Ainara Elgoibar, Erika Matsunami, Research Chatalogue, November 2014/March 2015)



Series I-ARUIWA, Analog Photography, ohne Doppelbelichtung, ohne Filter, ohne computer manipulation  @ Erika Matsunami, Berlin, 2012–2014 

<- How do you/I read this graph?

I'm sitting in a room by Alvin Lucier:

This sound performance by Lucier is not Japanese/Asian Minmalism. This is an event through sound phenomenon via (minimum) technology (repeat of recording and its output).


American contemprary music composition

American minimal music

Experimental composition

American Avant-Garde

American New Music

I'd like to introduce a Fine arts catalogue of disability artists in Berlin (Das Mosaik e.V, Berlin) - Kunst kommt aus dem Schnabel, wie er gewachsen ist.




Book review (excerpt, ©The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press; all rights reserved)

Orders of Appearance

Daniel Spaulding

Sebastian Egenhofer,

Abstraktion – Kapitalismus –Subjektivität: Die Wahrheitsfunktion des Werks in der Moderne (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2008), 255 colour and b&w illns, 441 pp., ISBN: 978-3-7705-4397-7, 49.90f.

Sebastian Egenhofer, Towards an Aesthetics of Production, trans. James Gussen (Zu ̈rich: Diaphanes, 2018), 53 b&w illns, 299 pp., $30.

Estrangement and recognition will alternate in the mind ofany Anglo-American art historian reading SebastianEgenhofer’s two books. His signposts are, if anything, over-familiar: in Abstraktion – Kapitalismus – Subjektivität, the ear-lier volume, they are Marcel Duchamp, Piet Mondrian, Jackson Pollock, Andy Warhol, and the American Minimalists of the 1960s (Donald Judd is his key figure). The introduction of Michael Asher and Thomas Hirschhornin Towards an Aesthetics of Production (originally published by Diaphanes as Produktionsa ̈sthetikin 2010) only barely stretches the canon. These are the white male totems of acertain late-twentieth and early twenty-first-century arthistory. They are, in particular, the totems of the so-called October school, whose representatives Egenhofer cites atregular intervals. What Egenhofer has done, however, is tomake of his landmarks the stuff of a vastly ambitious conceptual framework that has no close analogue in Anglophone art history – nor, so far as I am aware, in anyother language. To render that achievement legible requires translation in more senses than one.

   Egenhofer earned his doctorate under Gottfried Boehm,a key figure in continental Bildwissenschaft (‘image studies’,more or less). Boehm’s hermeneutic approach to ‘iconicdifference’ is a palpable influence on his student’s work, asthe distinction between images and other kinds of things islikewise the pivot of Egenhofer’s theory. It is not, ofcourse, that artworks are something other than things. Butthey make of their ‘world–relation’ (Weltverha ̈ltnis: a central term in the earlier, still untranslated book) a problemthat they address head-on, rather than a convention they presume.Modern artworks, or at least the ones that Egenhofer cares about, disclose their own production insuch a way that a ‘rift’ emerges between what he calls thehorizontal and vertical dimensions of their existence. These dimensions are, respectively, that of immediate presence inthe viewer’s space and time (an aspect of the artwork thathe often simply calls the ‘image’, orBild), on the onehand, and on the other hand the temporal ‘archive’ or‘back side’ of the work’s production (in a word, history). Egenhofer uses the term ‘archive’ in an expansive sense torefer not only to the physical remnants of an artwork’smaking, but also, and perhaps more importantly, to its social and institutional frames, such as the gallery, the mu-seum, and the discourses of art criticism. It is perhaps forthis reason, too, that the author devotes nearly as much ofhis attention to artists’ writings as to their paintings orsculptures. Individual practices emerge in this presentationas sometimes self-contradictory bundles of form, matter, and discourse.



   Secondly, in addition to class, the two other great structures of social appearance in capitalist modernity, and in several other kinds of society for that matter, are gender and race, each of which interacts with class in complex ways. Gender and race are constituted and limited forms of appearance, as well; they cannot possibly remain external to an ‘anamnesis of the genesis’13 of aesthetic appearance, too, since the aesthetic (or anyway the institution called art) is similarly an ordering and limitation, a cross-section, of a broader continuum of possible practices, forms, objects, and metabolisms with nature. In a similar way, ‘male’ and ‘female’ are cross-sections, extractions, from a continuum of possible corporeal, sexual, and cultural modes of existence that are richer and deeper than the gender binary can abide. Race, in turn, sifts the category of the human as such, assigning some to privilege and others to social death on the basis of what is, nominally, an aesthetic fact, namely skin colour. (Frantz Fanon speaks of this as ‘epidermalization’.) Recognition of these dynamics might throw a certain light on Egenhofer’s choice of objects, too. We encounter Robert Morris, but not Yvonne Rainer or Simone Forti; Anne Truitt, Agnes Martin, Louise Bourgeois, Lynda Benglis, and Yayoi Kusama are mentioned only in passing, and Lee Bontecou only as an object of Judd’s criticism. There are no black artists at all; neither are there any artists frooutside the USA or Western Europe. This is not a plea for quotas but only for historical accuracy.

   There is, however, another and perhaps even more fundamental question that one can put to Egenhofer’s delimitation of his field. Though he implicitly adopts Boehm’s notion of iconic difference, at certain moments he seems hardly to mind the distinction between ‘aesthetic’ appearance and appearance as such; since they are congruent, the one is just a region of the other. At the very end of Aesthetics, for instance, he writes that ‘anything in the world can serve as the hinge to the infinite ground of beings’; any ‘thing that does not cling to the consistency of what already is’ but which rather ‘turns the non-self-evident character of its existence outward and shapes it into a resistance’ may accomplish the work of truth–production. One should hope so; one should hope that truth happens in places other than the gallery. So, as Christopher Wood asks of Belting: why then is art so persistently Egenhofer’s object? Why does he preserve art – canonical art, at that – as his ineluctable frame, when it seems, rather, that the constitution of any form of appearance whatsoever is the real stake of his  inquiry? Abstraktion and Aesthetics propose a theory of the production of semblance, but not of the production of art’s autonomy. Here perhaps is an immediacy not yet sublated. I am not sure there is an explanation for this other than historical inertia; that is, the fact of art’s institutionalization as just such a privileged zone of ontological instability. Egehnofer’s is not, admittedly, a harmonizing political aesthetics a` la Friedrich Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, since ‘strife’ is its keynote; what I am saying is just that art here maintains its privilege as a space of onto-political experimentation. But the horizon of his aesthetics of production may not be art at all.



Abstraktion - Kapitalismus - Subjektivität

Die Wahrheitsfunktion des Werks in der Moderne

Sebastian Egenhofer

1. Aufl. 2012, 441 Seiten, kart.

ISBN: 978-3-7705-4397-7


Die Krise der Repräsentation durchläuft im 20. Jahrhundert einen Moment, in dem Kunstwerke nicht mehr von bloßen Objekten zu unterscheiden sind. In der amerikanischen Minimal Art der sechziger Jahre ist das Werk auf ein Ding reduziert, das, statt ein Bild einer Welt zu entwerfen, nur sein eigenes Vorhandensein auszusagen scheint: it is what it is, what you see is what you see. Seit dem Durchgang durch den Spiegel dieser Tautologie bezieht sich Kunst in vielfältiger Weise nicht mehr auf eine repräsentierte, sondern auf die Welt, der es selbst angehört. Die minimalistische Situation kann so als Schwelle zur zeitgenössischen Kunstproduktion verstanden werden. Das Buch beschreibt die doppelte Genealogie dieser Schwellensituation, indem es einerseits die Geschichte der Bildabstraktion vom Impressionismus bis zu Frank Stellas protominimalistischer Malerei verfolgt und andererseits das Verhältnis des modernen Werks zur kapitalistischen Warenproduktion analysiert, das emblematisch in Marcel Duchamps Ready-mades zum Ausdruck kommt. Zwischen den extremen Polen der modernen Repräsentationskritik, dem Ready-made und dem monochromen Bild, wird so eine Topik der Kunst der Moderne aufgespannt, von der aus neues Licht auf die Arbeit von Künstlern wie Marcel Duchamp und Piet Mondrian, Andy Warhol und Ad Reinhardt, Donald Judd und Jackson Pollock fällt.

->Ich bringe meine NI meiner Digital Kamera/AI bei. AI braucht viele unterschiedliche Erfahrungen, sonst die nimmt die Objekte nicht auf, und die nimmt die Objekte auf, die ich nicht will. 

'Precise' means also tight.

-> Diese Performance damals (in den 90er) in Wedding, Berlin war mit Tonband, mehrere Stunden hat es gedauert, ich denke, gesamte Aufnahme hat mehr als 24 Stunden gedauert, soger fast 48 Stunden gebraucht, um diese Performance (Aufnahme) bis ende zu bringen. (Ich schlage noch mal nach.)

Zeitdauer heute, sie wurde gekürzt.

Ich habe diese Performance von Lucier in der UdK Berlin vor ein paar Jahren mir angeschaut/erlebt. Er saß auf der Bühne und die Peformance hat perfekt und on-time funktioniert, aber es hat mir etwas gefehlt, vielleicht Sinn des Werkes... , ein wichtiger war "Zeitwahrnehmung" in dieser Performance I'm sitting in a room. Ich sah Lucier.

Wenn er in einem Raum saß und diese Performance mehr als eine Stunde gedauert hätte, ich hätte über (Amerikanischen) Minimalisums nachgedacht..., diese Veranstaltung war, es gign nicht um musikalische Metaphysik sondern Informative der musikalischen. Beiden Ereignisse zusammen nach zu denken, es war interessante für mich auf der Ebene der Musik-Komposition nach zu denken.

Serialism in Music

Arnold Schönberg, John Cage, Olivier Messiaen, Karlheinz Stockhausen, Luigi Nono, La Monte Young, ...

A method of composition using series of pitches, dynamics, rhythms, timbres or other musical elements.

Arnold Schönberg  "twelve-tone technique"

Musical dimensions (through elements of music) such as duration, dynamics and timbre.  

The Romanian spectral tradition focuses more on the study of how sound itself behaves in a "live" environment. Sound work is not restricted to harmonic spectra but includes transitory aspects of timbre and non-harmonic musical components (e.g., rhythm, tempo, dynamics). Furthermore, sound is treated phenomenologically as a dynamic presence to be encountered in listening (rather than as an object of scientific study). This approach results in a transformational musical language in which continuous change of the material displaces the central role accorded to structure in spectralism of the "French school".[24] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectral_music)

Spectralism in Music

Olivier Messiaen, Iannis Xenakis, La Monte Young, Karlheinz Stockhausen, ...

-> not only in visual art, but also in music composition

Das Buch von Egenhofer, für das ich großen Respekt habe, aus meiner Perspektive in 2020 möchte ich die Rezension von Spaulding anfangen, um Kunst zu forschen. Dabei möchte ich noch mal (in meiner Kunst-Forschung) auf das Thema Serein von Export zurückkommen.

Ich möchte dabei Minimalismus in Nord-Amerika und in Europa mit dem Japanischen bzw. Asiatischen unterscheiden. Weil Japanischer bzw. Asisatischer Minimalisums nicht die Ideologie oder für die Ideologie, sondern eher den Mensch zu heilen und aus dem extremen Zustand balancieren, der als geistige Intelligenz ist, "Selbstbewusstsein" ist ein des Teils. (Ein der Forschung für Neuroästhetik/Neurowissenschaft wichtig ist).  Sodass wer asiatischen Minimalisums schaffen könnte, der war Mönch als Ästhetiker, der nicht Künstler ist/war. Dadurch wurde wie beispielsweise in der Japanischen Ästhetik sowie Wabi und Sabi entstanden. 

Kare-sannsui (枯山水), Ryōan-ji (竜安寺)

Minimalismus in Nord-Amerika und in Europa geht es um Human being und deren Gesellschaft in Late modern period, dabei gab der die Frage, ob neue Ästhetik war. Aus meiner Perspketive in 2020 sehe ich anders, und wie ich anders sehe, die ich in Verbindung mit meiner Research Questions andeuten möchten. Heuitige Technologie wird immer verbessert und weiter entwickelt, die Zeitwahrnehmung würde immer mehr wie und auf NI (Natural Intelligence) eingestellt. In Late modern period Menschen waren von der Machine sehr begeistert, besonders um zu bedienen und damit in der Gesellschaft zu umgehen, aber gleichzeitig waren Menschen sehr verzweifelt, und verschuten Menschen weiter neue Ideen zu entwickeln.

Heute wissen wir Menschen, Intelligenz der natrürlichen (...) Minimalismus in Nord-Amerika und in Europa von Late modern period ist eine abgeschlossene Idee heute. Wir könnten uns es bald als damaliges Menschenkind im historischen Museum anschauen.


Japanischer bzw.asiatischer Minimalisums ist nicht gleich mit (amerikanischem) Minimalismus. Japanischer bzw.asiatischer Minimalisums geht es um "Sinn des Lebens", der nicht Kunst oder High-Art oder High-culture oder Philosophie ist, es geht um Wahrnehmung von jedem.

From Modern to Post-Modern

Kunst ist mehr kommunikativer und Kunst hat auch Spaß oder Freude dabei, oder andere Sicht von der Menschenheit ist dabei.

Marcel Duchamp

Readymade and Aneigung/Appropritation

“With reproduction as the moment of individuality, the living being posits itself as an actual individuality, a self-related being-for-self; but at the same time it is a real relation outwards, the reflection of particularity or irritability towards an other, towards the objective world. The process of life, which is enclosed within the individual, passes over into a relation to the presupposed objectivity as such, in consequence of the fact that when the individual posits itself as a subjective totality, the moment of its determinateness as a relation to externality becomes a totality as well” (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Science of Logic).4

For a long time people have dealt with humanity and its existence. Art has assumed an important role as a visualization of thinking. However, art not only has the iconographic character to be a symbolization, expression and representation, but it also influences the human psychology in relation to the brain and the individual perception and emotion, etc.

For example, Zekiclaims: “Yet no one has been able to relate the variability in artistic creativity and appreciation to any given brain structure or process, partly because no one knows the neural processes underlying the creative impulse or brain variability. And yet these differences in brain organization, whatever they may turn out to be, are superimposed on a common plan that is characteristic of all brains. It is this common organization that allows us to communicate through art and about art without using the written or spoken word.”6

In the case of the mathematical information as creation which is provided by the digital sensors of the computer and the programmed idea or the concept that arises from the idea of the human, and when this artwork (information of image) enters through the brain, according to this, I start to contemplate on the automatization (programmed recording without human eyes – “without seeing”) and also reflect on their creation (what is robotic creation).

The creation of visual art is a kind of intensive non-verbal “communication” that remains of the statement on the work of Elgoibar, or it could also “not remain” a statement of his work, it’s thereby made us descriptive or perspicuous about the technology in human life; what “alive, mortal and fragile” means for us.

Zeki claims in his essay on the influence of “abstraction” in the memory system on the brain and with reference to philosophy its “idealism” from the neurological aspect that: “Abstraction is also imposed on the brain by the limitations of its memory system, since it does away with the need to recall every detail. (...) Abstraction leads naturally to the formation of ideals. Plato used the term ‘ideal’ to mean a universal – derived from the intellect alone – as opposed to the particular, derived from sensory experience. Because memory of the particular fades, the ideal built by the brain from many particulars becomes the only real thing about which we can have knowledge, much as Plato and Kant believed.”7

(Excerpt of a comment: Computerised Motion by the Notion as Visual Composition - Contemplation for the video work ‘One Motorbike, One Arm, Two Cameras’ (2014) by Ainara Elgoibar, Erika Matsunami, Research Chatalogue, November 2014/ March 2015)

Minimal Art


Minimal Music

1. Ph. Glass, zit. Nach: W. Mertens, 1983, S. 70.

„besteht aus den beiden rhythmischen Bausteinen die in „continuous, regular arithmic progression“zusammenfügt und durch Schläge der Hände auf einen Tisch realisiert werden sollen, ohne dass Glass die mathematische Struktur explizit vorgibt“ (Minimal Music, Ulli Götte, 2002)

2. Morris, “Notes on Sculpture, Part 2”, p. 22; Sylvester and Morris, “A Duologue”, in Compton and Sylvester, Robert Morris, p. 18.

3. Arnheim, Rudolf (1904–2007) German-born Jewish-American media scientist, psychologist and co-founder of the art modern art education.

4. “Hegel’s Science of Logic”, translated by A. V. Miller, George Allen & Unwin, 1969


„Mit der Reproduktion, als dem Momente der Einzelheit, setzt sich das Lebendige als wirkliche Individualität, ein sich auf sich beziehendes Fürsichsein, ist aber zugleich reelle Beziehung nach außen, – die Reflexion der Besonderheit oder Irritabilität gegen ein Anderes, gegen die objektive Welt. Der innerhalb des Individuums eingeschlossene Prozeß des Lebens geht in die Beziehung zur vorausgesetzten Objektivität als solcher dadurch über, daß das Individuum, indem es sich als subjektive Totalität setzt, auch das Moment seiner Bestimmtheit als Beziehung auf die Äußerlichkeit zur Totalität wird.“ (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, Werke. Band 6, Frankfurt a. M. 1979, S. 474-480.)

4 Semir Zeki (1940–) ist ein britischer Neurobiologe mit Forschungsschwerpunkten im Bereich visuelles Systemvisuelle Wahrnehmung durch das Gehirn sowie neurobiologische Grundlagen der Kunst und Ästhetik. (a British neurobiologist who has specialized in studying the primate visual brain and more recently the neural correlates of affective states, such as the experience of love, desire and beauty that are generated by sensory inputs within the field of neuroesthetics.)

5 Trying to make sense of art

Nature,  August 29, 2002, Vol.418(6909), p.918(2) (Peer Reviewed Journal), Cengange Learning, Inc. ISSN: 0028-0836

6 Abstraction and idealism

Nature, April 6, 2000, Vol.404(6778), p.547(1) (Peer Reviewed Journal), Cengange Learning, Inc. ISSN: 0028-0836


- Aesthetics and Phenomenology


- Representhing the Real: a Mereau-Pontyan Account of Art and Experience from the Renaissance to New Media


1. The phenomenological relevance of art / Mark Wrathall

2. Phenomenology and aesthetics; or, why art matters / Steven Crowell

3. Objectivity and self-disclosedness: the phenomenological working of art / Jeff Malpas 4. Horizon, oscillation, boundaries: a philosophical account of Mark Rothko?s art / Violetta L. Waibel

5. Representing the real: a Merleau-Pontyan account of art and experience from the Renaissance to New Media / Sean Dorrance Kelly

6. The judgment of Adam: self-consciousness and normative orientation in Lucas Cranach's Eden / Wayne Martin

7. Describing reality or disclosing worldhood?: Vermeer and Heidegger / Beatrice Han-Pile -- 8. Phenomenological history, freedom, and Botticelli's Cestello Annunciation / Joseph D. Parry

9. Showing and seeing: film as phenomenology / John B. Brough.

(American) Minimalism

is towards industrial 'production' in capitalism

In the contemporary music: Third dimension of sound -> 

"Minimalism" in Germany generally is misreading, especially from the perspective in East. The original Idea of East and Wast was one, but later, East and West were 'enemy' each other, and both are from Modern.


We are rather algorithmically in the contemporary society today. -> Komplexitätstheorie

But ...,

What is 'algorithm'?


Cognitive map "Neurological basis[edit]

Cognitive mapping is believed to largely be a function of the hippocampus. The hippocampus is connected to the rest of the brain in such a way that it is ideal for integrating both spatial and nonspatial information. Connections from the postrhinal cortex and the medial entorhinal cortex provide spatial information to the hippocampus. Connections from the perirhinal cortex and lateral entorhinal cortex provide nonspatial information. The integration of this information in the hippocampus makes the hippocampus a practical location for cognitive mapping, which necessarily involves combining information about an object's location and its other features.[10]"

- Contemorary music and the thrid dimension of sound

-> Contemorary art

-> Contemporary philosophy (in the culture)

-> Contemporary aesthetics (in the culture)

---> Ethics in the contemporary 


„Meine Sätze erläutern dadurch, daß sie der, welcher mich versteht, am Ende als unsinning erkennt.", Ludwig Wittgenstein


„Es liegt ein Sinn im Unsinn.", Kurt Schwitters


(Still statt Wahrheit - Kurt Schwitters und Ludwig Wittgenstein über ästhetische Lebensformen, Lambert Wiesing, 1991)

2. The Critique of Scientism (Wittgenstein’s Aesthetics

First published Fri Jan 26, 2007; substantive revision Wed Jul 30, 2014)

Wittgenstein turns to the idea of a science of aesthetics, an idea for which he has precious little sympathy (“almost too ridiculous for words” [Wittgenstein 1966, 11]). But as is often the case in Wittgenstein's philosophical work, it does not follow from this scornful or dismissive attitude that he has no interest in the etiology of the idea, or in excavating the hidden steps or components of thought that have led some to this idea. In the ensuing discussion he unearths a picture of causation that under-girds the very idea of a scientific explanation of aesthetic judgment or preference. And in working underground in this way, he reveals the analogies to cases of genuine scientific explanation, where the “tracing of a mechanism” just is the process of giving a causal account, i.e. where the observed effect is described as the inevitable result of prior links in the causal chain leading to it. If, to take his example, an architect designs a door and we find ourselves in a state of discontentment because the door, within the larger design of the façade (within its stylistic “language-game”, we might say), is too low, we are liable to describe this on the model of scientific explanation. Then, we make a substantive of the discontent, see it as the causal result of the lowness of the door, and in identifying the lowness as the cause, think ourselves able to dislodge the inner entity, the discontent, by raising the door. But this mischaracterizes our aesthetic reactions, or what we might call, by analogy to moral psychology, our aesthetic psychology.

2.1 Aesthetic Reactions

The true aesthetic reaction—itself rarely described in situ in terms of a proximate cause (“In these cases the word ‘cause’ is hardly ever used at all” [Wittgenstein 1966, 14]) is far more immediate, and far more intertwined with, and related to, what we see in[4] the work of art in question. “It is a reaction analogous to my taking my hand away from a hot plate” (Wittgenstein 1966). He thus says:

To say: “I feel discomfort and know the cause”, is entirely misleading because “know the cause” normally means something quite different. How misleading it is depends on whether when you said: “I know the cause”, you meant it to be an explanation or not. “I feel discomfort and know the cause” makes it sound as if there were two things going on in my soul—discomfort and knowing the cause (Wittgenstein 1966, 14).

But there is, as he next says, a “Why?” to such a case of aesthetic discomfort, if not a cause (on the conventional scientific model). But both the question and its multiform answers will take, indeed, very different forms in different cases. Again, if what he suggested before concerning the significance of context for meaning is right, the very meaning of the “Why?”-question will vary case to case. This is not a weaker thesis concerning variation on the level of inflection, where the underlying structure of the “Why?”-question is causal. No, here again that unifying, model-imposing manner of proceeding would leave out a consideration of the nuances that give the “Why?”-question its determinate sense in the first place.

But again, Wittgenstein's fundamental concern here is to point out the great conceptual gulf that separates aesthetic perplexities from the methodology of empirical psychology. To run studies of quantified responses to controlled and isolated aesthetic stimuli, where emergent patterns of preference, response, and judgment are recorded within a given population's sample, is to pass by the true character of the aesthetic issue—the actual puzzlement, such as we feel it, will be conceptual, not empirical. And here again we see a direct link to his work in the philosophy of psychology: the penultimate passage of Part II of Philosophical Investigations (1958, sec. xiv), was “The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by” (Wittgenstein 1958, II, iv, 232). He says, near the close of this part of his lectures on aesthetics, “Aesthetic questions have nothing to do with psychological experiments, but are answered in an entirely different way” (Wittgenstein 1966, 17). A stimulus-response model adapted from scientific psychology—what we might now call the naturalizing of aesthetics—falsifies the genuine complexities of aesthetic psychology through a methodologically enforced reduction to one narrow and unitary conception of aesthetic engagement. For Wittgenstein complexity, and not reduction to unitary essence, is the route to conceptual clarification. Reduction to a simplified model, by contrast, yields only the illusion of clarification in the form of conceptual incarceration (“a picture held us captive”).[5]

Problem of problem solving with old alogrithmcal system:

If one can not the way of manifold thinking, its problem solving with Alogrithm is Yes or No solving, that means the combination in the dual system such as correct or incorrect and the combination of its option. Its problem for Human is, I think that such as Demenz such as "geschlossenes Universum, das immer mehr verkleinert wird". I don't use anything of this way in my artwork. Without study (theoretical and parctical exploring), I don't think to be able to find 'soemthing of thing'. 

Alogrithm today is in the manifold system and its dynamics by the multisensory. (in the NASA level).

The social problem with old Alogrithm had in Japan also.  In Japan, currently, it is attempting to change, and to educate people in gereral more essentially. Otherwise human would be one-foldness (one association (one-path and its memory)) of thinking way in a dual system) by the old type of Alogrithm.

In these contexts (different phenomenological contexts), OIO (geistig Assemblage) was experimental, therefore OIO is in the contemporary music. 

-> contemporary -->

I'm also in the contemporary.

Artistic Research:

Page 1: Introduction

Page 2: Exploring informative in terms of 3 and 4

Page 3: Exploring practically

Page 4: Exploring theoretically

Assemblages of in Art

Gilles Deleuze

Felix Guattari

A Thousand Plateaus

(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987) tr. Brian Massumi

1. Introduction: Rhizome

The two of us wrote Anti-Oedipus together. Since each of us was several, there was already quite a crowd. Here we have made use of everything came within range, what was closest as well as farthest away. We assigned clever pseudonyms to prevent recognition. Why have we kept own names? Out of habit, purely out of habit. To make ourselves unrecognizable in turn. To render imperceptible, not ourselves, but what makes us act, feel, and think. Also because it's nice to talk like everybody else, to say the sun rises, when everybody knows it's only a manner of speaking. To reach, not the point where one no longer says I, but the point where it is no longer of any importance whether one says I. We are no longer ourselves. Each will know his own. We have been aided, inspired, multiplied.

A book has neither object nor subject; it is made of variously for matters, and very different dates and speeds. To attribute the book subject is to overlook this working of matters, and the exteriority of their relations. It is to fabricate a beneficent God to explain geological movements. In a book, as in all things, there are lines of articulation segmentarity, strata and territories; but also lines of flight, movement deterritorialization and destratification. Comparative rates of flow on these lines produce phenomena of relative slowness and viscosity, or, on contrary, of acceleration and rupture. All this, lines and measurable speeds, constitutes an assemblage. A book is an assemblage of this kind, and as such is unattributable. It is a multiplicity-but we don't know yet at the multiple entails when it is no longer attributed, that is, after it has been elevated to the status of a substantive. One side of a machinic assemblage faces the strata, which doubtless make it a kind of organism, or signing totality, or determination attributable to a subject; it also has a side facing a body without organs, which is continually dismantling the organism, causing asignifying particles or pure intensities to pass or circulate, and attributing to itself subjects that it leaves with nothing more than a name as the trace of an intensity. What is the body without organs of a book? There are several, depending on the nature of the lines considered, their particular grade or density, and the possibility of their converging on "plane of consistency" assuring their selection. Here, as elsewhere, the units of measure are what is essential: quantify writing. There is no difference between what a book talks about and how it is made. Therefore a book has no object. As an assemblage, a book has only itself, in connection with other assemblages and in relation to other bodies without organs. We will never ask what a book means, as signified or signifier; we will not look for anything to understand in it. We will ask what it functions with, in connection with what other things it does or does not transmit intensities, in which other multiplicities its own are inserted and metamorphosed, and with what bodies without organs it makes its own converge. A book exists only through the outside and on the outside. A book itself is a little machine; what is the relation (also measurable) of this literary machine to a war machine, love machine, revolutionary machine, etc.-and an abstract machine that sweeps them along? We have been criticized for overquoting literary authors.

But when one writes, the only question is which other machine the literary machine can be plugged into, must be plugged into in order to work. Kleist and a mad war machine, Kafka and a most extraordinary bureaucratic machine ... (What if one became animal or plant through literature, which certainly does not mean literarily? Is it not first through the voice that one becomes animal?) Literature is an assemblage. It has nothing to do with ideology. There is no ideology and never has been.

-> I agree to this graph on time, space and body.

From Post-Modern to Contemporary 

"The dematerialized images of film are the raw contents of sensation, without the forms, horizons, and contexts that usually orient them. And this is how film crosses the threshold of a new kind of perception, one that is below or above the human. This new perception is multiple and anarchic, nonintentional and asubjective; it is no longer subordinated to the requirements of representation and idealization, recognition and designation.60 What I argue through Nancy and Denis is that this model of perception need not be situated at a pre-personal level. In other words, we do not necessarily need to move beyond the human to shift our understanding of perception to that which is always mediated, is often non-intentional, asubjective and multiple. In this vein, in critiquing the subject that classical film theory constructs as its viewer, Shaviro assumes that subject and then dismisses it as ‘human’, and in need of displacement. Therefore, in his account, we need to move above or below the human level to cross to a new form of perception. In this way he leaves the subject of classical theory intact and moves elsewhere for an account of film perception. Rather than completely shifting away from the human, however, I argue that the human is not limited to the ‘subject’ that film addresses, nor does classical film exhaust the reality of human perception or definitively account for what is ‘natural’. The concept of the human is contingent, mutable and flexible. It can stretch to encompass changing notions of modes of perception, new ways of understanding the body, and challenges to false dichotomies such as natural/technical or human/animal. Neither above nor below the human, we need to think the human itself as not subordinated to the requirements of representation. Furthermore, we do not have to escape the category of the human to get a perception that is always already becoming-other, technological, often non-intentional, and without guiding consciousness.61

   Like Deleuzian models, I argue for a way of thinking about film using concepts that focus not on cognition and referential meaning, but instead on forces and material encounters. In contrast to a Deleuzian approach, however, I think through these encounters in terms of subjects. But in my reading the subject is constituted inter-relationally or in alterity. This understanding works to dismantle oppressive formulations of the subject that have been historically dominant in Western thought. The subject is not thought of as autonomous, discrete or as having mastery over her environment. She is not easily able to separate self and other or to categorise others on the bases of various adjectives. This de-subjectified subject makes it difficult to operate in ways that are dominating or that reduce others to a known quantity. In contrast to Deleuzian antihumanism, I formulate here an ethics that uses humans, but humans refigured or thought otherwise. Operating from the standpoint of ethics and wanting to hold on to a notion of responsibility, the particular perspective I am moving towards here maintains a notion of a subject, however interrupted.

   Paradoxically, models of ethics that try to completely move away from the subject often in fact become solipsistic – and the web of relations in which we are enmeshed and act recede from view. Here I refer specifically to Deleuzian formulations and their roots in Spinoza and Nietzsche. From Spinoza the emphasis on positive affects as a basis for forming adequate thoughts from which to act in the world, while inspiring, requires a great deal of elaboration to convincingly argue that it can address the ways in which our responsibilities and relatedness may often diminish our powers to act or undo us in necessarily painful ways. The Nietzschean emphasis on an active forgetting of the past and a willing singular affirmation in the present, while it absolves us of our guilty consciences in ways that can be affectively liberating, may let too many off the hook in terms of our ethical accountability and responsibility. I worry that it may absolve precisely those who have played the greatest role in past atrocities that have diminished and continue to diminish the power of particular peoples. A considerable amount of work must be done to make a convincing argument that Deleuze and Guattari’s ethics can encompass a notion of responsibility, although their focus on desiring productivity and lines of flight provides needed resources for thinking about resistance to the dogmas of late capitalism. Tamsin Lorraine attempts such a reworking through her argument that Deleuzian assemblages can be read as larger groups or communities, extending their framework beyond the individual-as-assemblage, to which it falls prey conceptually.62 Lorraine further reasons that by limiting others’ lines of flight, I limit my own, therefore my power to act is dependent on the ability of all to act. While these modifications help to broaden a Deleuzian ethics and give shape to a related world of beings, for the purposes of my project here, Nancy and Levinas offer a framework that I find more productive. Whatever the category of the human may mean, there is a way in which the life form that has been given that title is uniquely responsible to and for the world. By world, I mean to other beings, including animals, to their histories and to the environment. It is the case that ‘humans’ seems to be particularly adept at damaging the environment, animals and each other. This is the category of life, however historically contingent, that I mean to address as potential spectators. Although a traditional notion of subjectivity is undone by both Levinas and Nancy, there is still a subject, just one that is dependent on, vulnerable to and constituted with others. There is also room for animals and plants and even rocks (particularly in Nancy). For these reasons, I find Levinas and Nancy more compelling than Deleuzian approaches for thinking through the ethics of film.

   Finally, in contrast to Deleuze-and-Guattarian models, which tend to move away from the language of difference and towards that of becoming, my account is still invested in formulating how to conceive of difference. The model developed in Chapter 3, drawing on Levinas, emphasises difference based on the unknowability of the other as opposed to a recognition or identity-based model.63 The feminist perspective offered here attempts to forge a complex middle ground between approaches that are entrenched in sexual difference as the key to understanding spectatorship and Deleuzian approaches which may miss sexed identity altogether in their emphasis on flows and molecular becomings. As Elena del Río writes in her book on Deleuze and the Cinemas of Performance, ‘A Deleuzian model of the body as an impersonal flow of forces may arguably fall short of meeting the political needs of a feminist position that still finds it necessary to differentiate between the sexes, and to maintain a distinct notion of female subjectivity as individuated molar identity.’64Rather than completely doing away with identity, I acknowledge the tension between real and materially productive categories and their inadequacy with respect to accounting for the world and our capabilities. Chapter 2, for example, discusses Nénette and Boni’s depiction of teen pregnancy and the ways in which Denis challenges stereotypical images of motherhood to move us towards something else entirely; that is, a focus on an exposure to the other’s singularity, a sensory and dynamic encounter that cannot be fully understood or finalised. This is in contrast to a notion of representation that enables clear meaning and completion. Rather than turning to Deleuzian forces and syntheses at the pre-individual level, the focus is on how we encounter the other through cinema. As Adrián Pérez Malgosa writes in his book on affect and intercultural cinema, he wants to ‘theorize film and cinematic reception as areas of cultural tension where the subject both emerges and is constantly questioned’.65 In a sense, the emergence and interrogation of the subject is a process that my project echoes – cinema participates in producing particular forms of subjectivity, and is also a site where it is continually brought into question and reconfigured. The ongoing solidification of the subject and its paradoxically tandem dissolution applies both to the spectator and to the characters within Denis’s filmic worlds. The tension between identities and their limitations with respect to accounting for our interrelated and complex experiences are key to the model put forth here." (Towards a Feminist Cinematic Ethics: Claire Denis, Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Luc Nancy, Kristin Lené Hole, 2016, pp. 20–22)


-> in general meaning of 'a book' is contemporary art.

My idea for an artistic project "Point in Time" was Assemblage (for stance of a couple of years, which is not for each minute.) timely and its characteristic of time and space was globally.

My PhD Kunst-Forschung is focused  on and for contemporary arts.

In my series projects, "B.O.D.Y." is a book and Assemblage.

The project "still/silent" is also a book – its Assemblage, that is by OIO. I conceived the project "still/silent" that is a contemporary art project. OIO is "Therefore a book has no object. As an assemblage, a book has only itself, in connection with other assemblages and in relation to other bodies without organs." – our improvisational composition, thus 'a book' in OIO is a piece. 

-> OIO was started,

Antonis Anissegos, Erika Matsunami, and Kyota Takahashi.

A Project "trans +O" by OIO is an Assemblage.


"still/silent" is my Assemblage-Werk, therefore OIO is geistig Assemblage, that is my concept for this project "still/silent".


How it works:

Antonis Anissegoss (GR/DE), Chris Dahlgren (USA/DE), Kyota Takahashi (JP), Erika Matsunami (JP/DE), Niklas Schminke (DE) have different context of phenomenology.

Only Kyota Takahashi has not the context of musical composition, however he has the context of visual composition, and thereby Erika Matsunami is in-between of the context of musical and visual compostion ("still/silent" – OIO solo).


During this performance "still/silent" - OIO solo in a room, the data of wars on earth after 6 and 9. August 1945 until 2011 was projected on the wall. This performace was started from the data in 1945, and the ending of this Data was the ending of this performance.

As artistic researcher in the Doctor context therefore about what I have to contemplate. 

difference of "X" between Bence Nanay's theory and 

Noël Carroll's theory:

- two different kontexts of theories,

such as attention in aesthetic value and in the contemporary representational theory.

In the contemporary art, artistic concept itself is strategic and it encompasses in fine arts study.

However, their theories are in a context of my artistic research, due to the research subjects of "semi-formalism", and "from threefoldness to multi-foldness". "X" in Nanay's theory is in threefoldness.


-> auf der Ebene der Philosophie der Wahrnemung/on the level of Philosophy of Perception on Reflextion:

Research Subject -> Semi-Formalism

Ich denke, dass ich ehrlich mich mit dem Projekt "still/silent" im Kontext auseinandergesetzt habe.

Materiality and Immateriality

In dieser geistige Assemblage OIO im Projekt "still/silent", Jeder hat als Komponist das "Autor-Recht", dass ich alle Stücke bei GEMA, Deutschland angemeldet habe, die Stücke als kollektive Komposition gesetzlich anerkannt sind.

Dafür habe ich den Katalog "still/silent" konzipiert, und dabei habe ich das Konzept des Katalogs "still/silent" geschrieben, um zu beantragen. 

Research subject -> Auditory perception

We (OIO)'ve never sheared own work, its autonomy and independent. We (OIO) are being only in performance, in which of the Installation. OIO is 'Site-Specific'.

->nicht direkt zu Noël Carroll's theory, sondern in Bezug auf Phänomenologie sowie bei Husserl denke ich nach.

-> The Philosophy of Information

Page 3: Exploring parctically „A series of series"